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This is a research project on the potential complementarity between the Nagoya 
Protocol and the international human rights law with respect to Indigenous peoples 
and local communities (IPLCs). The Nagoya Protocol is a multilateral treaty that 
governs issues of access to genetic resources (GR) and associated traditional 
knowledge (TK) and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from their 
utilisation under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). State Parties of the 
Nagoya Protocol are obliged to facilitate access and benefit-sharing (ABS), especially 
when Indigenous and local communities (ILCs) are involved and their GR and TK are 
at stake. Adopted in 2010 and entering into force in 2014, the Nagoya Protocol now 
has 123 Parties and the CBD has almost universal recognition from States. The 
implementation process of the Nagoya Protocol is accelerating and the impact of its 
ABS rules is profound and increasing, not only in shaping the behaviours and 
obligations of States and multinational corporations vis-à-vis ILCs, but also in 
understanding the dynamics and interrelations between international environmental 
law and other branches of international law.  
Recent developments in international human rights law show a trend of 
integrating ABS norms into the protection of the rights of IPLCs. The ABS 
requirements of fair and equitable benefit-sharing and prior informed consent (PIC) 
are increasingly elaborated as part and parcel of IPLCs’ human rights concerning their 
lands, natural resources, culture and TK at the UN level and by regional human rights 
courts and tribunals. Against this background, it is worth asking what the human rights 
implications are for interpreting and implementing the Nagoya Protocol, and in turn, 
how the Nagoya Protocol may contribute to the protection of IPLCs’ human rights. 
For instance, what are the implications of the right of Indigenous peoples to self-




human rights norm “free, prior and informed consent” with the ABS norm PIC? Do 
human rights to develop and property also include an aspect of fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing? Does the recognition of ILCs’ customary law in the Nagoya Protocol 
strengthen their human right to culture? And fundamentally, how and to what extent, 
are State Parties of the Nagoya Protocol obliged to interpret and implement the ABS 
rules in accordance with international human rights law? 
The principles of systemic integration and mutual supportiveness provide the 
theoretical framework of this thesis. As emerging principles of international law, they 
require different branches of international law to be interpreted and implemented in a 
systemic and mutually supportive manner. The value of these principles manifests in 
situations where there is conflict between norms derived from different fields of 
international law. Furthermore, the principle of mutual supportiveness speaks beyond 
interpretative matters—as demonstrated in the thesis, this principle could also shed 
light on the law-making processes when efforts at reconciling competing rules have 
been exhausted, as well as implementation challenges at both international and 
domestic levels. Essentially, this theoretical approach is underpinned by the 
perspective that international law is a dynamic, complex and interconnected system in 
which norms operate and evolve interdependently. Particularly, ABS and human rights 
should not and cannot be isolated from one another for achieving their respective 
objectives. 
Based on a range of international treaties and “soft” instruments, the practices 
of the UN, international treaty bodies, courts and tribunals, and relevant scholarly 
debates, this research provides a pragmatic account of the implications of the 
principles of systemic integration and mutual supportiveness in understanding the 
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Hoodia, a flowering plant native to Southern Africa, has been used by the San people 
as a hunger suppressant for centuries when hunting or going on long trips in the 
Kalahari Desert. This traditional practice attracted attention from a South African 
research institution in the 1960s, who successfully isolated the active molecule from 
the plant in 1996 and gained a patent on it. The work resulted in a collaboration 
between the institution and two pharmaceutical companies with a commercialisation 
plan to promote Hoodia as an appetite-suppressant and anti-obesity drug. The market, 
especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, responded with a roaring trade 
on Hoodia products. The San people, on the other hand, has been fighting for a fair 
share of the commercial benefits and recognition of the ownership over Hoodia ever 
since. 1  Similarly, a Dutch company, based on a benefit-sharing agreement with 
Ethiopia in 2005 for using Teff, an ancient Ethiopian grain, obtained two patents for 
processing Teff in 2007. Instead of receiving the promised benefits, Ethiopia was left 
empty-handed as the company declared bankruptcy in 2009, even though Teff was 
quickly gaining popularity as a superfood in the European market. Ethiopia also lost 
its rights to utilise its own Teff genetic resources as the patents remained valid in many 
European countries.2  
                                               
1 Roger Chennells and Rachel P. Wynberg, ‘Green Diamonds of the South: An Overview of the San-Hoodia Case’ 
in Roger Chennells, Doris Schroeder and Rachel P. Wynberg (eds), Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Benefit 
Sharing: Lessons from the San-Hoodia case (Springer 2009) 89 and Daniel F. Robinson, Confronting Biopiracy: 
Challenges, Cases and International Debates (Earthscan 2010) 61. 
2 These two patents remained valid until 2019, see discussion in the next paragraph and also Regine Andersen and 
Tone Winge, The Access and Benefit-Sharing Agreement on Teff Genetic Resources: Facts and Lessons (Fridtjof 
Nansen Institute, 2012) 7 <http://www.abs-
initiative.info/fileadmin/media/Knowledge_Center/Pulications/FNI/FNI-R0612.pdf> accessed 09/07/2018. 
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Scholars including Shiva, Wynberg, Ikechi and Drahos have portrayed the 
landscape of these on-going appropriations by powerful companies in developed 
countries of the world's genetic resources and traditional knowledge from various 
perspectives.3 Cases concern many biological resources that are well known: from 
potatoes to Basmati rice, from Enola beans to Soy beans, from quinine to Maca to 
Rooibos tea and the list could go on and on. Not only that these cases have been 
internationally criticised as “biopiracy” on an ethnic basis, but also are increasingly 
outlawed by the recent legal developments at both international and national levels.4 
For instance, South Africa adopted the Biodiversity Act in 2004 and its implementing 
regulation on bioprospecting, access and benefit sharing in 2008, which recognise and 
protect the rights of the providers of Indigenous biological resources and associated 
traditional knowledge and require the users to obtain permits and share benefits.5 
Moreover, in February 2019, a court in the Netherlands has ruled that the Dutch patents 
for processing Teff are null and void, against the background that the European Union 
has adopted a regulation on access and benefit-sharing in 2014.6  
Indeed, marked by the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization7 (Nagoya Protocol) in 2010 and its entering into force in 2014, many 
                                               
3 Vandana Shiva, Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge (South End Press 1999) 5, Roger Chennells, 
Doris Schroeder and Rachel P. Wynberg (eds), Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Benefit Sharing: Lessons from 
the San-Hoodia Case (Springer 2009) 3, Mgbeoji Ikechi, Global Biopiracy: Patents, Plants, and Indigenous 
Knowledge (UBC Press 2005) 9 and Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property, Indigenous People and their Knowledge 
(Cambridge University Press 2014) 138. 
4 Biopiracy means “the practice of commercially exploiting naturally occurring biochemical or genetic material, 
especially by obtaining patents that restrict its future use, while failing to pay fair compensation to the community 
from which it originates” see Oxford English Dictionary, "biopiracy, n." (Oxford University Press). 
5 Biodiversity Act [2004] (SA) and Regulations on Bio-Prospecting, Access and Benefit-Sharing [2008] (SA). 
6 Information available at Rechtbank Den Haag, ‘Uitspraken’ (Rechtbank Den Haag, 07/12/2018) 
<https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2018:13960> accessed 08/05/2019. 
7 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization [adopted 29 October 2010, entered into force 12 October 2014] CBD Decision 10/1. 
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countries have started the process of taking legislative and policy measures to regulate 
access to and benefit-sharing (ABS) of genetic resources (GR) and associated 
traditional knowledge (TK). This international ABS framework envisaged by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)8 and its Nagoya Protocol is founded on the 
recognition of States’ sovereign rights over their natural resources, but also explicitly 
requires respect for the participatory rights of Indigenous and local communities (ILCs) 
and their customary laws in ABS transactions. As the Nagoya Protocol focuses on GR 
and TK, it inevitably interlinks and interacts with norms and rules regulating lands and 
natural resources, intellectual property, as well as issues of Indigenous and traditional 
ownership over such resources and knowledge, and more broadly their cultural identity 
and ways of life. The intricacies of these interrelations between the Nagoya Protocol 
and other branches of international law generate contested concepts, diverse contexts 
and complex practices for interpreting and implementing the Nagoya Protocol at both 
inter-State and intra-State levels.9  
Focusing on Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs)10 and their 
rights pertaining to GR and TK, this thesis examines the Nagoya Protocol and its 
implication from a human rights perspective. This is because scholarly attention on the 
particular interface between ABS law and human rights law is scarce, especially 
compared to the academic work attributed to the legal interaction between ABS law 
and IPRs law.11  Nevertheless, the connection between ABS and human rights is 
                                               
8 Convention on Biological Diversity [adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993] 1760 UNTS 79. 
9 See essays in Evanson C. Kamau and Gerd Winter (eds), Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and the Law: 
Solutions for Access and Benefit Sharing vol 19 (Routledge 2009) 3 and Sebastian Oberthür and G. Kristin Rosendal 
(eds), Global Governance of Genetic Resources: Access and Benefit Sharing after the Nagoya Protocol (Routledge 
2014) 1. 
10 The following section 1.2 will clarify the use of the terminology “IPLCs” and “ILCs” in. In general, this thesis treats 
these two terms interchangeably.  
11  See, for instance, Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge 
(Earthscan 2004) 3, Drahos (n 3) 108 and Johanna Gibson, Community Resources: Intellectual Property, 
International Trade, and Protection of Traditional Knowledge (Routledge 2016) 185. 
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important and increasingly recognised, in not only scholarly debates,12 but also the UN 
human rights machinery and international and regional human rights case law. 13 
Indeed, one fundamental premise of this research is that the Nagoya Protocol and 
human rights law should not be isolated from one another for protecting IPLCs and 
their rights over GR and TK. The overarching objectives of safeguarding human 
dignity14 and pursuing equity and fairness requires a holistic and systemic approach to 
integrate human rights standards into the process of interpreting and implementing the 
Nagoya Protocol. In this mind-set, this research intends to provide a pragmatic account 
of the human rights implications for the Nagoya Protocol. It aims to investigate to what 
extent a mutually supportive interpretation, that is, to understand the provisions of the 
Nagoya Protocol in light of relevant international human rights law, may shed light on 
the persisting normative uncertainties and practical challenges in applying the ABS 
rules, especially in Indigenous and local contexts.15 This chapter introduces the context, 
key international instruments and doctrinal methodology of the thesis and offers an 
overview of the research questions and the structure in which they are investigated. 
                                               
12 See Elisa Morgera, ‘The Need for an International Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing’ (2016) 27 
(2) European Journal Of International Law, 355 and Jérémie Gilbert, Natural Resources and Human Rights: An 
Appraisal (First edn, Oxford University Press 2018) 80. 
13 An overview of the human rights context, including international instruments, case law and the UN human rights 
treaties bodies, will be provided in the following section 2.1.2. Detailed discussion of these cases and jurisprudential 
interpretation is provided in later chapters, for instance, in section 3 of chapter two and section 2 of chapter three.  
14 For a thorough discussion about the interrelation between human dignity and international law see Stephen Riley, 
Human Dignity and Law: Legal and Philosophical Investigations (Routledge 2018) 101.  
15 See the discussion in sections 1 and 2 of chapter two, section 1 of chapter three and sections 1 and 2 of chapter four. 
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1. Nagoya Protocol and the international ABS framework  
1.1 History, legal status and the rationale of the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol  
Opened for signature at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 and entered into force in 
December 1993, the CBD is dedicated to the conservation of biodiversity, sustainable 
use of the components of biodiversity and fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising out of the utilisation of GR.16 Fundamentally, the CBD recognises States’ 
sovereign rights over their natural resources, which determines that access to such 
resources is subject to States’ domestic laws and regulations.17 To implement the third 
objective of “fair and equitable benefit-sharing”, the CBD requires Parties to facilitate 
access to GR and take measures to ensure benefit-sharing based on prior informed 
consent (PIC) and mutually agreed terms (MAT).18  Significantly, it also requires 
Parties to “respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of 
Indigenous and local communities” and encourages “equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices”.19  The 
Nagoya Protocol was adopted in 2010 under the CBD and entered into force in 2014. 
It aims to substantiate the ABS provisions of the CBD by elaborating obligations with 
respect to access, utilisation and fair and equitable benefit-sharing of GR and 
associated TK, including those held by ILCs. In a nutshell, Parties of the Nagoya 
Protocol are obliged to establish appropriate legislative, administrative or policy 
measures to ensure that PIC is obtained for access and that MAT are negotiated for 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing with the provider countries of the GR, and/or the 
ILCs who hold GR and associated TK. Meanwhile, the provider countries are entitled 
to regulate access and receive agreed benefits generated from the utilisation of their 
                                               
16 CBD, art 1. 
17 ibid art 15(1). 
18 ibid art 15. 
19 ibid art 8(j). 
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GR and associated TK. To date, the CBD has nearly universal recognition in the world 
with 196 Parties.20 The Nagoya Protocol has 120 Parties and 3 countries that have 
ratified the Protocol but are not yet Parties.21 Thus, an international ABS framework 
regulating GR and TK associated with such resources is in place. It is worth noting 
that ABS agreements have been seen in a number of different international legal 
regimes, including those regulating GR for food and agriculture,22 marine GR23 and 
TK-related IPRs. 24  As a matter of scope, the “international ABS framework” as 
referred to in this thesis does not include ABS provisions of those other regimes. It 
considers specifically a treaty-based framework envisaged by the CBD and the Nagoya 
Protocol. In reality, both Parties and non-Party States are implementing the ABS 
principles and rules of the Nagoya Protocol at the national level to varying degrees 
according to different domestic circumstances.25 This process relies on and facilitates 
                                               
20 Only two member States of the United Nations are not Parties to the CBD: United States of America and the Holy 
See, information available at CBD, ‘List of Parties’ (CBD, 1992) <https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml> 
accessed 03/03/2019. 
21  Information available at CBD, ‘ Access and Benefit - Sharing Clearing - House’  (CBD, 2014) < 
https://absch.cbd.int/> accessed 17/12/2019. 
22 The binding instrument is the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture [adopted 3 
November 2001, entered into force 29 June 2004] 2400 UNTS 303. For scholarly discussion see Claudio Chiarolla, 
Sélim Louafi and Marie Schloen, ‘An Analysis of the Relationship between the Nagoya Protocol and Instruments 
related to Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture and Farmers’ Rights’ in Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and 
Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing in Perspective: Implications for 
International Law and Implementation Challenges (Brill Nijhoff 2012) 83. 
23 Under the UN, the discussion of a binding instrument regulating marine GR is ongoing, see UNGA Res 72/249, 
'International Legally Binding Instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction' (19 
January 2018) UN Doc A/RES/72/249. For scholarly discussion see Petra Drankier and others, ‘Marine Genetic 
Resources in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: Access and Benefit-Sharing’ (2012) 27 (2) The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 375. 
24 The binding instrument is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [adopted 15 
April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995] WTO. For scholarly discussion see Daniel J. Gervais, ‘Traditional 
Knowledge & Intellectual Property: A TRIPS-Compatible Approach’ (2005) Michigan State Law Review, 138. 
25 For example, Brazil is not yet a Party to the Nagoya Protocol but it has a comprehensive national legal framework 
on ABS, see CBD, ‘Country Profiles: Brazil’ (CBD, 2014) <https://absch.cbd.int/countries/BR> accessed 
03/03/2019. 
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transnational partnership among States’ authorities, public institutions, private sectors 
and ILCs in accessing and utilising GR and TK.26 
The need for such an ABS framework emerges from the rapid advancements 
in the field of bioscience and technology. Research and development (R&D) of genetic 
components of biological resources has empowered broad application of these 
resources in various industrial sectors such as pharmaceutics, botanical medicines, 
food and cosmetics.27 The growing realisation and prospects of the economic value of 
GR thus encourage institutions and companies from developed countries to search for 
novel compounds derived from plant and animal species, often from developing 
countries with rich biodiversity.28 In the past few decades, large-scale bioprospecting 
and commercial exploitation of GR without fair compensation to its original holders 
has triggered increasing legal and political concerns worldwide. Successful 
commercialisation and patents of GR and associated TK, such as San Hoodia, yellow 
Enola beans and Basmati rice, are criticised as “biopiracy”. They directly prompted 
the international regulatory discussion of a fair and equitable solution for accessing 
and utilising GR and associated TK.29 Furthermore, the principle of equity demands 
fair distribution of benefits among those who have created, managed and developed 
the concerned GR and associated TK.30 Thus, as developing countries call for the 
                                               
26 Tomme R. Young, ‘An International Cooperation Perspective on the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol’ in 
Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing 
in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Brill Nijhoff 2013) 457 and 
Elisa Morgera, Elsa Tsioumani and Matthias Buck, Unraveling the Nagoya Protocol: A Commentary on the 
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Brill 2014) 2. 
27 Kerry Ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity: Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-
sharing (Earthscan 2002) 1. 
28  Sarah A. Laird and Rachel P. Wynberg, ‘CBD Factsheet’ (CBD, 2012) 1 
<https://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/factsheets/policy/ABSFactSheets-Overview-web.pdf> accessed 
14/03/2019. 
29 Robinson (n 1) 3 and Ikechi (n 3) 119. 




recognition of their sovereign control over living and inanimate natural resources, an 
ABS mechanism is proposed under the CBD framework.31 It is designated to provide 
biodiversity-rich countries and communities with economic incentives and financial 
support in order to achieve global goals of biodiversity conservation and sustainable 
use of its components.32 Not without controversies and compromises among key State 
actors, the Nagoya Protocol was finally adopted after lengthy negotiation in Japan in 
October 2010.33 
1.2 Linkages between the Nagoya Protocol and human rights 
The concept of ABS is not only articulated under the CBD framework, but also 
increasingly incorporated in a number of other international legal frameworks, 
including sustainable development, intellectual property and most importantly, human 
rights.34 This reflects the multi-faceted nature of ABS issues. In particular, an ABS 
issue is often a human rights issue when ILCs are concerned. For instance, access to 
GR and associated TK requires identifying legitimate right-holders of certain natural 
resources and TK (right to natural resources); the notorious biopiracy cases are not 
only economically unfair to ILCs, but may also have adverse impacts on ILCs’ 
traditional way of life and economic practices (right to development); and to negotiate 
a fair and equitable benefit-sharing agreements requires consultation with ILCs and 
respect for their customary laws and community protocols (right to culture). 
Furthermore, the Nagoya Protocol and the human rights law share a similar set of legal 
                                               
31 Morten W. Tvedt and Tomme R. Young, Beyond Access: Exploring Implementation of the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing Commitment in the CBD (IUCN 2007) 1. 
32 See Greiber and others (n 30) 83 and Kate and Laird (n 27) 75. 
33 Linda Wallbott, Franziska Wolff and Justyna Pozarowska, ‘The Negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol: Issues, 
Coalitions and Process’ in Sebastian Oberthür and G. Kristin Rosendal (eds), Global Governance of Genetic 
Resources: Access and Benefit sharing after the Nagoya Protocol (Routledge 2014) 33. 
34 Charles Lawson, Regulating Genetic Resources: Access and Benefit Sharing in International Law (Edward Elgar 
2012) 240. 
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tools to deal with these issues. For instance, PIC as established by the Nagoya Protocol 
is a way to ensure ILCs’ control over their GR or TK, which explicitly overlaps with 
the procedural requirement of free, prior, informed consent (FPIC) in fulfilling ILCs’ 
participatory human rights pertaining to lands, natural resources and development.35 
Another example is the requirement of the Nagoya Protocol to respect ILCs’ 
customary laws and community protocols in ABS transactions, which echoes the 
obligations imposed by the ILCs’ human right to culture and self-determination. These 
examples indicate that the Nagoya Protocol and international human rights law share 
certain normative ground when it concerns the issue of protecting the rights of ILCs 
especially regarding their natural resources and TK.36 As a logical consequence, the 
realisation of the rights of ILCs in one context could be complementary and mutually 
supportive to the realisation of the rights established in the other. This shared 
normative ground and the hypothesis of a mutually supportive interpretation and 
implementation are unpacked and investigated in the following chapters in detail.  
States play an imperative role in implementing international norms and 
fulfilling international obligations with respect to ILCs. The political willingness, 
economic and legal capacities of States to implement the international standards and 
cooperate with other States may vary dramatically hence the outcome of the 
transposition of internationally agreed norms into domestic and local contexts. Based 
on multilateral treaties and the recognition of States’ sovereign rights, both the Nagoya 
Protocol and international human rights law need to deal with the margin of State 
discretion as they implement their international obligations. 37  It is no longer 
                                               
35 Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The International Human Rights Law Implications of the Nagoya Protocol’ in Elisa Morgera, 
Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective: 
Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Brill Nijhoff 2013) 53. 
36 ibid and Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 26) 117.  
37 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Nature of Obligations’ in Daniel Moeckli and others (eds), International Human Rights Law 
(Third edn, Oxford University Press 2018) 97. 
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controversial that contemporary sovereignty is by no means absolute, but redefined by 
global challenges, such as biodiversity conservation and sustainable development, and 
restrained by human rights obligations. This consensus requires States to cooperate for 
the good of the international community and to balance their sovereign rights and 
duties.38 For instance, the CBD proclaims that the conservation of biodiversity is a 
“common concern of humankind”.39 According to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), some human rights obligations are established as binding erga omnes— owned 
“towards the international community as a whole” and “by their nature, are the concern 
of all States”. 40  Furthermore, although natural resources are subject to States’ 
sovereign rights, Parties to the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol are frequently called 
upon to, inter alia, facilitate the ILCs in their capacity-developing, enhance ILCs’ 
participation in the decision-making process and develop “culturally appropriate 
processes” to benefit-sharing.41 In the human rights context, States bear obligations to 
not only refrain from interfering, so that the rights of individuals and groups are 
respected, but also to safeguard and facilitate, so that their rights are protected and 
fulfilled.42 States also play an increasing role in regulating relations and behaviours in 
private arenas in order to make sure that the non-State actors are in compliance with 
the human rights standards too.43 States’ obligation, therefore, could be a helpful entry 
                                               
38 Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge University Press 
1997) 368 and Patricia W. Birnie, Alan E. Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment 
(Third edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 192. 
39 CBD, pmbl. 
40 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) [5 February 
1970] (ICJ) Rep 6 para 33. For a detailed discussion on the collective nature of the obligations under the Nagoya 
Protocol and the human rights law, see section 3.2.1 of chapter four. 
41 CBD Working Group on Article 8(j), 'Participatory Mechanisms for Indigenous and Local Communities' (27 
November 2001) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG8J/2/4 para 73 and CBD COP Decision XIII/18, 'Article 8(j) and 
related Provisions' (17 December 2016) UN Doc CBD/COP/DEC/XIII/18 para 17. 
42 Mégret (n 37) 97. 
43 Jacob Katz Cogan, ‘The Regulatory Turn in International Law’ (2011) 52 (2) Harvard international law journal, 
324. 
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point to examine the human rights implication in the ABS context of the Nagoya 
Protocol. A key premise is that by taking into account States’ human rights obligations 
while implementing ABS rules, States could fulfil their obligations imposed by both 
international laws in a synergetic manner vis-à-vis ILCs. Furthermore, since the 
international ABS framework and human rights law are based on multilateral treaties, 
it is also feasible to compare and contrast their compliance mechanisms and the ways 
State Parties are held accountable in cases of violations, which is a point scrutinised in 
chapter four.  
These connections provide the legal foundation for considering the Nagoya 
Protocol in light of international human rights law. Essentially, the dynamics of ABS 
and human rights issues require an approach to interpretation and implementation that 
could adequately reflect and address their legal complexity and interrelations. Since 
the adoption of the CBD, a “rights-based approach” to achieve the objectives of the 
CBD has been increasingly discussed by legal scholars.44 Morgera and Tsioumani 
explicitly link human rights to intra-State benefit-sharing with ILCs in an ABS context 
in 2010. 45  The need for a mutually supportive interpretation between the ABS 
framework and the international human rights law has since been discussed, especially 
with respect to Indigenous peoples and a wide range of their human rights including 
the right of self-determination, development, culture, science and so on.46 Human 
                                               
44 See Rosemary J. Coombe, ‘Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in International 
Law posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity’ (1998) 6 (1) Indiana 
journal of global legal studies and Jessica Campese and others (eds), Rights-based Approaches: Exploring Issues 
and Opportunities for Conservation (CIFOR and IUCN 2009) 47. 
45 Elisa Morgera and Elsa Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit Sharing: Linking Biodiversity and Community 
Livelihoods’ (2010) 19 (2) Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, 167. 
46 See various comments in Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 26) 35, Savaresi (n 35) 58,Elisa Morgera, ‘Fair and 
Equitable Benefit-Sharing at the Cross-Roads of the Human Right to Science and International Biodiversity Law’ 
(2015) 4 (4) Laws, 803 and Elisa Morgera, ‘Under the Radar: Fair and Equitable Benefit-sharing and the Human 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities related to Natural Resources’ (2019) (Online) International 
Journal of Human Rights, 2. 
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rights issues in the ABS context also have attracted attention at the UN level. For 
instance, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (PFII)—the high-level advisory 
body to the UN Economic and Social Council—has commissioned a study on the 
Nagoya Protocol and its influences to the human rights of Indigenous peoples.47 
Within the CBD, the Conference of Parties (COP) decides in 2018 that safeguards in 
biodiversity financing mechanisms should take into account relevant international 
agreements, including, inter alia, international human rights treaties and the 
UNDRIP.48 In 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment 
Mr. John H. Knox proposes 16 principles relating to human rights and the environment, 
which explicitly includes benefit-sharing.49 
This bird’s-eye view of the linkages between the Nagoya Protocol and the 
international human rights law will be unpacked in greater detail and depth in the 
subsequent chapters. The value of integrating international human rights law is to 
structure a doctrinal framework for systemically understanding, implementing and 
questioning the normative and practical dimensions of the ABS principles and 
procedures. On the other hand, exploring the ABS implications in a human rights 
context may also inform the understanding and implementation of specific human 
rights pertaining to ILCs and their rights over GR and TK. The aspiration is that such 
a complementary approach could contribute to ensuring that the interpretation and 
implementation of the Nagoya Protocol fully respect international human rights 
standards and vise versa. In this mind-set, the next sections firstly clarify the key 
notions of ILCs and “Indigenous peoples and local communities” (IPLCs) and their 
                                               
47  Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 'Nagoya Protocol: Substantive and Procedural Injustices relating to 
Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights' (16 May 2011) 1. 
48 CBD COP Decision 14/15, 'Safeguards in Biodiversity Financing Mechanisms' (30 November 2018) UN Doc 
CBD/COP/DEC/14/15 3. 
49 Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to 
the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment' (24 January 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/37/59 
18. 
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respective controversies. It then establishes the theoretical basis for a mutually 
supportive interpretation of the Nagoya Protocol and relevant international human 
rights law, namely, the principle of systemic integration and mutual supportiveness. 
Finally, I ask the research questions and explain the structure of the thesis. 
2. Indigenous peoples and local communities 
2.1 Setting the stage: who are they? 
As discussed, the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol have explicitly recognised the role 
and rights of ILCs as the “custodians of biodiversity” in the context of biodiversity 
conservation, sustainable use of biological resources and fair and equitable benefit-
sharing.50 Over time, the CBD Parties have also elaborated that the notion of “ILCs” 
contains essentially two groups: “Indigenous peoples” and “local communities 
embodying traditional lifestyles”, although these terms are subject to intense political 
and legal controversies and conceptual ambiguities.51 Before moving on to discuss the 
legal implications attached to these terms by international law, it is helpful to establish 
a general understanding of who these peoples and/or communities are. 
According to a range of UN documents, the approximate Indigenous 
population worldwide nowadays is somewhere between 300 million to 400 million, 
representing over 5000 ethnic groups and constituting 6% of the world’s population.52 
                                               
50 Nagoya Protocol, pmbl. See also Manuel Ruiz and Ronnie Vernooy (eds), The Custodians of Biodiversity: Sharing 
Access and Benefits to Genetic Resources (Earthscan 2012). 
51  CBD COP Decision XII/12, 'Article 8(j) and related Provisions' (13 October 2014) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XII/12 section F. 
52 See Manuela Tomei, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: An Ethnic Audit of Selected Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (International Labour Organization 2005) 1, PFII, Who are Indigenous Peoples? (UN PFII, 21 October 
2007) 1 <https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/5session_factsheet1.pdf> accessed 11/03/2018.and 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Indigenous Peoples in Comparative Perspective (United Nations Development Programme, 
2004) 1 <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2004_rodolfo_stavenhagen.pdf> accessed 04/05/2018. 
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Many of these peoples and communities have become familiar with the public: the San 
in the Kalahari Desert, the Inuit of the Arctic regions, the Sami reindeer herders in 
Norway, the Yanomami hunters in the Amazon rainforest, the Tibetan mountain 
people of China, the Maoris of New Zealand, the Cree, the Maya, the Mapuche, the 
Maasai, and so it goes on and on.53 Many of them had suffered in the age of colonialism 
with their lands brutally claimed, people slaughtered and property taken.54 Many still 
face severe risks of marginalisation, assimilation and dispossession of lands, territories, 
and resources today.55 Currently, different countries have taken different approaches 
to recognise and protect the rights of such peoples and communities, in which their 
identities (as “peoples”, “minorities” or “communities”) have been established to 
varying degrees and in different forms.56 Nevertheless, over millennia, these peoples 
and communities have developed significant knowledge about flora and fauna 
taxonomy and usage, gathering, hunting and cultivating skills, and management of a 
variety of ecosystems. Such knowledge forms and shapes their distinctive identities 
and is an integral part of their Indigenous and local cultures. The imperative role of 
Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs) in safeguarding the world’s 
remaining biological and cultural diversity is now widely recognised.57 Their TK and 
                                               
53 Julian Burger, The Gaia Atlas of First peoples: A Future for the Indigenous World (Robertson McCarta 1990) 180. 
54 Kenneth Coates, A Global History of Indigenous Peoples: Struggle and Survival (Palgrave Macmillan 2004) 18, 
Julian Burger, Report from the Frontier: The State of the World's Indigenous Peoples (Zed 1987) 36 and Dee 
Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian history of the American West (Holt Rinehart & Winston 1971) 
1. 
55 In August 2017, for example, more than 100 Maasai huts in Tanzania were reported to have been burned down 
near the Serengeti National Park, with hundreds of Indigenous Maasai people evicted at gunpoint, see BBC, ‘Maasai 
Displaced after Huts Burned in Tanzania’ (BBC, 16 August 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
40950383> accessed 08/11/2018. In general, see Colin Samson, Indigenous Peoples and Colonialism: Global 
Perspectives (Polity Press 2017) 148 and Gillette H. Hall and Harry A. Patrinos, ‘Introduction’ in Gillette H. Hall 
and Harry A. Patrinos (eds), Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Development (Cambridge University Press 2012) 2. 
56 For detailed discussion about different national approaches to IPLCs see section 3.3 of chapter two. 
57  The linkage between cultural and biological diversity is recognised in the 1992 Global Biodiversity Strategy 
promulgated by World Resources Institute (WRI), The World Conservation Union (IUCN) and United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP). For an anthropologic study on the subject, see Luisa Maffi, ‘Linguistic, Cultural 
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traditional practices also inspire innovative solutions for modern agriculture, 58 
pharmacology,59 sustainable management of local ecosystems and resources.60  
2.2 From ILCs to IPLCs: an overview of the development under the CBD 
framework 
ILCs are recognised as holders and providers of GR and TK in the CBD and the 
Nagoya Protocol; therefore, are entitled to issue PIC, negotiate benefit-sharing terms 
and receive agreed benefits. 61 However, the term “ILCs” is not defined under the CBD 
framework, nor it is self-explanatory. It is generally accepted that self-identification is 
the most appropriate way to establish who may be Indigenous and/or local 
communities, although the practical effects of the ABS rules may largely depend on 
national recognition of these identities and implementation of the ABS measures.62 
Since 2010, the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) has 
been calling on CBD Parties to adopt the terminology ‘Indigenous peoples and local 
                                               
and Biological Diversity’ (2005) 34 Annual Review of Anthropology and Lj Gorenflo and others, ‘Co-occurrence 
of Linguistic and Biological Diversity in Biodiversity Hotspots and High Biodiversity Wilderness Areas’ (2012) 
109 (21) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 
58 M. Kat Anderson, Tending the Wild: Native American Knowledge and the Management of California's Natural 
Resources (First edn, University of California Press 2005) 309 and Miguel A. Altieri, ‘Linking Ecologists and 
Traditional Farmers in the Search for Sustainable Agriculture’ (2004) 2 Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 
35. 
59 Ababacar Maiga and others, ‘A Survey of Toxic Plants on the Market in the District of Bamako, Mali: Traditional 
Knowledge Compared with a Literature Search of Modern Pharmacology and Toxicology’ (2005) 96 (1) Journal 
of Ethnopharmacology and Richard Evans Schultes, ‘Reasons for Ethnobotanical Conservation’ in Robert E 
Johannes (ed), Traditional Ecological Knowledge: A Collection of Essays (IUCN 1989) 31. 
60 See Andre Lalonde, ‘African Indigenous Knowledge and its Relevance to Sustainable Development’ in Julian T 
Inglis (ed), Traditional Ecological Knowledge: Concepts and Cases (International Program on Traditional 
Ecological Knowledge and IDRC 1993) 55 and K. P. Laladhas, Preetha Nilayangode and Oommen V. Oommen 
(eds), Biodiversity for Sustainable Development (Springer 2017) 165.  
61 Nagoya Protocol, arts 5(2) 5(5) 6(2) and 7. 
62CBD Expert Group Meeting of Local Community Representatives, 'Guidance for the Discussions concerning Local 
Communities within the Context of the Convention on Biological Diversity' (7 July 2011) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/AHEG/LCR/1/2 para 7. 
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communities’ in order to better reflect the international human rights development 
especially with respect to Indigenous peoples. 63 In 2014, in response to the increasing 
pressure of UNPFII’s demand, the CBD Parties agreed that the term “IPLCs” would 
be used in their future decisions and secondary documents as appropriate. 64 However, 
as will be discussed in greater detail in the section 1.2.2 of chapter three, I observe that 
this acknowledge of terminological change is essentially a sleight of hand played by 
the CBD Parties, in the sense that they have rejected almost all the legal implications 
that might be derived therefrom.65  
The reluctance, if not a complete refusal, of the CBD Parties to fully 
acknowledge and embrace human rights achievements with respect to IPLCs 
concerning GR and TK has its reasons. Fundamentally, “Indigenous peoples” is 
recognised and established by international law as a distinct legal subject.66 Even 
though the debate on the exact nature and scope of the rights of Indigenous peoples is 
ongoing, the general existence of their rights is uncontroversial.67 For instance, their 
rights of self-determination and the rights with respect to their lands, territories and 
natural resources.68 The 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
                                               
63 UNPFII, “Report on the ninth session” (19–30 April 2010) UN Doc E/2010/43– E/C.19/2010/15. 
64  CBD COP Decision XI/14, 'Article 8(j) and related Provisions' (5 December 2012) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XI/14 sec G para 2. 
65 The CBD decision only accepted the term “IPLCs” on an exceptional basis, see discussion in section 1.2.2 of chapter 
three. 
66 Russel Lawrence Barsh, ‘Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International Law?’ (1994) 7 
Harvard Human Rights Journal, 33 and Benedict Kingsbury, ‘"Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: a 
Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy’ (1998) 92 (3) American journal of international law, 414. 
67 See, inter alia, Kingsbury (n 66) 414, Mattias Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples' Status in the International Legal System 
(First edn, Oxford University Press 2016) and G. Pentassuglia, Minorities in International Law: An Introductory 
Study (Council of Europe Pub. 2002) 23. 
68 Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous People' (19 July 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/37 para 76 to 78. Allen Buchanan, ‘Role of 
Collective Rights in the Theory of Indigenous Peoples' Rights’ (1993) 3 (1) Transnational Law & Contemporary 
Problems, 93. 
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Peoples (UNDRIP) is widely accepted as a significant milestone for addressing 
Indigenous peoples’ claims and establishing their rights69. At the international level, 
there has cumulated numerous interpretations of general human rights standards “in a 
manner favourable to indigenous claims” by international treaty bodies, 70 robust 
regional judicial standards on indigenous rights71 and the establishment of several UN 
mechanisms for promoting indigenous rights. 72  Importantly, the Nagoya Protocol 
notes in its Preamble the importance of the UNDRIP and affirms that nothing in the 
Protocol “shall be construed as diminishing or extinguishing the existing rights of 
indigenous and local communities”. Thus, it is reasonable to suggests that the Nagoya 
Protocol recognises the existence of indigenous rights and suggests that the 
interpretation and implementation of this Protocol shall be in line with the 
requirements of these rights.73 Admittedly, as will be discussed in various sections in 
this thesis, the Nagoya Protocol does not incorporate the language of human rights per 
se and the margin left for States’ discretion on the issue of protecting IPLCs’ human 
rights is considerable. 
In comparison, “local communities” remains a notion much less well-defined 
by international law. The CBD was the first international framework which has called 
upon the global community to pay attention to the essential role played by local 
                                               
69 For a collection of analysis of the Declaration, see Steve Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart 2011). 
70 Alexandra Xanthaki, ‘Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years and Future Developments’ 
(2009) 10 (1) Melbourne Journal of International Law. Also see the detailed analysis of HRC’ interpretation in 
Section 3.1. 
71 Luis Rodríguez-Pinero, ‘The Inter-American System and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Mutual Reinforcement’ in Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Bloomsbury Publishing 2011) 457. 
72 They include, for instance, the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the UNPFII, and the Special 
Rapporteur mechanism addressing situations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous peoples.  
73 Kabir Bavikatte and Daniel F. Robinson, ‘Towards a Peoples History of the Law: Biocultural Jurisprudence and 




communities with respect to biodiversity conservation and established their rights in 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing. The CBD Parties have also accepted a “potentially 
useful” list of key characteristics of local communities,74 including, inter alia, their 
right to self-identification, traditional lifestyle, definable territory and existence of 
customary rule. 75  As will be discussed in the following section, the work of 
recognising and protecting of the rights of local communities in international human 
rights law has only started to accelerated in the past few years. The lack of legal sources 
on “local communities” as a legal subject in international law makes it more difficult 
to establish their rights and corelated States’ responsibilities than Indigenous peoples.  
2.3 Indigenous peoples and local communities in international human rights law 
From a historic perspective, since Indigenous peoples firstly encountered the European 
explorers over approximately 500 years ago,76  international law has undergone a 
fundamental change with respect to its treatment of IPLCs. Overall, it has evolved, 
perhaps rather “grudgingly and imperfectly”, 77  from an instrument to facilitate 
colonialism before the 20th century to recognise and protect IPLCs’ rights in the 20th 
and 21st centuries.78 The most significant development is the emergence of “human 
rights” in the international legal system. Specifically, under the UN framework, 
                                               
74 XI/14 (n 64) para 19. 
75 CBD Working Group on Article 8(j), 'Report of the Expert Group Meeting of Local Community Representatives 
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important human rights instruments have been negotiated and adopted. These include 
the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948, the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide in 1951, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in 1965,79 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)80 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966. These instruments affirm fundamental human 
rights and dignity to all human persons and some specifies the rights of “peoples” 
and/or “minorities” to varying degrees.81 In particular, advocates of IPLCs have often 
used Article 27 of ICCPR to claim their cultural rights as “minorities” within States.82 
These instruments contain not only human rights obligations for State Parties, but in 
many cases erga omnes obligations that apply to all States.83 Magallanes has argued 
that from the 1950s to 1970s, the prevailing ideology of international law was still 
positivist and that the new focus on human rights did not significantly influence the 
rights of IPLCs in international and national contexts.84 Nevertheless, human rights 
concepts have become the basis of contemporary international law, as demonstrated 
by the UN Charter, that the purpose of the UN is based on the principle of “equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples”. 85  In the context of the International Labour 
                                               
79 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [adopted 21 December 1965, 
entered into force 4 January 1969]. 
80 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976] 
999 UNTS 171, art 7. 
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Organization (ILO) and other UN agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and World Health Organisation (WHO), 
the rights of IPLCs also started to enter their organisational policies and agendas. For 
instance, the ILO firstly articulates concerns about the plight of native labour in 1921 
and adopts the ILO Convention No. 107 on the Protection and Integration of 
Indigenous, Tribal and Semi-tribal Populations in Independent Countries (ILO 
Convention 107) in 1957, which has established a rather integrative and assimilationist 
framework to address the protection of IPLCs.86 Furthermore, the ILO and the FAO, 
WHO and other UN agencies have initiated the Andean Indian Programme to facilitate 
development and help integrate the estimated 10 million Indians living in isolated areas 
of the Andes Mountains into the national communities —mainly Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Peru—to which they belong.87 
However, it was not until the 1970s that international human rights law rejected 
the assimilationist approach of its earlier standards and started to establish the rights 
of IPLCs as distinct peoples and communities with their own cultural identity.88 Under 
the UN framework, the UN Human Rights Commission set up the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations,89 which promoted the drafting work that eventually led to the 
adoption of the landmark UNDRIP in 2007. Special systems of the UN human rights 
machinery also include the special rapporteur on Indigenous issues and a permanent 
forum for Indigenous peoples to participate in the UN structure. A legal breakthrough 
was the decision of the ICJ in the Western Sahara case in 1975. The court held that 
                                               
86 For a thorough study on the ILO Conventions and the “fall of integration”, see Luis Rodríguez-Piñero, Indigenous 
Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International Law: The ILO Regime (1919-1989) (Oxford University Press 2005) 
215. 
87 See Jef Rens, ‘The Development of The Andean Indian Programme and Its Future’ (1964) 18 (104) Ekistics, 29. 
88 Magallanes (n 76) 238. 
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the Indigenous inhabitants of the Western Sahara were entitled to self-determination 
and rejected the principle of terra nullius under the laws and principles of 
decolonisation.90 In 1989, the ILO adopts Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO Convention 169), revising its 
previous Convention 107 and in particular its assimilationist approach. The ILO 
Convention 169 reflects much of the discussion that had took place in the UN context, 
confirming the international obligations of States to safeguard Indigenous peoples’ 
rights of cultural self-determination, participation and rights to lands and resources.91 
However, to date, the ILO Convention 169 only has 23 State Parties.92 Began in 1980s, 
international and regional human rights courts and tribunals have been established to 
ensure compliance of international human rights, which are further complemented by 
various domestic enforcement measures.93 With respect to local communities, the UN 
Human Rights Council recently adopted the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants 
and Other People Working in Rural Areas, which broadens the understanding of “local 
communities” in the sense that it also includes rural groups, such as small-scale 
farmers, artisanal fishing communities, island and mountain communities. 94  This 
Declaration also recognises a wide range of rights of local communities regarding, 
inter alia, land and other natural resources,95 a safe, clean and healthy environment,96 
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91 Anaya (n 77) 58. 
92 ILO, ‘Ratifications of C169’ (1991) 
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right to biological diversity 97  and cultural rights and traditional knowledge. 98  In 
general, due to the lack of legal sources for addressing concerns and rights of local 
communities, it might be difficult to establish States’ obligations to protect local 
communities in an ABS context to the same level as Indigenous peoples. 99  
This thesis focuses on the jurisprudence developed by UN human rights treaty 
bodies, the ICJ, and regional human rights courts and tribunals in interpreting the 
international human rights standards in specific circumstances vis-à-vis IPLCs. The 
term “jurisprudence” is deployed in a liberal sense, as many of these bodies are not 
courts per se. For instance, the “General Comments”, “Concluding Observations” on 
States’ periodic reports and the “views” expressed in individual communications 
provided by the UN human rights treaties bodies are not strictly binding in law. 
Nevertheless, they are generally regarded as highly authoritative interpretations of 
international human rights standards and States’ human rights obligations, both at a 
standard-setting level and in the resolution of particular disputes in individual cases.100 
I also examine the jurisprudential interpretation provided by regional human rights 
courts and tribunals, in which the rights of IPLCs have been most prominently 
elaborated, especially with respect to lands, resources and culture as well as procedural 
elements such as FPIC and benefit-sharing. 101  These include, inter alia, 2007 
                                               
97 ibid art 20. 
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99 Greiber and others (n 30) 91.  
100 HRC, 'CCPR General Comment No. 33: The Obligations of States Parties under the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' (5 November 2008) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/33 para 11. See 
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Saramaka case102 and 2015 Kaliña and Lokono case103 of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and the 2010 Endorois case104 of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples' Rights. 
To conclude, the contemporary international human rights law recognises the 
rights of IPLCs and it has become the dominant rubric for pursuing the rights of IPLCs 
and addressing the “historic injustices” they had suffered.105 Admittedly, human rights 
norms and their national compliance are far from satisfactory—one only needs to look 
at Rohingya people in Myanmar and Maasai people in Tanzania to realise that the most 
fundamental human rights, after half an century’s establishment, are still facing severe 
threats and in deep political turmoil. In scholarly discussion, the difference between 
human rights terms relating to IPLCs, such as Indigenous peoples and minorities, also 
remains a controversial matter. 106  Anaya, Kymlicka, Kingsbury and others have 
written extensively on the differences and tensions between Indigenous rights and 
minority rights, collective rights and individual rights, including their respective 
theoretical and normative grounds. 107 Their work in general reveals that the “rights” 
accorded to Indigenous peoples and minority groups by international law are far from 
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“perfect” as normative conceptions and meanwhile face divergent political 
ramifications.108 However, in the rich literature about how IPLCs and ILCs should be 
regarded by modern international law, it is not difficult to identify an overarching 
theme of recognising and respecting cultural pluralism and fundamental human rights 
such as the rights of lands, natural resource and self-determination of these peoples 
and communities.109 Furthermore, this legal development translates into States’ human 
rights obligations and the commitments of State Parties to introduce measures for 
domestic compliance and adaptions for domestic policies would have far-reaching 
consequences.110 Thus, acknowledging the normative and practical gap in establishing 
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key notions of ILCs and IPLCs in both the ABS and human rights contexts, this thesis 
attempts to explore and elaborate the potential synergies and complementariness 
between the Nagoya Protocol and human rights law. The argumentation is built upon 
a theoretical framework of the principles of systemic integration and mutual 
supportiveness, which will be explained in the following sections. Essentially, I focus 
on the extent to which by applying the principle of systemic integration and mutual 
supportiveness this gap might be bridged and the limitation this approach faces both 
in terms of treaty interpretation and implementation.  
3. Theoretical framework: systemic integration and mutual 
supportiveness 
3.1 The principle of systemic integration 
After the Second World War, the process and the work of international law-making 
witnessed a rapid and substantial expansion and growth.111 Treaties that were mostly 
bilateral and addressing issues of diplomatic relations and trade, have become 
multilateral and regulating a wide range of subjects from environment, health to labour 
rights. 112  This transforming process has resulted in a significant proliferation of 
international norms and an increasing concern about the fragmentation of international 
law.113 Against this background, the rules on interpretation, as enshrined in the Articles 
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31-33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), have received 
a great amount of scholarly attention.114 Amongst them, the Article 31(3)(c) of VCLT 
provides that when interpreting a treaty, “(t)here shall be taken into account, together 
with the context... (c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties”. This provision enables interpreters to read treaty norms in light 
of relevant sources stemming from both general and special international law in a 
broad and inter-temporal framework. 115  Indeed, the debates surrounding Article 
31(3)(c) has proved the necessity and the value of perceiving international law as “a 
normative system and a process rather than as rules”.116 In numerous cases, the ICJ 
has established the way individual treaties and rules should be interpreted: that they 
are by no means mechanistic or static, but rather should “be interpreted and applied 
within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the 
interpretation". 117  In this line of thinking, McLachlan has suggested that Article 
31(3)(c) codifies a general principle of systemic integration, which implies that the 
treaties that govern particular subject matter are all part of the international law system; 
therefore, must be “applied and interpreted against the background of the general 
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principles of international law”.118 As per treaty interpretation, this thesis is based on 
the principle of systemic integration, specifically as required by Article 31(3)(c), that 
“any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between Parties” 
shall be taken into account for interpretation. In order to fully unveil the implication 
of this principle with respect to the Nagoya Protocol and relevant international human 
rights law, as well as the difficulties such an attempt of integration faces, it is necessary 
to clarify two key concepts of Article 31(3)(c), namely, “relevant rules” and “parties”.  
Defining what are the “relevant rules” is crucial, as not all the rules would have 
a role for application in the context of Article 31(3)(c).119 The ordinary meaning of 
“relevant rules” of international law refers to those touching on the same subject matter 
as the treaty provision or interpreted provisions or which in any way affect that 
interpretation.120 In light of the principle of systemic integration, McNair has argued 
that since all the rules are part of the international legal system, they are all relevant to 
the background of international law albeit limited in their respective scope and subject 
matters.121 This approach of interpretation manifests in the separate opinion of Judge 
Higgins on Oil Platforms case, in which Article 31(3)(c) provides a legal basis for 
bridging a bilateral treaty governing Iran-United States relations and the principles of 
customary international law that are considered as “relevant rules”.122 Similarly, in the 
US-Shrimp case,123 the WTO Appellate Body referred to Article 56 of the UNCLOS 
in support of the interpretation of a general term “natural resources” as it reckoned that, 
the task of the tribunal is “to interpret…and seeking interpretative guidance…from 
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119 Richard K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Second edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 298. 
120 ibid 299.  
121 Arnold Duncan McNair McNair, The Law of Treaties (Clarendon Press 1961) 466. 
122 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins) [6 November 2003] (ICJ) Rep 803 para 46. 
123 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products [1998] (DSR) WT/DS58/R. 
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general principles of international law”.124 In this case, the WTO Appellate Body has 
also referred to some other relevant international environmental instruments, including 
the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the CBD and the 1979 
Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, for 
interpreting the concerned provisions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).125 The result is that the tribunal established that the sea turtles are indeed part 
of the “natural resources” and should be protected against the incidental killing during 
harvesting shrimp according to GATT. Nevertheless, the WTO Appellate Body in the 
end ruled against US as it found that the US has failed to negotiate the ban with the 
complaining states and the unilateral proceedings on the shrimp-importation ban is 
therefore discriminatory.126 
 Another important clarification that needs to be made is with respect to the 
term “Parties” in the VCLT Article 31(3)(c), as it defines the scope of the applicability 
of the relevant international rules. The definition of what is a Party to a treaty is not 
the issue. As provided in the VCLT Article 2(1)(g), a Party is “a State which has 
consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force”.127 The 
problem is to apply this concept and Article 31(3)(c) in a multilateral context: whether 
it refers to just those of Parties to the same treaty who have a dispute, or a group of 
Parties who have established some particular international agreements among 
themselves, or whether the reference is to all Parties to the treaty which is being 
invoked to provide applicable rules. On this issue, McLachlan has articulated four 
different ways in which the term ‘parties’ of Article 31(3)(c) can be constructed: A) 
that all parties to the interpreted treaty should be parties to the treaty relied upon, B) 
                                               
124 ibid para 158. 
125 ibid paras 7.52 and 7.53. 
126 ibid 286.  
127 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980] 1155 
UNTS 331, art 2(1)(g).  
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that reference to another treaty should be permitted if all parties to the dispute are also 
parties to the other treaty, C) that if a treaty is not in force among all members of the 
treaty under interpretation, it can only be considered if the rule contained therein is 
customary international law, and D) that an intermediate test is required, not based on 
a complete identity of parties, but on an evaluation that the other rules relied upon can 
reasonably be considered to express the common intentions or at least a common 
understanding of all the parties.128  
The above approaches demonstrate different possibilities of applying the 
principle of systemic integration: from a narrow and strict understanding of Article 
31(3)(c) (option A) to a rather flexible and broad taken of this provision (options C 
and D). In practice, it remains controversial as to which approach may best reflect the 
exact requirement of Article 31(3)(c). For instance, in the US-Shrimp case,129 the WTO 
Appellate Body interpreted the concerned provisions in the GATT in light of several 
environmental treaties, including the UNCLOS, the CBD and the 1979 Bonn 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, to which some 
of Parties to the dispute are not Parties.130 In contrast, the Panel in the EC-Biotech 
case131 applied the strictest criterion of Article 31(3)(c) and reckoned that since neither 
of the extraneous treaties the EC (European Communities, now the EU) had referred 
to was ratified by all Parties to the WTO agreement, the rules derived from the 
extraneous treaty do not apply in the case concerned.132  Scholars in general are 
sceptical about the EC-Biotech approach as it does not seem to reflect either the true 
                                               
128 McLachlan (n 118) 314.  
129 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (n 123). 
130 ibid paras 7.52 and 7.53. 
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meaning of Article 31(3)(c) as text or the current status of customary law.133 Instead, 
it is the last approach articulated by McLachlan that has been generally supported by 
scholars, including Pauwelyn and Young. 134  Overall, the WTO case law has 
demonstrated that there is no simple or concrete answer to the exact understanding of 
the term “parties” of the Article 31(3)(c). And indeed, in both cases, the WTO 
obligations have overridden the principles of international environmental law that 
were sought under Article 31(3)(c).135 
Admittedly, Article 31(3)(c) is not often used and when used for performing 
the tribunals’ interpretative function, it faces limitation of integrating specific treaty 
obligations into the general framework of international law.136 However, the value of 
this article and the principle of systemic integration it enshrines needs to be considered 
against a broader perspective of international law. Taking the US-Shrimp case for 
example, to position trade dispute in the broader context of global environmental 
protection demonstrates a holistic and evolutionary understanding of trade issues.137 
To this end, the extension and implication of Article 31(3)(c) can connect different 
areas of international law and facilitate the interplay and cross-fertilisation between 
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these areas by bridging gaps between international rules and systems.138 Thus, in this 
thesis, I base the arguments on the broadest application of the principle of systemic 
integration as it presents the most desirable outcome of harmonising different rules of 
international law. The principles and standards of human rights are considered 
“relevant rules” in interpreting the ABS provisions in the CBD and the Nagoya 
Protocol, and vice versa, in the sense that each regime contains norms of customary 
international law.139 I pay particular attention to the special features and interests of 
IPLCs as they are often the addressees of ABS obligations as well as human rights in 
the process of interpretation, as has been stressed several times by the European Court 
of Human Rights.140 Furthermore, many Parties to the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol 
have also made commitments to various human rights instruments. This fact also 
provides basis for exploring the interrelationship between these two branches of 
international law. 
3.2 The principle of mutual supportiveness  
More recently, the discourse of the fragmentation of international law has witnessed 
the rise of another important debate—about the principle of mutual supportiveness. 141 
This principle firstly appeared in the Agenda 21, the key document adopted by the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, which reiterates that the 
                                               
138 Merkouris (n 133) 6 and Nele Matz-Lück, ‘Norm Interpretation across International Regimes: Competences and 
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economic growth and environmental protection must be “mutually supportive”.142 
This remark was then picked up by the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment 
in the following years, which recurrently highlighted its aim of “making international 
trade and environmental policies mutually supportive”. 143  Later in 1998, mutual 
supportiveness was established in a normative form in the Preamble of the 1998 
Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent in light of the goal of sustainable 
development.144 Same formula has also been adopted in the 2000 Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety145 and the 2001 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture. 146  Furthermore, mutual supportiveness is included in the 2005 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
as an operative clause regulating its relationship with other treaties.147 Similarly, as 
Article 4 of the Nagoya Protocol establishes the relationship between the Protocol and 
other international agreements and instruments, it provides in paragraph 3 that “(t)his 
Protocol shall be implemented in a mutually supportive manner with other 
international instruments relevant to this Protocol”.148 Thus, as Pavoni has pointed out, 
the principle of mutual supportiveness indeed has transformed from a catchy political 
formula to an emerging general principle of international law.149  
                                               
142 Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development [14 June 1992] UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 vol.II, 
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Specifically, Pavoni has observed that the legal implications of the principle of 
mutual supportiveness are characterised by two dimensions, namely, an interpretative 
dimension and a law-making dimension. The first dimension is akin to the principle of 
systemic integration, as discussed above, in the sense that they both require 
international norms to be understood as reinforcing each other with a view to fostering 
harmonisation and complementarity. 150  In the context of the fragmentation of 
international law, mutually supportive interpretations and actions have been regarded 
as an objective of systemic integration.151  As an interpretative technique, mutual 
supportiveness is useful for addressing tensions between competing regimes involving 
the application of potentially conflicting rules, even though the degree to which this 
principle is exploited in the international judicial and arbitral practices is not always 
consistent.152 However, the legal implication of the mutual supportiveness exceeds the 
mere scope of treaty interpretation. Pavoni has demonstrated that the principle also 
contains a law-making dimension that requires States to cooperate in good faith in 
order to facilitate law-making processes, especially when efforts at reconciling 
competing rules have been exhausted.153 For instance, the ongoing discussion under 
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) about the 
relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, in particular on the 
patentability of GR and the protection of TK in light of the ABS requirements under 
the CBD, has provided powerful manifestations of what the principle of mutual 
supportiveness might imply. Specifically, the CBD principles of PIC and fair and 
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equitable benefit-sharing require WTO members to revise the current patent system 
with respect to GR and TK, which has led to the discussion of a new Article 29bis into 
the TRIPs Agreement.154 In 2011, the WTO Trade Negotiations Committee adopted a 
draft decision with a view to “enhance the mutual supportiveness between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the CBD”, in which a mandatory requirement for the disclosure of 
origin of GR and TK is articulated in an amendment of the current Article 29 of the 
TRIPS Agreement.155 Essentially, this amendment would alter the obligations of the 
WTO members via a mutually supportive law-making process. This law-making 
dimension has also been discussed more recently by Morgera in the context of climate 
change and biodiversity and increasingly in the context of ABS.156  
With respect to the Nagoya Protocol, as its Article 4 explicitly requires that a 
mutually supportive implementation vis-à-vis other relevant international instruments, 
it is quite clear that the principle of mutual supportiveness is recognised in the Nagoya 
Protocol with both dimensions of its legal implications. Rather unusually, Article 4 
also calls for due regard to “useful and relevant ongoing work or practices under such 
international instruments and relevant international organizations”.157 Thus it further 
demonstrates the possibility of integrating helpful knowledge and practice from other 
areas of international law into the Nagoya Protocol.158 Admittedly, Article 4 and its 
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integration of the principle of mutual supportiveness is not free from interpretative 
ambiguity. Important questions remain, for instance, the benchmark for assessing the 
usefulness of ongoing work and practices and the scope of relevant rules that could be 
taken into consideration.159 Nevertheless, international human rights law, as important 
relevant norms and practices, shall be taken full consideration in the process of 
negotiating future specialised ABS instruments or other relevant agreements. Thus, it 
can be concluded that a research of the complementarity between the Nagoya Protocol 
and human rights is not only as an interpretative requirement imposed by Article 
31(3)(c), but also strongly underscored by the principle of mutual supportiveness with 
a view of achieving a synergistic understanding and implementation of international 
law.  
4. Research questions and thesis structure 
The discussion of the emergence of the international ABS framework illustrates the 
multifaceted challenges facing biodiversity conservation and fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing, which are interrelated with issues of protecting IPLCs’ rights 
pertaining to lands, natural resources and culture. Contemporary developments in 
international law, especially human rights law, provide prominent avenues to address 
concerns and interests of IPLCs. Relying on the principle of systemic integration and 
mutual supportiveness, I aim to explore the potential of a mutually supportive 
interpretation of the Nagoya Protocol in light of international human rights law with 
respect to IPLCs. I ask the following questions to guide the research: 
1. What are, and what are the purpose of, the principles of systemic integration 
and mutual supportiveness?  
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2. What are the strengths and limitations of the Nagoya Protocol in protecting 
IPLCs’ rights? 
3. What are the relevant human rights of IPLCs in the ABS context and what are 
their implication on States’ obligations vis-à-vis IPLCs? 
4. Can Nagoya Protocol and human rights be mutually supportive in protecting 
the rights of IPLCs? 
5. What are the normative and practical implications of the principles of systemic 
integration and mutual supportiveness? 
6. What are the limitations of applying the principles of systemic integration and 
mutual supportiveness in bridging the gaps between the Nagoya Protocol and 
the international human rights law?  
I shall make clear that this research concerns all of the “constitutive processes” of 
making international ABS norms and human rights law, including the procedures, 
participants and instruments employed in the process, 160  rather than theories of 
international law. 161  Accordingly, I focus on treaties and non-binding legal 
instruments adopted under the UN bodies and other international organisations, 
customary international law and general principles, as well as jurisprudential 
interpretation by international courts and tribunals. It shall be noted that the systems 
and mechanisms of international law vis-à-vis IPLCs have been historically 
established by mostly European jurists from a Western-centric perspective in the age 
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of colonialism and European State formation,162 which continue to influence how 
IPLCs are addressed by international law and how they participate in international law-
making nowadays. Nevertheless, I chose this context for ensuring the clarity and 
consistency of the discussion. I do so without the intention to undermine other 
approaches to international law, for instance, Third World and the feminist approaches 
to international law.163 
The main body of the thesis consists of three chapters under the theme of access, 
benefit-sharing and compliance respectively, as they are the three pillars of the 
international ABS framework. 164  Each of these chapters outlines the relevant 
provisions and debates of the Nagoya Protocol and offers an analysis of the relevant 
human rights implications. Specifically, chapter two looks at the interpretation and 
implementation of the Nagoya Protocol with respect to access to GR and associated 
TK and discusses their implications vis-à-vis the rights of IPLCs and the 
responsibilities of State governments. It focuses on the key concepts, principles and 
procedural requirements adopted under the Nagoya Protocol, including GR, TK, State 
sovereignty and PIC. Emphasising on situations where IPLCs’ GR and TK are sought 
and accessed, I unpack IPLCs’ human rights of self-determination, FPIC and those 
pertaining to their customary laws and survey the implications of these rights on States’ 
obligations vis-à-vis IPLCs in the ABS context. Chapter three investigates benefit-
sharing, the so called “grand bargain” struck under the CBD between developing 
countries with rich biodiversity and developed countries with advanced technology 
                                               
162 For a chronology of the Euro-American Law of Nations and Indigenous peoples see, Paul Havemann (ed), 
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and funding.165 In this chapter, I look at the key elements and issues of benefit-sharing, 
including, means for its realisation, legitimate ABS beneficiaries, Parties’ obligations 
to implement benefit-sharing and ensure intra-State benefit-sharing with ILCs, and the 
core normative standards “fair and equitable”. Chapter three approaches a mutually 
supportive understanding of ILCs’ ABS rights and human rights as well as correlated 
States’ obligations via the lens of three substantive human rights, namely, the right to 
equality and non-discrimination, the right to development and to property. Chapter 
four looks at the issue of compliance. It considers the enforcement of the Protocol in 
inter-State and intra-State contexts and asks to what extent and through what means 
the compliance with the Nagoya Protocol could be ensured and facilitated and that 
non-compliance could be effectively addressed. Based on a scrutiny of the 
international compliance mechanism and domestic compliance measures of the 
Nagoya Protocol, I discuss the opportunities and challenges for IPLCs to participate 
in the compliance processes of ABS rules in an effective and meaningful manner. 
These questions are then analysed in light of ILCs’ human right of access to justice 
and human rights mechanisms to ensure States’ compliance of their inter-State 
obligations. The final chapter concludes the key findings and their relevance in 
response to the research questions, summarising how and the extent to which the 





                                               
165 Michael A Gollin, ‘An Intellectual Property Rights Framework for Biodiversity Prospecting’ in Walter V. Reid 
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Chapter Two 
Access and human rights implications for access related provisions of 
the Nagoya Protocol 
This chapter looks at the interpretation and implementation of the Nagoya Protocol 
with respect to its provisions on access to genetic resources (GR) and associated 
traditional knowledge (TK), as one of the three pillars of the international access and 
benefit-sharing (ABS) framework.1 According to the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, 
access to GR is subject to domestic ABS legislation or regulatory requirements, in 
particular the prior informed consent (PIC) of the provider Party of GR.2 This is due 
to the fact that natural resources are paramount to States’ interests—a point that is 
substantiated through the negotiation of the CBD and called by especially developing 
countries for national controls over GR.3 In situations where Indigenous and local 
communities (ILCs) hold GR and associated TK, the Nagoya Protocol requires Parties 
to ensure PIC or approval and involvement of ILCs4 and to respect ILCs’ customary 
laws, community protocols and procedures while implementing their obligations under 
the Protocol. 5  International legal scholars have appraised these provisions of the 
Nagoya Protocol in the sense that it is the first binding environmental treaty to address 
issues of accessing GR and TK held by ILCs who live within sovereign States and 
impose intra-State obligations to Parties toward ILCs who live within their territories.6 
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For instance, Vermeylen suggests that the Protocol provides protection to ILCs’ TK 
and GR in accordance with ILCs’ own worldviews and customary rules.7 Morgera and 
others argue that the Nagoya Protocol presupposes a rights-based system by mandating 
State Parties to address the concerns of ILCs and protect their rights over their GR and 
TK.8 Furthermore, Savaresi points out the particular relevance of international human 
rights in interpreting the ABS provisions via the overlapping norms such as free prior 
informed consent (FPIC) as adopted under human rights law vis-à-vis PIC. 9 
Meanwhile, many practical and interpretative uncertainties and challenges persist. For 
instance, Greiber and others have warned that the commitment of the Nagoya Protocol 
to respect ILCs’ customary rules and community protocols might be rather 
“tangential”10 and Tobin also has suggested that the legal status of ILCs’ customary 
laws in domestic contexts remain extremely unclear and under-explored in scholarly 
debates.11 
Against this background, this chapter investigates the access-related provisions 
in the Nagoya Protocol and their implications vis-à-vis the rights of ILCs and the 
responsibilities of State governments. Based on a range of binding and non-binding 
instruments and relevant scholarly discussion, I focus on the key concepts, principles 
and procedural requirements adopted under the ABS framework, including GR, TK, 
State sovereignty and PIC. In light of the principle of mutual supportiveness, this 
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chapter also articulates the potential interaction between the Nagoya Protocol and 
relevant human rights. I ask questions, including, what are the relevant human rights 
established at the international level for ILCs in situations where their GR and TK are 
sought and accessed? What is the relationship between the ABS rights and the human 
rights of ILCs and to what extent could they assist one another in their realisation? 
What are the relevant obligations imposed upon States by international human rights 
standards? The human rights of self-determination, FPIC, culture and those pertaining 
to ILCs’ customary laws are highlighted as bridging norms between the Nagoya 
Protocol and the human rights law because of their fundamental importance and 
particular relevance to these questions. For instance, the realisation of the right of self-
determination, as provided in the most fundamental human rights,12 requires economic 
and cultural empowerment of ILCs in matters relating to their land and natural 
resources, which would not be possible without having ILCs effectively participate in 
the decision-making processes on projects that might affect their rights.13 
The chapter consists of four sections. The first and second sections unpack the 
key subject matters, principles and procedural requirements of ABS and discuss the 
implications for ILCs’ rights and States’ responsibility. The third section explores the 
connection between the access-related provisions in the Nagoya Protocol and 
international human rights law with a sharpened focus on ILCs, under the themes of 
the right of self-determination, FPIC and customary law respectively. The analysis is 
conducted in a mind-set that the ongoing legal developments under the Nagoya 
Protocol, including its scholarly interpretation and national implementation, as well as 
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relevant development in international human rights law, advancements in technology 
and their consequential influence on the behaviours of States, ILCs and private entities, 
all have a part in affecting and shaping the ABS framework and its interpretation. The 
final section concludes on the normative gaps as well as complementarities between 
these two branches of international law in the context of access to GR and TK. 
1. Key concepts: genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge 
Access-related provisions under the Nagoya Protocol refer to GR and associated TK.14 
According to Article 3 of the Protocol, the Protocol shall apply to “genetic resources 
within the scope of Article 15 of the Convention”, as well as “traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources within the scope of the Convention”.15 Thus, instead 
of defining its subject matter, the Nagoya Protocol referrs to GR and associated TK as 
established under the CBD. In order to clarify the respective meaning and scope of GR 
and associated TK, it is therefore necessary to consult relevant provisions of the CBD. 
This section aims to establish an understanding of the key concepts—GR and TK—
for the subsequent analysis. Respective definitions and scope of GR and TK as 
provided in the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol are firstly investigated. I then look at 
the broader context of international law in which issues of GR and TK arise. The 
purpose is to clarify the conceptual elements of GR and TK in access-related 
provisions, and meanwhile to provide a bird’s-eye view of its positions and general 
interaction with other areas of international law.  
                                               
14 Nagoya Protocol, arts 6 7 and 8. 
15 ibid art 3. 
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1.1 Genetic resources 
Under the CBD, “genetic resource” is explicitly defined as “genetic material of actual 
or potential value”, while “genetic material” means “any material of plant, animal, 
microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity”. 16  GR is also 
regarded as a subcategory of “biological resources”, in addition to “populations, or any 
other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for 
humanity”.17 Thus, not all biological material is a genetic resource because GR must 
contain functional units of heredity, that is, genes that can pass on properties to the 
next generation.18 Meanwhile, fruits and vegetables traded and consumed as food are 
also not GR as covered in the Nagoya Protocol even though they contain functional 
units of heredity. This is because the ABS rules only apply to the “utilization of genetic 
resources”, which as a term of art means to conduct research and development on the 
genetic and/or biochemical composition of GR; and food commodities are not used for 
their genetic or biochemical properties.19 Arguably, the Nagoya Protocol goes beyond 
the CBD to also include “derivatives” of GR that do not contain functional units of 
heredity, but is a naturally occurring biochemical compound resulting from the genetic 
expression or metabolism of biological or genetic resources.20 As such, the CBD and 
the Nagoya Protocol provide some legal certainty for interpretation and 
                                               
16 Convention on Biological Diversity [adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993] 1760 UNTS 79, 
art 2. 
17 ibid art2. 
18 Lyle Glowka, A Guide to Designing Legal Frameworks to Determine Access to Genetic Resources (IUCN 1998) 
31. 
19 Veit Koester, The Nagoya Protocol on ABS: Ratification by the EU and its Member States and Implementation 
Challenges (Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, 2012) 4 
<https://www.iddri.org/en/node/21500> accessed 12/07/2019. 
20 Nagoya Protocol art 2(e). 
Access and Human Rights Implications 
44 
implementation but the definitions relating to GR and their application still lacks 
clarity and precision.21  
The general rule of treaty interpretation22 requires that the term GR to be 
considered in the overarching context of the CBD as well as the particular objective, 
“fair and equitable benefit-sharing”, to which GR is mostly adopted for. 23  This 
approach determines that GR shall be understood primarily and specifically for ABS 
related interpretation and implementation.24 In this light, we can note two opposing 
stances held by developing and developed countries in their submissions to the Ad Hoc 
Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing (WGABS) for elaborating 
the meaning of GR. 25  While developing countries have advocated for a wider 
application of GR,26 they in fact aimed to establish a wider scope of ABS obligations 
regarding GR because most of the developing countries are the providers of GR.27 
Developed countries such as EU Member States, on the other hand, have promoted to 
narrow the scope of GR so that their utilisation of GR could be regulated by a 
comparably narrow set of ABS obligations.28 A compromise approach manifests in the 
Nagoya Protocol as adopted in 2010. Without directly altering the meaning of GR as 
                                               
21 Morten W. Tvedt and Tomme R. Young, Beyond Access: Exploring Implementation of the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing Commitment in the CBD (IUCN 2007) 53. 
22 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980] 1155 UNTS 
331, art 31. 
23 Tvedt and Young (n 21) 56. CBD, arts 15 16 and 19(2). 
24 CBD Working Group on ABS, 'Study on the Functionality of an ABS Protocol' (26 August 2010) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/INF/20 15. 
25 CBD COP Decision VI/24, 'Access and Benefit-sharing as related to Genetic Resources' (2002) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VI/24 1. 
26 For instance, to also include derivatives generated from GR, see CBD Working Group on ABS, 'Report of the Ad 
Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing on the Work of its Third Meeting' (3 March 
2005) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/3/7 22. 
27 Joji Cariño and others, Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from Their Utilization: Background and Analysis (The Berne Declaration, Bread for the World, 
Ecoropa, Tebtebba and Third World Network 2013) 33. 
28 ibid 34. 
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established under the CBD, it includes derivatives of GR that do not contain functional 
units of heredity into the ABS framework by covering “biotechnology” that works 
with not only GR but also its derivatives.29 However, it shall be noted that the exact 
scope and definition of GR is up to States’ national elaboration of ABS rules, which 
tends to vary dramatically in different national and local contexts.30 
1.2 Traditional knowledge 
The international legal discourse concerning “traditional knowledge” has left the term 
undefined and fluid, with several related terms that sometimes are used 
interchangeably, such as Indigenous knowledge or traditional environmental 
knowledge.31 TK is generally accepted as being a dynamic concept that refers to a 
body of knowledge fundamentally different from the Western scientific counterparts.32 
It is intertwined with the customary worldviews, values and traditional practices of 
ILCs that is vital for their survival,33 general well-being,34 and their traditional way of 
life, which usually includes sustainably managing and exploiting local resources and 
                                               
29 Nagoya Protocol, art 2 (e). 
30 Jorge Cabrera Medaglia, Frederic Perron-Welch and Freedom-Kai Phillips, Overview of National and Regional 
Measures on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing: Challenges and Opportunities in Implementing the 
Nagoya Protocol (Third edn, CISDL 2014) 15. 
31 Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge (Earthscan 2004) 91 and 
Martha Johnson, ‘Research on Traditional Environmental Knowledge: Its Development and its Role’ in Martha 
Johnson (ed), Lore: Capturing Traditional Environmental Knowledge (IDRC/CRDI 2014) 7. 
32 See CBD Working Group on ABS, 'Report of the Meeting of the Group of Technical And Legal Experts on 
Traditional Knowledge Associated with Genetic Resources in the Context of the International Regime on Access 
and Benefit-Sharing' (15 July 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2* para 33 and Graham Dutfield, ‘TK 
Unlimited: The Emerging but Incoherent International Law of Traditional Knowledge Protection’ (2017) 20 (5-6) 
Journal of World Intellectual Property, 145. 
33 UNCTAD Secretariat, 'Systems and National Experiences for Protecting Traditional Knowledge, Innovations and 
Practices' (22 August 2000) UN Doc TD/B/COM.1/EM.13/2 para 11. 
34 According to the WHO, up to 80% of the world’s population depends on traditional medicine for its primary health 
needs, see WHO Secretariat, 'Traditional Medicine' (13 December 2013) EB134/24 para 5. 
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the ecosystem. 35  In the context of the CBD, TK relates closely to biodiversity 
conservation. Article 8(j) of the CBD sketches a preliminary scope of TK, referring to 
the “knowledge, innovations and practices of Indigenous and local communities 
embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity”. 36  Three dimensions to approach this definition have been 
suggested by the CBD Working Group on Article 8(j) via its cultural, temporal and 
spatial implications.37 These dimensions imply that TK as a means to reflect the culture 
of a community is usually passed on through generations, and its content is usually 
related to the territory, lands and waters, as well as natural resources that are 
traditionally occupied or used by the community. With a sharpened focus on ABS, TK 
has been recognised to be of significant value in discovering and capturing the 
potential of genetic material—in many cases, TK has raised the scientific awareness 
to valuable GR and provided preliminary guidance on its potential usefulness. 38 
Accordingly, the Nagoya Protocol narrows down the scope of TK by referring to “TK 
associated with GR”;39 therefore, excludes TK that is not related to GR, but might be 
to other subjects of ILCs’ traditional lifestyle, such as literature, folklores and 
architecture.40 As a result, TK that is subject to the ABS rules of the Nagoya Protocol 
is a particular body of knowledge held by ILCs that embodies their traditional lifestyles 
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity as well as associated 
                                               
35 Dutfield, Intellectual Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge (n 31) 97. 
36 CBD, art 8(j). 
37  CBD Working Group on Article 8(j), 'Elements of Sui Generis Systems for the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge, Innovations and Practices' (9 September 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG8J/6/5 para 31. 
38 See CBD Working Group on ABS, 'The Concept of "Genetic Resources" in the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and How It Relates to A Functional International Regime on Access and Benefit-Sharing' (19 March 2010) UN 
Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/INF/1 and CBD Secretariat, 'Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Inter-Sessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and related Provisions of the Convention on Biologogical Diversity' 
(21 November 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/2 36. 
39 Nagoya Protocol, art 3. 
40 Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing 
in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Brill Nijhoff 2013) 507. 
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with GR. In reality, Chennells has demonstrated that it is rather difficult to provide a 
case where TK is “sufficiently” associated with GR and that this task of identifying 
TK subject to ABS rules essentially leads to the thorny question of identifying the 
right-holders (ABS beneficiaries) of TK.41  
1.3 Genetic resources and traditional knowledge in the context of international 
law 
The international ABS framework as established by the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol 
is not the only multilateral forum where GR and TK are considered and their legal 
implications on rights and obligations are debated and negotiated. With respect to TK, 
the discussion about its scope and protection in the context of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) and international trade takes place simultaneously under the Word Trade 
Organization (WTO),42 the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)43 and 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).44 Growing 
concerns about the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity are 
also evident. Discussions under the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly 
indicate a trend on developing an international, legally-binding instrument under the 
                                               
41 Roger Chennells, ‘Traditional Knowledge and Benefit Sharing after the Nagoya Protocol: Three Cases from South 
Africa’ (2013) 9 (2) Law, Environment and Development Journal, 181 and CBD Working Group on ABS, 
'Protecting Community Rights over Traditional Knowledge: Implications of Customary Laws and Practices' (6 
October 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/INF/4 2. 
42 The 2001 WTO Doha Declaration laid the foundation to include discussion about the protection of traditional 
knowledge and folklore in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [adopted 15 
April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995] WTO see Daniel J. Gervais, ‘Traditional Knowledge & Intellectual 
Property: A TRIPS-Compatible Approach’ (2005) Michigan State Law Review, 138. 
43 Especially the work of Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore (IGC), see Daniel F. Robinson, Ahmed Abdel-Latif and Pedro Roffe (eds), Protecting 
Traditional Knowledge: the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (Routledge 2017) 3. 
44 UNCTAD, The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol: Intellectual Property Implications-
-A Handbook on the Interface between Global Access and Benefit Sharing Rules and Intellectual Property 
(UNCTAD 2014) 30. 
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to address especially 
marine biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction that also includes GR.45 
Furthermore, the contemporary development of international human rights standards 
also demonstrates increasing relevance with respect to ILCs as it recognises not only 
the general human rights of ILCs in an environmental context,46 but also specific rights 
related to GR and TK in the context of their utilisation, benefit-sharing and so on.47  
Thus, a web of complex legal relations and interactions underpinned by 
different legal approaches and perspectives can be observed for regulating and 
protecting GR and TK at the international level. What cannot be ignored is also rapidly 
developing biotechnological inventions, which are able to alter the known methods of 
utilising GR and TK to an extent that might fundamentally change the way that GR 
and TK are written.48 In this light, it is essential to approach the subjects, especially 
GR, in a flexible and dynamic manner.49 Thus, I acknowledge that ongoing legal 
developments under international law on various sujects, including human rights, trade 
and intellectual property, advancements in technology and their consequential 
influence on the behaviours of States and private entities, as well as the international 
scholarly debates all have a part in affecting and shaping the Nagoya Protocol and its 
interpretation of what GR and TK are relevant for its purposes. As a matter of scope, 
                                               
45 UNGA Res 72/249, 'International Legally Binding Instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National 
Jurisdiction' (19 January 2018) UN Doc A/RES/72/249 para 2. 
46 See Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating 
to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment' (24 January 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/37/59 
and Alan E. Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?’ in Ben Boer (ed), Environmental Law 
Dimensions of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2015) 203. 
47  Elisa Morgera, ‘Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing at the Cross-Roads of the Human Right to Science and 
International Biodiversity Law’ (2015) 4 (4) Laws, 804. 
48 Pottage Alain and Marris Claire, ‘The Cut that Makes a Part’ (2012) 7 (2) BioSocieties, 104. 
49 ABS, The Concept of "Genetic Resources" in the Convention on Biological Diversity and How It Relates to A 
Functional International Regime on Access and Benefit-Sharing (n 38) 2. 
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this research discusses GR and TK as defined under the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol 
and addresses their legal implication for ABS purposes, taking into account 
international human rights law at the interface with the Nagoya Protocol, especially 
with respect to ILCs and their rights towards GR and TK.  
2. Principles and procedural requirements for access  
The access-related provisions are grounded on a certain set of principles and 
procedural requirements in the Nagoya Protocol. This section firstly investigates the 
underpinning principle of State sovereignty and examines its implications for the intra-
State relationship between States and its ILCs. It then unpacks the key procedural 
requirement for access to GR and TK—prior informed consent (PIC)— based on a 
range of relevant binding and non-binding instruments adopted under the CBD. The 
aim, function and standards of PIC mechanism are visited in turn and the importance 
of PIC in safeguarding the participatory rights of ILCs is highlighted. Furthermore, 
according to Article 12 of the Nagoya Protocol on TK associated with GR, I examine 
the role of ILCs’ customary rules and community protocols in the process of States’ 
implementation of the Nagoya Protocol.50 In light of the discourse on legal pluralism, 
I suggest that Article 12 poses an opportunity of considering the legitimacy and the 
function of ILCs’ customary laws as opposed to domestic laws. Finally, the section 
examines the content and characteristics of the obligations imposed upon State 
governments in the process of implementing their obligations under the Nagoya 
Protocol.  
                                               
50 Nagoya Protocol art 12(1). 
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2.1 The principle of State sovereignty and its relationship with the rights of ILCs  
State sovereignty over natural resources is the cornerstone of the architecture and 
functionality of the international ABS framework.51 This is, foremost, due to the fact 
that natural resources are valuable not only for the economy, but also for culture and 
the environment; therefore, are paramount to States’ interests. This point has been 
substantiated through the negotiation of the CBD and grounded on the calls of 
especially developing countries for national controls over GR.52 As a result, Article 15 
of the CBD recognises that the authority to determine access to GR rests with the 
national governments and is subject to national legislation. In general, by proclaiming 
the sovereign rights of States over their biological resources, 53  recognising the 
sovereign rights to exploit their own resources54 and recalling the sovereign rights of 
States over their natural resources as a basis for national authority to determine access 
to GR,55 “sovereignty” indeed functions as a principle underpinning the access-related 
provisions of the CBD. While affirming States’ sovereign rights to their natural 
resources, the CBD does not grant States a proprietary right over these resources, nor 
does it clarify whether such sovereign rights extend to GR and TK held by ILCs.56 As 
a measure of in-situ conservation, the CBD Article 8(j) requires each Party, subject to 
national legislation, “to respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and 
practices of Indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles”.57 
Louka has argued that this provision could be read as a recognition of the right of ILCs 
                                               
51 Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge (n 3) 3. 
52 ibid 5. 
53 CBD, pmbl. 
54 ibid art 3. 
55 ibid art 15. 
56 Instead, the issue of ownership is left to be determined by the respective national law of the Party States. Glowka, 
Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge (n 3) 76. 
57 CBD, art 8(j). 
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to their “knowledge, innovations and practices”.58 More conservatively, Greiber and 
some others suggest it does not establish a right per se but at least could be reckoned 
as a recognition of the fact that TK associated with GR most often vests with ILCs.59 
Nevertheless, there is no explicitly line between the sovereign rights of State and the 
rights of ILCs with respect to GR and TK held by ILCs.  
The Nagoya Protocol inherits the principle of State sovereignty, as it renders 
the obligation of Parties to regulate access to GR to the “exercise of sovereign rights 
over natural resources” and their respective domestic laws. In particular, Article 7 and 
the first two paragraphs of its Article 6 read: 
Article 6: 1. In the exercise of sovereign rights over natural resources, and 
subject to domestic access and benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory 
requirements, access to genetic resources for their utilization shall be subject 
to the prior informed consent of the Party providing such resources that is the 
country of origin of such resources or a Party that has acquired the genetic 
resources in accordance with the Convention, unless otherwise determined by 
that Party. 
2. In accordance with domestic law, each Party shall take measures, as 
appropriate, with the aim of ensuring that the prior informed consent or 
approval and involvement of Indigenous and local communities is obtained for 
access to genetic resources where they have the established right to grant 
access to such resources. 
Article 7: In accordance with domestic law, each Party shall take measures, as 
appropriate, with the aim of ensuring that traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources that is held by Indigenous and local communities is 
accessed with the prior and informed consent or approval and involvement of 
                                               
58 Elli Louka, International Environmental Law: Fairness, Effectiveness and World Order (Cambridge University 
Press 2006) 301. 
59 Greiber and others (n 1) 109. 
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these Indigenous and local communities, and that mutually agreed terms have 
been established. 
Thus, the Nagoya Protocol addresses the issue of access to GR held by ILCs; therefore, 
articulates Parties’ obligation in regulating access to GR and TK in an intra-State 
context with the binding force of a treaty.60 In Article 7 and paragraph 2 of Article 6 
that address GR and associated TK held by ILCs, the language of sovereign rights is 
absent, albeit Parties’ obligations to ensure ILCs’ PIC or approval and involvement 
are still qualified by “in accordance with domestic law”.61 Specifically, for GR held 
by ILCs, Parties are required to take measures, as appropriate, with the aim of 
ensuring that the PIC or approval and involvement of ILCs is obtained for access to 
GR where they have the established right to grant access to such resources.62 For 
associated TK, although the requirement of ILCs to have an “established right” is 
absent, the obligation is qualified by similar wordings like “as appropriate” and “with 
the aim of ensuring”. Legal uncertainties thus persist not only in a practical sense that 
it is unclear how each Party would interpret the qualifiers and implement them at the 
domestic level, but also in a normative sense in that the Nagoya Protocol essentially 
does not address the crucial relationship between States’ sovereign rights and the rights 
of ILCs. In fact, these provisions are commonly interpreted as to suggest that, formally 
adopted national laws that explicitly address the protection of GR and TK of ILCs may 
be necessary, in order for the relevant rights of ILCs to be recognised and protected 
under the Nagoya Protocol.63 This interpretation, nevertheless, could undermine the 
                                               
60 As the first international environmental treaty to do so, see Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 6) 137. 
61 Nagoya Protocol, arts 6(2) and 7. 
62 ibid art 6(2). Emphasis added. 
63 Tomme R. Young, ‘An International Cooperation Perspective on the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol’ in 
Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing 
in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Brill Nijhoff 2013) 461. 
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interests and rights of ILCs as it suggests that ILCs’ rights are subsidiary to domestic 
law.64 I will articulate this point in the following section 3. 
Even though established as a cornerstone of the international ABS framework, 
State sovereignty is neither unconditional nor absolute.65 The danger embedded in the 
trump card that is often played by States—“State A is sovereign therefore its conduct 
is unquestionable”—merits caution of international lawyers and scholars.66 First, in 
light of the fundamental principle of the CBD that “the conservation of biological 
diversity is a common concern of humankind”, States’ sovereign rights over natural 
resources shall be understood and exercised in harmony with the common duty of 
States to conserve biological diversity and that the exercise of such rights is not to 
prevent biodiversity conservation from being treated as a question of common concern 
for all States.67According to the Nagoya Protocol, excising States’ sovereign rights is 
further conditioned by certain procedural requirements of implementation, such as to 
facilitate access, implement PIC and establish MAT.68 Additionally, it is necessary to 
understand State sovereignty as an evolutionary concept.69 Judicial interpretations of 
States’ sovereignty in, for instance, S.S. "Wimbledon" case and Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf case, indicate that the implications of this principle, if seen as a legal 
creation for addressing States’ international rights and duties, needs to be considered 
                                               
64  UNGA, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' (13 August 2012) UN Doc 
A/67/301 para 60. 
65 Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge (n 3) 3. 
66 This is especially the case with States’ “internal affairs”, see John Jackson, ‘Sovereignty-modern: a New Approach 
to an Outdated Concept’ (2003) 97 (4) American journal of international law, 782. 
67  Note that the CBD is not the only treaty that highlights this point, for example, African Convention on the 
Conservation of Nature [adopted 15 September 1968, entered into force 16 June 1969] 1001 UNTS 4 and 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World's Cultural and Natural Heritage [adopted 16 November 1972, 
entered into force 17 December 1975] 1037 UNTS 151. See Patricia W. Birnie, Alan E. Boyle and Catherine 
Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Third edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 138. 
68 CBD, art 15. 
69 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Second edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 32. 
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according to specific circumstances.70 Scholars including Henkin, Weil and Crawford 
agree with this approach and further add that the understanding of States’ sovereignty 
needs to reflect the ongoing development in the broader context of international law.71 
This perspective is especially important in clarifying the relationship between States 
and ILCs. In human rights law, for instance, the normative power of sovereignty has 
been significantly questioned, challenged72 and arguably, weakened since the Second 
World War.73 States’ sovereign rights also include and are increasingly intertwined 
with States’ obligations to respect and fulfil ILCs’ human rights. In this light, I 
acknowledge that this research considers States sovereignty as a fundamental yet 
conditioned principle to achieve the objectives of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol.  
2.2 Procedural requirements: a focus on prior informed consent 
As demonstrated, the Nagoya Protocol articulates the role of ILCs in the process of 
granting access of their GR and associated TK.74 Procedural requirements include: A) 
PIC or “approval and involvement” of ILCs for accessing their GR and TK, and B) 
MAT on granted access.75 This section focuses on the requirement of PIC or “approval 
                                               
70  For instance, the ruling of the former Permanent Court of International Justice in S.S. "Wimbledon" (United 
Kingdom, France, Italy & Japan v Germany) [17 August 1923] (PCIJ) Series A No. 1. Also the Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf Case (Greece v Turkey) [19 September 1978] (ICJ) Rep 62 and Dispute regarding Navigational 
and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) [13 July 2009] (ICJ) ICGJ 421. 
71 See Louis Henkin, ‘That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, et cetera’ (1999) 68 (1) 
Fordham Law Review, 2, Prosper Weill, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’ (1983) 77 (3) 
American journal of international law, 418 and James Crawford, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of 
International Law, General Course on Public International Law (Brill 2014) 92. 
72 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform’ (2005) 99 (3) 
American journal of international law, 620. 
73 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’ (1998) 9 (4) European Journal Of International Law, 602. 
74 Nagoya Protocol, arts 6(2) and 7. Lyle Glowka and Valérie Normand, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access and 
Benefit-Sharing: Innovations in International Environmental Law’ in Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa 
Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing in Perspective: Implications for 
International Law and Implementation Challenges (Brill Nijhoff 2013) 30. 
75 Nagoya Protocol, art 6(2). 
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and involvement”, while MAT as a means to realise fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
is studied in-depth in chapter three. How have PIC or its equivalences been defined 
and interpreted under the Nagoya Protocol, especially those to be obtained from ILCs? 
To what extent could these procedural requirements safeguard ILCs’ control over their 
GR and TK and support ILC’s ABS-related claims? In order to answer these questions, 
I examine relevant binding and non-binding instruments adopted under the CBD 
framework chronologically as they address PIC from different perspectives and in 
various depths. It concludes with three key observations. First, PIC, as a key 
procedural legal requirement of ABS, has been significantly elaborated in international 
environmental law. It is not a fixed process that can provide a one-size-fits-all solution 
but plays an important role in ensuring ILCs’ participation in ABS transactions.76 
Second, there exists concerning interpretative ambiguity of PIC-related provisions in 
the Nagoya Protocol. The narrow reading of the text might impair ILCs’ claims to their 
GR and TK, thus creating hurdles for ILCs to be recognised as legitimate beneficiaries. 
Third, during the process of elaborating the legal obligation relating to PIC, the CBD 
Parties have enunciated the connection between the ABS framework and the protection 
of ILCs’ rights to culture, TK and lands via a range of innovative voluntary guidelines. 
However, these instruments do not create binding obligations and the rules and 
standards of best practice might be resisted by many States. 
                                               
76  CBD COP Decision XIII/18, 'Mo’otz Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines for the Development of Mechanisms, 
Legislation or other Appropriate Initiatives to Ensure the “Prior and Informed Consent”, “Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent” or “Approval and Involvement”, depending on National Circumstances, of Indigenous Peoples and Local 
Communities for Accessing their Knowledge, Innovations and Practices, for Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
arising from the Use of their Knowledge, Innovations and Practices relevant for the Conservation and Sustainable 
use of Biological Diversity, and for Reporting and Preventing Unlawful Appropriation of Traditional Knowledge' 
(17 December 2016) UN Doc CBD/COP/DEC/XIII/18 para 9. 
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2.2.1 Origin of PIC and its adaptation under the international ABS framework 
As a procedural legal tool, PIC originates from the medical law regime to address the 
potential risks of medical treatments received by patients and to support their full 
autonomy. 77  Consent is also required in the context of medical and scientific 
experimentation to protect individual from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).78 
In the early 1980s, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) 
promotes PIC as an international legal principle in the context of the International 
Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides.79 The 1998 Rotterdam 
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade then pins the concept in a legally 
binding instrument.80 In this international context, PIC is often utilised as a procedural 
requirement to protect people, especially in developing countries, from hazardous 
pesticide formulations that can cause severe health and environmental problems. 
Meanwhile, it serves as a safeguard to States’ sovereign rights and plays an important 
role in international relations.81 Admittedly, PIC in the ABS context has distinctive 
meaning and function. For instance, Dutfield has suggested that the emergence of the 
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PIC concept is tightly linked to the emergence of the concept of “biopiracy”.82 Indeed, 
the aim is to protect primarily the sovereign rights and interests of the provider States 
of GR, as well as the rights and interests of ILCs where they have a legitimate claim 
to GR and TK, instead of preventing hazards or potential risks.83 
The reading of Article 6 of the Nagoya Protocol suggests that although PIC is 
obligatory for access to GR, it is subject to domestic ABS laws and can be “otherwise 
determined”.84 In other words, under the Nagoya Protocol, PIC as a precondition for 
accessing to States’ GR can be abolished or modified as the provider State deems 
appropriate.85 PIC of ILCs cannot be “otherwise determined” but is subject to a range 
of qualifiers including “established rights” “as appropriate” and “in accordance with 
domestic law”. Nijar points out that these qualifiers could be read rather restrictively 
to suggest that unless ILCs’ right to grant access to GR is explicitly established, Parties 
do not have to ensure their PIC is obtained.86 During the meetings of the Interregional 
Negotiating Group on ABS, many countries have raised concern that the restrictive 
approach contradicts the very objective of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, as well 
as the intention of Parties as it was expressed during the negotiation history of the 
Protocol.87 This interpretative controversy leads to a continuous discussion about PIC 
under the CBD framework and the result is a number of instruments adopted by CBD 
Parties that provide voluntary guidance on the implementation of the PIC in particular 
at the domestic level. These include, the Bonn Guidelines (2002), the Akwé: Kon 
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83 Greiber and others (n 1) 95. 
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Guidelines (2004), the Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct (2011) and the Mo’otz 
Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines (2016). I examine them and their PIC-related provisions 
in the following section in order to unpack the meaning of PIC and its legal 
implications vis-à-vis ILCs in the ABS context.  
2.2.2 Normative innovations of CBD Parties via voluntary guidelines 
Before I discuss in depth the voluntary guidelines and their implications, it is necessary 
to clarify why they merit attention. The fact that these instruments are not legally 
binding among Parties make them “soft law” in nature. However, unanimously 
adopted by some 180 countries, these soft instruments have “a clear and indisputable 
authority” and provide “welcome evidence of an international will to tackle difficult 
issues that require a balance and compromise on all sides for the common good”.88 In 
scholarly discussion, it is increasingly accepted that these soft instruments can generate 
a wide-ranging consensus on international definitions and legal standards and indeed, 
contribute significantly to the corpus of international law.89 In the context of the CBD, 
for instance, the Bonn Guidelines as adopted in 2002 has eventually led to the 
articulation and adoption of the Nagoya Protocol in 2010. Other voluntary instruments 
adopted after 2010 are also important as they provide essential and detailed rules and 
standards on implementing the Nagoya Protocol and the ABS provisions in the CBD. 
They may not yet have acquired binding characteristics or status as a subsequent 
agreement of Parties. Nevertheless, the normative innovations enshrined in these soft 
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instruments, as will be discussed, are a significant part of the ABS framework and 
cannot be dismissed for constructing a holistic and systemic perspective of the Nagoya 
Protocol. Furthermore, there exists the possibility for the normative standards of these 
soft instruments to be adopted by law-applying organs, such as judges, officials or 
legislators, and therefore, become authentic interpretations that are of legally-binding 
effects. 90 
The Bonn Guidelines. In 2002, as the work to operationalise CBD provisions 
began to intensify, the Conference of Parties (COP) to the CBD adopted the Bonn 
Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the 
Benefits Arising out of their Utilization (Bonn Guidelines)91 at its sixth meeting. This 
voluntary instrument seeks to assist CBD Parties, governments and other stakeholders 
in developing national access legislation as well as negotiating contractual ABS 
terms.92 As far as PIC is concerned, the Bonn Guidelines stipulate the basic principles 
for a PIC system, including legal certainty and clarity, minimum cost, transparent 
restrictions, legal grounds and consistency with CBD objectives.93 Tully has observed 
that the PIC process articulated in the Bonn Guidelines does not only involve top-down 
efforts assigned to legislators and regulators, but also bottom-up inputs from 
communities and private entities—a two-tiered approach underpinned by public 
participation and consultation processes.94 A thorough reading of the Bonn Guidelines 
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also unveils its fundamental concern that PIC shall be meaningful, inclusive and 
reflective to the voices of ILCs. 
Specifically, the Bonn Guidelines highlight the principal role of competent 
national authority(ies) to grant access permission and suggest that this system could 
be established at different levels domestically (national/provincial/local). 95  The 
instrument provides that ILCs’ competence to grant PIC shall also be considered as a 
basic principle of PIC system, as appropriate to the circumstances and subject to 
domestic law.96 In the same line, the Guidelines further address the need to respect the 
established legal rights of ILCs vis-à-vis their GR and TK, and that PIC or “the 
approval and involvement of the holders of traditional knowledge, innovations and 
practices” should be obtained, in accordance with their traditional practices, national 
access policies and subject to domestic laws.97  
With respect to what specific elements should PIC contain for practical 
purposes, the Bonn Guidelines provide a list as such: competent authority(ies); timing 
and deadlines; specification of use; procedures for obtaining PIC; mechanism for 
consultation of relevant stakeholders; process.98 They further specify that PIC needs 
to be obtained adequately in advance to be meaningful for both those seeking and for 
those granting access.99 PIC should also be strictly linked to the purpose for which 
consent is granted to. The Guidelines suggest new PIC should be obtained, when any 
change of use (including transfer to third parties) is of concern.100 Furthermore, one 
chapter of the Bonn Guidelines, “Participation of Stakeholders”, highlights the 
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importance of and the possible ways to realise the involvement of relevant stakeholders 
in order to achieve adequate implementation of ABS measures.101 Specific guidance 
on developing and implementing consultative initiatives (e.g. national consultative 
committees),102 procedural requirements (e.g. that stakeholders’ views shall be taken 
into consideration in each step of the consultation process) 103  and facilitative 
responsibilities (e.g. provide scientific and legal advice to ILCs and support ILCs for 
capacity-building in order to ensure effective participation and active engagement) are 
provided.104  The instrument also stresses that the diversity of stakeholders might 
require “appropriate involvement” to be determined on a case-by-case basis.105 These 
procedural standards could empower IPLCs to participate in ABS transactions and 
encourage participatory institutions that possess rights to control access to GR and TK, 
but it would very much depend on the national implementation and political 
willingness to substantiate the Guidelines at domestic and local levels.  
The Akwé: Kon Guidelines. In the seventh session of the CBD in 2004, 
another voluntary instrument focusing on the cultural, environmental and social impact 
assessment regarding ILCs’ lands and waters— Akwé: Kon Guidelines 106 —was 
adopted by the COP.107 This instrument arises from the CBD commitment to protect 
TK by incorporating ILCs’ considerations into the new or existing impact assessment 
procedures.108 Under the general mandate of the Akwé: Kon Guidelines of regulating 
impact assessment, they highlight the fact that PIC corresponds to different phases of 
                                               
101 ibid para 17. 
102 ibid para 19. 
103 ibid para 18. 
104 ibid para 20. 
105 ibid para 17. Emphasis added. 
106 “Akwé: Kon” is a Mohawk term meaning "everything in creation" and used for the name of the Guidelines with a 
wish to representing the holistic nature of the instrument. 
107 VII/16 (n 88) anx F. 
108 ibid. 
Access and Human Rights Implications 
62 
the impact assessment process. Thus, the PIC system should consider “rights, 
knowledge, innovations and practices of Indigenous and local communities; the use of 
appropriate language and process; the allocation of sufficient time and the provision 
of accurate, factual and legally correct information”. 109  In the same line of 
strengthening public participation, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines envisage a twofold 
function of PIC in the impact assessment process: safeguarding ILCs’ ownership and 
control over TK, and respecting ILCs’ customary laws and intellectual property 
rights.110 Thus, this instrument not only strongly supports public participation of ILCs 
who are likely to be affected by the proposed activities,111 but also connects PIC with 
the objective of safeguarding ILCs’ rights and customary rules with respect to their 
TK. 
The Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct. At its tenth meeting in 2011, 
the COP adopted the Code of Ethical Conduct on Respect for the Cultural and 
Intellectual Heritage of Indigenous and Local Communities Relevant for the 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity (Tkarihwaié:ri Code of 
Ethical Conduct), focusing on the concept of TK.112 The Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical 
Conduct embraces a definition of TK that is in line with CBD Article 8(j), meaning 
“knowledge, innovations and practices of Indigenous and local communities 
embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity”.113 The interdependent relationship among TK, ILCs’ cultural heritage 
and their lands and waters is highlighted throughout the text of this instrument. 
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Specifically, the instrument notes that the protection of TK is fundamental for 
promoting full respect for ILCs’ cultural and intellectual heritage and in turn, ILCs’ 
access to their lands and waters and the opportunity to practise TK on those lands and 
waters, is paramount for the retention of TK.114 Specially, the Code of Ethical Conduct 
suggests ten general ethical principles that should underpin any interaction/activity in 
relation to ILCs, including “PIC and/or approval and involvement”.115 For TK that is 
associated with conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, the 
Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct requires any activities/interactions that are 
occurring on or likely to impact on ILCs’ lands and waters to be carried out with the 
PIC and/or approval and involvement of ILCs.116 Notably, it integrates the human 
rights concept of FPIC into its PIC principle, by elaborating the element “free” without 
enunciating it—“such consent or approval should not be coerced, forced or 
manipulated”.117  
The Mo’otz Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines. In 2016, the COP adopted the 
Mo’otz Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines in its thirteenth meeting, providing guidance to 
ensure ILCs’ consent for accessing their TK and fair and equitable benefit-sharing.118 
Controversially, the Guidelines make parallel reference to “PIC”, “FPIC” and 
“approval and involvement”, and use the non-conventional term “Indigenous peoples 
and local communities” (IPLCs). Morgera suggests that the presentation of a mixture 
of terminologies results from the fact that no consensus can be achieved by national 
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delegations during the negotiation process.119 Indeed, it implies disagreement on a 
universally agreed term. However, by incorporating a variety of terms rather than 
dispensing with the principle all together, it also represents an implicit consensus that 
measures, however termed, must be in place to ensure Indigenous and local 
participation in the decision-making process.  
Based on the key PIC elements identified by the Bonn Guidelines, the Mo’otz 
Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines elaborate them with particular attention to accommodate 
ILCs’ special interests and circumstances. That is, a “tailored” PIC system for ILCs. 
The instrument notes that, “depending on national circumstances and the diverse 
internal organization of various Indigenous peoples and local communities”; a PIC 
system may include competent authorities not only at the national or subnational level, 
but also for ILCs (at the community level).120 It elaborates the procedural elements of 
PIC, emphasising how the process could be best designated to involve ILCs in the 
decision-making and consent-granting process to a full extent.121 Key suggestions of 
the Guidelines include that the manner and language used in the process should be the 
ones that are understood by ILCs, and that the timing, implementation and monitoring 
processes should be culturally appropriate for ILCs.122 Furthermore, the Guidelines 
stress that due consideration for customary laws, community protocols, practices and 
customary decision-making processes of IPLCs could be taken into account for 
developing national ABS laws and regulations.123 Thus, it significantly strengthens the 
two-tiered structure elaborated by the Bonn Guidelines, in the sense that the ILCs are 
assigned a more proactive role in the PIC process at the local level. Specifically, the 
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gap between the top-down and the bottom-up approaches is narrowed through 
introducing “community” as a competent authority to issue PIC.  
Thus, it can be concluded that the CBD Parties have taken innovative 
approaches to articulate the meaning and requirement of PIC, especially in Indigenous 
and local contexts. As a precondition for access to GR and TK, PIC is designated to 
safeguard the rights and interests of provider States as well as ILCs/IPLCs where 
applicable. While the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol subject the ways in which PIC 
should be implemented to domestic laws, a range of voluntary guidelines is in place, 
providing detailed, albeit in some cases, controversial, standards for transposing PIC 
as a legal mechanism into domestic systems. Specifically, the importance of 
strengthening public participation and empowering democracy in the ABS transactions 
has been highlighted. The connection between PIC mechanisms and the protection of 
ILCs’ rights to their culture, TK and lands has also been emphasised in light of the 
recognition of the interdependent relationship among TK, cultural heritage and the 
lands and resources of ILCs. Moreover, the necessity and standards of respecting and 
taking into account specific national circumstances, customary laws and cultural 
diversity have been elaborated in order to achieve an effective, meaningful and 
inclusive PIC process. Nevertheless, it shall be noted that these instruments are 
adopted via COP decisions as voluntary instruments. Regardless the potential 
contribution they may have to the interpretation and implementation of the Nagoya 
Protocol in a mutually supportive manner with relevant human rights standards, they 
can only encourage and facilitate such process but not impose obligations on Parties 
to conduct these best practices. In reality, it still greatly depends on State governments 
for these international standards of soft law to take full effects. 
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2.3 ILCs’ customary laws and community protocols 
The customary laws of ILCs are addressed differently under the CBD and its Nagoya 
Protocol. The CBD does not refer to the customary laws of ILCs explicitly. Instead, 
concerns of ILCs are scattered across provisions relating to in situ conservation of 
biodiversity, 124  sustainable use of its components 125  and technical and scientific 
cooperation. 126  Its Working Group on ABS, nevertheless, has investigated the 
implications of customary laws for TK protection and ABS based on several case 
studies including India, China, Peru and Kenya.127 The Working Group found that, 
customary laws, including specific rules, social values and principles, worldviews and 
beliefs, codes of conduct and established practices, may vary in exact content but often 
share common principles.128 For instance, they are usually enforced by community 
institutions, derived from the utilisation of natural resources, locally recognised, orally 
held, dynamic and underpinned by values like reciprocity and equilibrium.129  By 
contrast, Article 12 of the Nagoya Protocol establishes an overarching clause obliging 
Parties to “take into consideration” ILCs’ customary laws, community protocols and 
procedures with respect to TK associated with GR while implementing all their 
obligations. 130  Several “broadly framed” obligations for Parties to facilitate 
understanding and fairness in ABS processes, 131  support the development of 
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community protocols,132 not restrict customary use,133 and to raise awareness of ILCs’ 
community protocols and procedures134 have also been provided. 135 Arguably, these 
requirements shall also cover GR held by ILCs given the inextricable linkage between 
GR and TK, as discussed in the previous section 1 in this chapter. Thus, albeit 
abstractly, the Protocol commits itself to protect ILCs’ TK and GR in accordance with 
ILCs’ own worldviews and customary rules.136  
This commitment is unprecedented in binding international environmental 
treaties and might appear “tangential” vis-à-vis other core provisions on ABS under 
the Protocol.137 For instance, Tobin suggests that the issue of the legal status of ILCs’ 
customary laws and community protocol and ways for respecting them in domestic 
contexts remain extremely unclear and under-explored in scholarly debates. 138 
Nevertheless, it poses an opportunity to consider the implication of ILCs’ customary 
laws in the broader context of international law: what is the legal status of their 
customary laws (as established by ILCs) vis-à-vis national laws (as established by 
domestic authorities)? This is particularly relevant to consider in light of legal 
pluralism, which recognises the legitimacy of both.139  By acknowledging the co-
existence of overlapping normative structures, legal pluralists essentially promote 
heterogeneous sources of legality and authority of law; therefore, acknowledge non-
State actors as norm generating subjects as well. 140  With respect to the Nagoya 
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Protocol, Bavikatte and Robinson have suggested in a rather optimistic manner that 
Article 12 would see “increased community rights and control over national resources 
where they are appropriate ‘owners’ or resources-holders”.141 Strictly speaking, the 
Nagoya Protocol does not recognise the legitimacy of ILCs’ customary laws as 
equivalent to national laws. Instead, the way in which and the extent to which 
customary laws shall be taken into consideration need be “in accordance with domestic 
law” and “as applicable”.142  However, it is possible that the customary laws and 
community protocols of ILCs could communicate specific rules, needs and aspirations 
of the communities from the local level to domestic and even international levels 
through ABS procedures. For instance, PIC could incorporate the local decision-
making process within the community and MAT could include terms that are deemed 
fair and equitable by ILCs themselves. The obligation of Parties to recognise and 
respect ILCs’ customary laws may essentially, although indirectly, assign legal power 
to customary laws and community protocols to a certain level that supports the 
premises of legal pluralism. It shall be noted, nevertheless, only few scholarly 
discussions have addressed the implication of the recognition of ILC’s customary laws 
in the Nagoya Protocol.143 
There are also practical benefits that might emerge from developing and 
incorporating ILCs’ customary rules and community protocols into national legal 
frameworks. In a broad context of biodiversity conservation and sustainable 
development, the wisdom and practical guidance of ILCs are increasingly sought as 
they may provide insights in terms of sustainably managing natural resources.144 In a 
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community context, a community protocol could function as a guidebook for outsiders 
as well as a checklist for community members to discuss and settle ABS-related 
questions, including authorities and procedures for community PIC and terms of 
benefit-sharing. 145  Furthermore, Morgera and others have suggested that a 
participatory process of developing community protocols could enhance the overall 
organisational capacity of the ILCs, assure inter-community equity and participation 
and empower collective self-identification. 146  From an interpretative perspective, 
elaborated customary rules of ILCs may also provide benchmarks for determining 
whether Parties’ obligation are fulfilled, for instance, whether their measures for 
implementation are indeed “appropriate” or not.  
Two main challenges persist with regard to implementation. First, substantial 
gaps remain in implementing processes with respect to ensuring participation of ILCs 
in the process of recognising their customary laws. In December 2016, the CBD COP 
notes the limited progress made in mainstreaming Article 8 (j) into various efforts 
relating to capacity development and the participation of ILCs, as well as the 
concerning fact that only a limited number of national biodiversity strategies and 
action plans even refer to ILCs and their customary sustainable use of GR.147 In 2017, 
Parties to the Nagoya Protocol were requested to submit an Interim National Report 
on their implementation, which contained a question asking whether the country is 
taking into consideration ILCs’ customary laws, community protocols and procedures 
as provided in Article 12(1). A total of 24 Parties and 1 non-Party State have affirmed 
that they have taken into consideration ILCs’ customary laws, while 24 Parties and 1 
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non-Party State reported to the contrary.148 A number of countries149 indicate that they 
are planning to address this issue while developing their ABS measures, including 
those countries that answered “no” to this question.150 The majority of the Parties have 
not yet fully implemented Article 12, notwithstanding a few successful cases.151 The 
problem is that there are no internationally established standards and procedures to 
guide the implementation of Article 12 and it has been approached in various ways at 
the national level.152 Second, it remains unclear as to how to ensure compliance with 
ILCs’ customary laws.153 At the national level, the CBD Working Group on ABS has 
suggested two approaches to incorporate Indigenous customary laws into domestic 
legal system: one is to recognise the legitimacy of ILCs’ customary laws embodying 
traditionally established rights; and another is to recognise the rights of ILCs over their 
TK and GR, in accordance with their customary laws.154 The first approach renders a 
part of States’ sovereign jurisdiction to authority of ILCs’ customary laws, which 
echoes the premises of legal pluralism. In comparison, the second approach transfers 
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certain standards embedded in the customary laws into domestic legal system and the 
rights would be integrated and protected when applying domestic laws. 155  Both 
approaches need time and practice to test their respective feasibility and effectiveness 
under specific national circumstances. Nevertheless, the issue of protecting ILCs’ 
rights pertaining to their customary laws remain relevant with either approach. Given 
the rights of especially Indigenous peoples pertaining to customary law are 
increasingly discussed in the context of international human rights, I will continue the 
discussion about the legitimacy of ILCs’ customary laws and States’ obligations to 
respect it in the subsequent section 3.3.156  
2.4 Responsibilities of State governments 
Since the authority to regulate the exact manner, extent and procedure of access rests 
with State governments, it is imperative to examine the role of governments and their 
responsibilities in developing national ABS frameworks and ensuring its functionality. 
Under the CBD, Parties are obliged to “facilitate access to their genetic resources for 
environmentally sound uses” and not to “impose restrictions that run counter to the 
objectives of the CBD”.157 Under the Nagoya Protocol, such facilitative obligations 
are elaborated at two levels. At the domestic level, Parties are required to establish 
various institutional arrangements to support access, including national focal points 
and competent national authorities.158 At the international level, Parties are required to 
promote transboundary cooperation159 and share ABS-related information through the 
                                               
155 ibid para 55. 
156 For a discussion of the status of Indigenous peoples’ rights to their own legal regimes under international law and 
the recognition of custom as a source of law in national constitutions, see Brendan Tobin, Indigenous Peoples, 
Customary Law and Human Rights - Why Living Law Matters (Routledge 2014) 52. 
157 CBD, art 15(2). 
158 Nagoya Protocol, art 13. 
159 ibid art 11. 
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Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House.160 Furthermore, Article 8 of the Protocol 
highlights certain situations in connection with non-commercial research, 161 
emergency cases related to human, animal, or plant health162 and the importance of 
GR for food security,163 which call for Parties’ special considerations. As a means to 
complement legislative and regulatory approach to regulate ABS, Article 20 also 
encourages Parties to support the development and utilisation of voluntary norms, such 
as codes of conduct, guidelines and best practices and/or standards.164 This implies 
that concerted efforts are necessary for achieving the objectives of the Nagoya Protocol 
from not only governments, but also companies, scientific associations, non-
governmental organisations and ILCs that are involved in the ABS transactions. The 
role of government in this context is also of a facilitative nature, which includes a range 
of specific responsibilities such as, inter alia, awareness raising, capacity-building and 
promoting best practices.165 In particular, Article 21 requires Parties to take measure 
to raise awareness of community protocols and procedures of ILCs166 and Article 22 
provides specific reference to the need to increase capacities of ILCs (with a sharpened 
focus on women) in relation to ABS and particularly TK associated with GR.167 
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that governments of Parties to the Nagoya 
Protocol are expected to take up a facilitative role in the process of implementing the 
Protocol. It contains responsibilities to facilitate access while taking into account 
relevant human rights of ILCs to food, health and customary laws, as well as the 
specific needs and interests of women within ILCs. The implementation of the 
                                               
160 ibid art 17 (1)(a)(iii). 
161 ibid art 8(a). 
162 ibid art 8(b). 
163 ibid art 8(c). 
164 Greiber and others (n 1) 159. 
165 ibid 196. 
166 Nagoya Protocol art 21(i). 
167 ibid art 22(5). 
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Protocol also involves a multitude of relationships among a variety of stakeholders, 
including private entities, research institutes and NGOs, as well as ILCs within and 
beyond States’ territorial boarders. These characteristics will be revisited in the 
following section 3 as I explore the implications of the responsibilities imposed on 
States by international human rights law with respect to ILCs. 
3. Human rights implications on access-related provisions 
Previous sections have analysed access-related provisions in the Nagoya Protocol and 
their implications vis-à-vis the rights of ILCs and the responsibilities of State 
governments. Based on the potential interaction between the Nagoya Protocol and 
relevant human rights as highlighted, this section investigates specific international 
human rights established for IPLCs, as well as the correlated human rights obligations 
imposed on States. I aim to answer the questions raised at the beginning of this chapter. 
What are the relevant human rights established at the international level for IPLCs in 
situations where their GR and TK are sought and accessed? What is the relationship 
between the ABS rights and the human rights of IPLCs and to what extent they may 
assist one another in their realisation? What are the relevant obligations imposed upon 
States by international human rights standards? Three categories of human rights are 
identified because of their fundamental importance and particular relevance to these 
questions, namely, the human rights of self-determination, FPIC and cultural rights 
pertaining to IPLCs’ customary laws. 
3.1 Right of self-determination 
The right of self-determination appears in the Charter of the United Nations as well as 
the two International Covenants. The ICCPR and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) establish the right of “all peoples” to 
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self-determination as their key prerogative in Article 1 with identical provisions, 
asserting that “by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”,168 as well as to “freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources” for their own ends.169 In the time when 
these instruments were adopted, the right of self-determination was mainly meant as a 
political and legal tool to achieve decolonisation, which is evident in the text of Article 
1(3) of the ICCPR and the ICESCR170 and the relevant practice of the UN.171 For 
instance, in the advisory opinion on the Namibia case in 1970, the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) recognised the applicability of self-determination as a principle 
enshrined in the UN Charter to all peoples in colonial situations.172 The ICJ reiterated 
this position in the Western Sahara case in 1975,173 where it formally acknowledged 
the existence of the Indigenous notion of land rights of Western Sahara.174 Although 
the original importance of self-determination is rendered to colonial peoples, this right 
and its implications continue to be relevant and important in the post-colonial era.175 
In a more recent case, the Israeli Wall case in 2004, the ICJ reaffirmed that “the right 
of peoples to self-determination is today a right erga omnes”, citing the UN Charter 
                                               
168 ICCPR and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 3 January 1976], art 1(1). 
169 ICCPR and ICESCR, art 1(2). 
170 It reads, “State Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-
Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination”. 
171 CERD, 'CERD General Recommendation No. 21: Right to Self-determination' (1996) UN Doc A/51/18 para 4 
and Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [16 October 1975] (ICJ) Rep 12 37. See also Gj Simpson, ‘The Diffusion 
of Sovereignty: Self-determination in the Post-colonial Age’ (1996) 32 (2) Stanford Journal Of International Law, 
265. 
172 See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [21 June 1971] (ICJ) Rep 16 31. See 
Robert McCorquodale, ‘Self-determination: a Human Rights Approach’ (1994) 43 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 858. 
173 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) (n 171). The Court heard this case at the request of the UN General Assembly. 
174 ibid 40. 
175 Rhona K. M. Smith, International Human Rights Law (Eighth edn, Oxford University Press 2018) 296. 
 Complementarity between the Nagoya Protocol and human rights 
75 
and the Human Rights Covenants.176  Furthermore, the ICCPR General Comment 
No.12 reckons the right of self-determination as “an essential condition for the 
effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for the promotion 
and strengthening of those rights”.177 Indeed, the right of self-determination is the 
foundation of many other human rights, including, inter alia, political and civil rights 
such as the right of political participation178 and minority rights,179 and economic, 
cultural and social rights such as the right to national resources180 and the right to 
development.181 
The right of self-determination is in general considered as entailing two 
dimensions: external and internal. An external claim to self-determination usually 
concerns a territorial dispute and could be realised by secession aiming for an 
independent statehood. 182  This dimension of self-determination is conspicuously 
intertwined with the notion of decolonisation during the 1950s and 1960s.183 However, 
its realisation has also been witnessed in the post-Cold War era by non-colonial 
                                               
176 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [9 
July 2004] (ICJ) Rep 136 paras 87 and 88. For more discussion about ICJ and its advisory opinions in these cases, 
see chapter four section 3.1.4. 
177 HRC, 'CCPR General Comment No.12: Article 1 The Right to Self-determination of Peoples' (13 March 1984) 
UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. II) 1. 
178 ICCPR, art 25. Also International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [adopted 
21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969], art 5(c). 
179 ICCPR, art 27. The HRC has reiterated that the provisions of Art 1 may be relevant in interpretation of other rights 
protected under the ICCPR, see Smith (n 175) 307. 
180 General Assembly adopted resolution 1803 (XVII) on the “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” on 
14 December 1962. See Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law (Second edn, Longman 2010) 147. 
181 Declaration on the Right to Development [4 December 1986] UNGA Res A/RES/41/128, pmbl, arts 1 and 5. 
Arjun K. Sengupta, ‘On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development’ (2002) 24 (4) Human Rights 
Quarterly, 862.  
182 CERD (n 171) para 4. Lea Brilmayer, ‘Secession and Self-determination: a Territorial Interpretation’ (1991) 16 (1) 
The Yale Journal of International Law, 178. 
183 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) (n 171) para 37. ; Frederic L. Kirgis, ‘The Degrees of Self-Determination in 
the United Nations Era’ (1994) 88 (2) American journal of international law, 305. 
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peoples from, for instance, the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. 184  Indeed, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
confirms that the principle of self-determination applies to all peoples—not only to 
colonised peoples. 185  Overall, external self-determination has not been widely 
accepted in a political sense as it poses potential threats to the territorial integrity of 
States.186 The internal dimension of self-determination includes the right of all peoples 
to pursue freely their economic, social and cultural development without outside 
interference. 187  From a people’s perspective, it follows that the right shall be 
understood not only as the attainment of independent statehood, but also as the 
assertion of identity, language, tradition, self-management and autonomy within States’ 
territories. 188  This dimension of self-determination has attracted much attention 
especially in an Indigenous context. For instance, the HRC has affirmed that the 
Indigenous Sami people in Finland and Chile are entitled to internal self-determination 
in the context of natural resources extraction.189 Since internal self-determination is 
less politically controversial (and thus more pragmatically accessible), it has been 
more widely used by legal scholars and Indigenous advocates when referring to 
various forms of Indigenous rights, including, self-government, autonomy, territorial 
integrity, lands and resources. 190  Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting that the 
                                               
184 Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and 
Commentary (Third edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 159. 
185 HRC, 'Comments of the Human Rights Committee on Azerbaijan' (3 August 1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.38 
para 6. 
186 Joseph and Castan (n 184) 159 and Catherine J. Iorns, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination: Challenging 
State Sovereignty’ (1992) 24 (2) Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 252. 
187 CERD (n 171) para 4.  
188 Anaya (n 13) 86. 
189 HRC, 'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Finland' (2 December 2004) UN Doc 
CCPR/CO/82/FIN para 17 and HRC, 'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Chile' (18 
May 2007 ) UN Doc CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5 para 19. 
190 Ricardo Pereira and Orla Gough, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in the 21st Century: Natural 
Resource Governance and the Right to Self-determination of Indigenous Peoples under International Law’ (2014) 
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scholarly debate continues as to the nature of internal self-determination and the level 
of autonomy which can be demanded to satisfy that right.191 
A major problem of the term is the lack of official definition of the right-
holders—who are the “peoples”? Various characteristics of peoples have been put 
forward, such as common historical tradition, racial or ethnic identity, territorial 
connection, common economic life and a certain minimum number of population.192 
However, no human rights instrument explicitly defines the concept and no universally 
accepted list of characteristics of “peoples” exists. 193  Furthermore, as the HRC 
determines that self-determination is not a right cognisable under the Optional Protocol 
of ICCPR,194  there is very limited jurisprudence on this matter offered by treaty 
monitoring bodies.195 The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) as adopted in 2007 is a milestone of the international recognition 
of Indigenous peoples and their human rights.196 Affirming the right of Indigenous 
peoples to self-determination (even though in a limited form), 197  the UNDRIP 
                                               
14 (2) Melbourne Journal of International Law, 156 and Karen Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous 
Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy (Duke University Press 2010) 67. 
191 Smith (n 175) 301. 
192 McCorquodale (n 172) 866 and Yoram Dinstein, ‘Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities’ (1976) 25 
(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 104. 
193 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice’ (1994) 43 (2) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 261. 
194  HRC, 'CCPR General Comment No. 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities)' (8 April 1994) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 para 3.1. 
195 The HRC has made clear that self-determination is a collective right, which cannot be claimed by individuals. See 
Lubicon Lake Band v Canada [26 March 1990] (HRC) UN Doc Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) paras 13.3 and 32.1. John 
Wilson v Australia [1 April 2004] (HRC) UN Doc CCPR/C/80/D/1239/2004 (2004) para 4.3.  
196 Steve Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki, ‘Introduction’ in Steve Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart Publication 2011) 1. 
197  In the sense that it does not recognise the “strong” forms of self-determination, including external self-
determination and internal self-determination that provide for significant autonomy for indigenous peoples. See 
Karen Engle, ‘On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Context of 
Human Rights’ (2011) 22 (1) European Journal Of International Law, 142. 
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provides a detailed list of rights that constitute the minimum standards for the survival, 
dignity and well-being of Indigenous peoples around the world.198 Reiterating the 
political, economic, social and cultural aspects of the right of self-determination, the 
UNDRIP highlights that Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to 
“their internal and local affairs”.199 The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous peoples, James Anaya, has 
suggested that the articulation of the right of self-determination in the UNDRIP shed 
light on the understanding of “Indigenous peoples” vis-à-vis their specific historical, 
cultural and social circumstances.200 Smith also argues that the instrument indicates a 
shift in the focus to re-centre on self-determination in international human rights 
law.201  A number of mechanisms, for example, FPIC, has been envisaged in the 
UNDRIP as a means in furtherance of their self-determination.202 
Thus, it can be observed that the right of self-determination is of fundamental 
importance in international human rights law, based on which all peoples are entitled 
to determine their political status, freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development, and dispose of their natural wealth and resources. The principle of State 
sovereignty over natural resources, as discussed in the previous section 2.1, shall thus 
respect people’s rights to self-determination. In light of States’ responsibility to 
safeguard and fulfil the right of self-determination, it can be interpreted that the 
principle takes shape in a human right obligation to exercise State sovereign rights for 
                                               
198 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [13 December 2007] UNGA Res 61/295, art 43. 
199 ibid art 4. 
200 HRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous 
peoples, S. James Anaya' (11 August 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/9/9 para 86. 
201 Smith (n 175) 304. 
202 As they can consent or veto proposed projects affecting their lands, see CESCR, 'Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Colombia' (6 December 2001) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.74 
para 12/33. Smith (n 175) 305. 
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the purpose of promoting national development and ensuring the well-being of all its 
peoples.203 While it remains undefined, the term “peoples” unquestionably includes all 
persons within a State and all the groups of persons such as minorities and Indigenous 
peoples. In particular, Indigenous peoples have been bestowed with the general 
applicability of universal human rights norms and principles that also takes into 
account the specific Indigenous historical, cultural and social circumstances. As this 
thesis addresses IPLCs and their human rights in the ABS context of the Nagoya 
Protocol, I focus on the internal aspects of self-determination in connection with the 
rights of IPLCs to lands, resources, culture, development and those pertaining to FPIC 
and customary laws, and their implications on States obligations to adopt national laws 
and policies, comply with international standards and cooperate. I do not discuss the 
external aspects of self-determination that addresses issues of accession to independent 
statehood, although it might be relevant for IPLCs in cases where they make territorial 
claims.204 
3.2 Right to free, prior, and informed consent 
Free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) refers to engagement and participation of 
IPLCs in decision-making process of projects that might affect their rights, often 
concerning development projects conducted by extractive industries such as logging 
                                               
203 Daniëlla Dam-de Jong, International Law and Governance of Natural Resources in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Situations (Cambridge University Press 2015) 58 and Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons, ‘Responsibility 
Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights 
Law’ (2007) 70 (4) Modern Law Review, 599. 
204 Scholars have generally noted that the self-determination rhetoric has been of limited utility to most non-colonial 
oppressed peoples and that it has not been of much help for such groups in their territorial claims. See Rupert 
Emerson, ‘Self-Determination’ (1971) 65 American journal of international law, 465 and Joshua Castellino, 
‘Territorial Integrity and the Right to Self-Determination: An Examination of the Conceptual Tools’ (2008) 33 (2) 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 556. 
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and mining.205 With a growing significance in safeguarding especially Indigenous 
rights, FPIC is integrated in many international fora and development agendas. For 
instance, the CBD, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the World Conservation Union, the World Bank and the 
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), dealing with issues 
ranging from biological resources and TK, to development and resettlement policies, 
natural conservation plans and protection of Indigenous cultural heritage.206 These 
developments largely are the consequence of the ongoing advocacy by Indigenous 
peoples to have their fundamental human rights recognised and respected, especially 
those pertaining to lands, natural resources and, increasingly, knowledge and 
cultures.207 Indeed, Doyle and Barelli have demonstrated that FPIC constitutes an 
emerging principle of international human rights law and its role in safeguarding 
IPLCs’ fundamental human rights is increasingly recognised by many international 
organisations, judicial and quasi-judicial bodies and numerous domestic laws. 208 
Anchoring their examination of FPIC to the UNDRIP and the International Labour 
                                               
205 Suzanne A. Spears and Lisa J. Laplante, ‘Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community Consent Processes 
in the Extractive Sector’ (2008) 11 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, 70. 
206 There is extensive literature on FPIC in these contexts, see, inter alia, Joel-David Dalibard and Toshiyuki Kono, 
‘Prior Informed Consent: Empowering the Bearers of Cultural Traditions’ in Toshiyuki Kono (ed), Intangible 
Cultural Heritage and Intellectual Property: Communities, Cultural Diversity and Sustainable Development 
(Intersentia 2009) and other contributions in this book, Britta Rudolff and Susanne Raymond, ‘A Community 
Convention? An Analysis of Free, Prior and Informed Consent Given under the 2003 Convention’ (2013) 8 
International Journal Of Intangible Heritage, 153,Stuart R. Butzier and Sarah M. Stevenson, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ 
Rights to Sacred Sites and Traditional Cultural Properties and the Role of Consultation and Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent’ (2014) 32 (3) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 297 and Fergus MacKay, ‘Universal Rights 
or a Universe unto Itself--Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights and the World Bank's Draft Operational Policy 4.10 
on Indigenous Peoples’ (2002) 17 (3) American University International Law Review, 533. 
207 Joji Cariño, ‘Indigenous Peoples' Right to Free, Prior, Informed Consent: Reflections on Concepts and Practice’ 
(2005) 22 (1) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 20. 
208 Cathal M. Doyle, Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights and Resources: The Transformative Role of Free 
Prior and Informed Consent (Routledge 2014) 71 and Mauro Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the 
Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges Ahead’ 
(2012) 16 (1) The International Journal of Human Rights, 2. 
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Organization in 1989,209 as well as existing jurisprudence and evolving international 
policies and practices, Doyle and Barelli argue that FPIC is founded on substantive 
human rights such as the right of self-determination and property rights to lands and 
resources.210 However, while the tie between FPIC as a procedural right and IPLCs’ 
substantive human rights are now widely established in scholarly discussions, it is 
necessary to note that the extent to which human rights norms may provide substantive 
support for Indigenous peoples’ claims to FPIC is much greater than those of local 
communities.211 
This section focused on FPIC as a human rights norm of IPLCs and investigate 
its implications for the access-related provisions of the Nagoya Protocol. The analysis 
builds upon the previous section 2.2, where PIC is examined as a key procedural 
mechanism to ensure ILCs’ rights and interests under the Nagoya Protocol. In 
particular, I look at the international standards as enshrined in the UNDRIP and the 
Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries adopted under the International Labour Organization (ILO Convention 
169).212 I also examine the jurisprudence of regional human rights courts and three UN 
human rights treaties bodies—the HRC, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
                                               
209 The ILO Convention 169 is the major binding international convention concerning Indigenous peoples before the 
UNDRIP, Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries [adopted 27 
June 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991] ILO C169. 
210 Doyle (n 208) 101 and Barelli (n 208) 11. 
211 See, inter alia, Caroline E. Foster, ‘Articulating Self-determination in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’ (2001) 12 (1) European Journal Of International Law, 148, Mary Ellen Turpel, ‘Indigenous 
People's Rights of Political Participation and Self-Determination: Recent International Legal Developments and the 
Continuing Struggle for Recognition’ (1992) 25 (3) Cornell International Law Journal, 593; Daniel Barstow 
Magraw and Lauren Baker, ‘Globalization, Communities and Human Rights: Community-Based Property Rights 
and Prior Informed Consent’ (2007) 35 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 419 and Helen Quane, 
‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: New Directions for Self-Determination and Participatory 
Rights?’ in Steve Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (Hart Pub. 2011) 263. 
212 ILO Convention 169. 
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Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD).213 The articulation of FPIC as a human rights norm provided 
in these contexts shines a light on the understanding of three key questions: A) what 
is a human right to FPIC? B) How does it relate to other human rights of IPLCs, for 
instance, the right of self-determination, culture, participation, property and 
development? And C) what are the implications of the right to FPIC and its 
interrelations with other human rights in the ABS context of the Nagoya Protocol? 
3.2.1 International human rights standards: the ILO Convention 169 and the 
UNDRIP 
FPIC is not always explicit in international human rights instruments. Some human 
rights instruments speak broadly of a minority’s right to participate in decisions that 
might affect them. For instance, the ICCPR General Comment No. 23 on the rights of 
minorities notes that the enjoyment of cultural rights under Article 27 of the ICCPR 
“may require positive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the effective 
participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them”.214 
The CERD General Recommendation No. 23 on the rights of Indigenous peoples also 
call upon States Parties to “ensure that members of Indigenous peoples have equal 
rights in respect of effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly 
relating to their rights and interests are taken without their informed consent”.215 
Similarly, the ILO Convention 169 216  requires State governments to conduct 
consultation and to facilitate Indigenous and tribal peoples to “freely participate in all 
                                               
213 They monitor the implementation of the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the ICERD respectively. 
214 HRC, CCPR General Comment No. 23 (n 194) para 7. 
215 CERD, 'CERD General Recommendation No. 23: Indigenous Peoples' (1997) UN Doc A/52/18 para 4(b). 
216 As discussed in section 2.1.2 of chapter one, this treaty does not have a large number of State Parties but has proved 
to be influential in elaborating indigenous and tribal rights in both international law-making process and in scholarly 
discussions, see Anaya (n 13) 58. 
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levels of decision-making”, “with the objective of achieving agreement or consent”.217 
Thus, even though these instruments do not use the language of FPIC, it could be 
argued that they in fact incorporate the essential elements of FPIC, for instance, 
effective participation and informed consent, in their establishments of human rights 
to varying degrees.218 Barelli has suggested that the requirements of consultation and 
participation in the Convention 169 should be read in conjunction with other 
provisions in the treaty, especially those establish the rights of Indigenous peoples 
pertaining to their lands, resources and culture, which include a strong demand for 
ensuring effective participation in the use, management and conservation of these 
resources.219 This line of thinking could also apply to the reading of the General 
Comments and Recommendations issued by human rights treaty bodies as well, that 
the requirements pertaining to FPIC is in fact interrelated to other fundament human 
rights of IPLCs. This point is articulated in the following section 3.2.3. 
On the contrary, the UNDRIP addresses explicitly the proactive role of FPIC 
in protecting Indigenous peoples’ human rights. Unlike the ILO Convention 169, the 
UNDRIP is not a binding instrument. There are legal scholars, including Anaya and 
Wiessner, hold strongly that the UNDRIP is binding to the extent that the content of 
the Declaration is supported by the factual State practice (even of the counties that 
voted against) and the general opinio juris. 220  Wisessner suggests that the key 
provisions of the UNDRIP, or at least the principles embedded in it, reflect pre-existing 
                                               
217 ILO Convention 169, art 6. 
218 This point can also be supported by the decision of the ILO Governing Body, see ILO Governing Body, 'Report 
of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Ecuador of the Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Confederación 
Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres (CEOSL)' (2001) GB. 282/14/2 para 39. 
219 ILO Convention 169, arts 13 and 15. Barelli (n 208) 6. 
220 S James Anaya and Siegfried Wiessner, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards Re-
empowerment (JURIST Forum, 2007) 7 <http://www.jurist.org/forum/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-of-
indigenous.php> accessed 27/11/2017. 
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customary international law and, to some extent, generate new customary international 
rules.221 There are also scholars who are more cautious about this perspective, for 
instance, Xanthaki and Davis, who have suggested that the above arguments are rather 
premature and over-ambitious.222 Although the normative status of the UNDRIP might 
be controversial in scholarly discussions, we should not overlook or underestimate the 
impacts of the UNDRIP in both practical and normative terms. As will be 
demonstrated in the next section, its provisions on FPIC have greatly influenced the 
practices of the most important human rights treaty bodies and several regional human 
rights courts towards the understanding Indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, resources 
and culture.  
Specifically, in relation to Indigenous rights of land and territories, Article 10 
of the UNDRIP stresses that Indigenous peoples shall not be relocated without their 
FPIC.223 Article 32 further requires States to consult and cooperate in good faith with 
Indigenous peoples through their own representative institutions in order to obtain 
FPIC prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources. 224  Pertinent to environmental protection, States are required to take 
effective measures to prevent storage or disposal of hazardous materials from taking 
place in the lands or territories of Indigenous peoples without their FPIC.225 The 
UNDRIP also highlights the States’ obligation to consult with Indigenous peoples in 
order to obtain their FPIC before adopting and implementing any domestic legislative 
                                               
221 Siegfried Wiessner, ‘The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges’ 
(2011) 22 (1) European Journal Of International Law, 130. 
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223 UNDRIP art 10. 
224 ibid art 32 (2). 
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or administrative measures that may affect them. 226  Furthermore, the UNDRIP 
imposes obligations on States to ensure restitution or compensation for the lands and 
resources which are traditionally owned or used by Indigenous peoples, if such lands 
or resources were occupied or used without Indigenous peoples’ FPIC.227 Finally, by 
recognising Indigenous peoples’ right to practise and revitalise their cultural traditions 
and customs, Article 11 calls upon States to provide redress with respect to their 
cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without FPIC or in violation 
of their laws, traditions and customs.228  
Thus, the UNDRIP makes clear that FPIC functions as an important procedural 
safeguard to Indigenous peoples in the contexts of lands use, relocation, resources 
exploitation, environmental protection and the development of national laws and 
policies that might affect Indigenous peoples’ rights. Meanwhile, as enshrined in 
Article 11 and 28 of the UNDRIP, States are obliged to provide redress and 
compensation for lands, resources, cultural and intellectual property of Indigenous 
peoples that have been taken without their FPIC. This remedial function of FPIC needs 
to be linked the “historic injustices” suffered by Indigenous peoples, as recognised in 
the paragraphs of the Preamble.229 In Anaya’s words, because Indigenous peoples are 
the peoples who “have suffered oppression at the hands of others”, their right to self-
determination also requires the international community and States to reverse and 
redress the past violations to Indigenous rights, in addition to States’ responsibility to 
respect and reconcile the political, economic, social and cultural relationship with 
                                               
226 ibid art 19. 
227 ibid art 28. 
228 ibid art 11. 
229 In the Preamble of the UNDRIP, the General Assembly expresses concerns “that indigenous peoples have suffered 
from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and 
resources”. 
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Indigenous peoples.230 In line with the ILO Convention 169, Article 18 of the UNDRIP 
also highlights the right of Indigenous people to participate in decision-making in 
matters which would affect their rights.231 In this connection, Anaya and Xanthaki 
argue that, as the UNDRIP anchors the Indigenous peoples’ right to participation to 
the internal aspect of self-determination, it is quite significant that FPIC then indirectly 
connects with the most fundamental human rights of Indigenous peoples.232 To push 
this argument further, it follows that the essential reason to establish mechanisms like 
FPIC is not only because the importance of preserving their distinct culture or 
promoting social and economic development, but also because the paramount demands 
of humanity to respect who they are and to assign that identity with universal human 
rights, as equally applied for other peoples.233 In order to shed light on the extent to 
which this might be realised in specific contexts, I look at the practices of regional 
human rights courts and international human rights treaties bodies in the following 
section, after a brief investigation of the definition of FPIC and its relationship with its 
ABS counterpart “PIC”. 
3.2.2 Definition of FPIC and its relationship with PIC 
The most commonly cited definition of FPIC is provided by the UN Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues (PFII) — an advisory body to the UN Economic and Social 
Council that provides expert advice and recommendations on Indigenous issues. In its 
2005 Report on FPIC and Indigenous peoples, PFII elaborates the key elements of the 
term FPIC by unpacking the questions of what is FPIC, when and how it should be 
                                               
230 S James Anaya, ‘The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post-Declaration Era’ in Claire 
Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA 2009) 196. 
231 UNDRIP, art 18. 
232 ibid art 3 and pmbl. Anaya (n 230) 193 and Xanthaki, ‘Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 
Years and Future Developments’ (n 222) 30. 
233 UNDRIP, art 2.  
 Complementarity between the Nagoya Protocol and human rights 
87 
obtained and from whom.234 According to this report, “free” should imply no coercion, 
intimidation or manipulation. “Prior” should imply that consent must be sought 
sufficiently in advance of any authorisation or commencement of activities, and that 
the relevant agents should guarantee enough time for the Indigenous 
consultation/consensus processes to take place. “Informed” implies that Indigenous 
peoples should receive satisfactory information in relation to certain key areas, 
including the nature, size, pace, reversibility and scope of the proposed project, the 
reasons for launching it, its duration, and a preliminary assessment of its economic, 
social, cultural and environmental impact. Crucially, this information should be 
accurate and in a form that is accessible, meaning that Indigenous peoples should fully 
understand the language used. Finally, “consent” should be intended as a process by 
which consultation and participation represent the central pillars.235 Under the CBD, 
FPIC has also been defined in the Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines in the context of access 
to IPLCs’ TK in the following terms: 
Free implies that Indigenous peoples and local communities are not pressured, 
intimidated, manipulated or unduly influenced and that their consent is given, 
without coercion; 
Prior implies seeking consent or approval sufficiently in advance of any 
authorization to access traditional knowledge respecting the customary 
decision-making processes in accordance with national legislation and time 
requirements of Indigenous peoples and local communities; 
Informed implies that information is provided that covers relevant aspects, 
such as: the intended purpose of the access; its duration and scope; a 
preliminary assessment of the likely economic, social, cultural and 
environmental impacts, including potential risks; personnel likely to be 
                                               
234 PFII, 'Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies regarding Free, Prior and Informed Consent and 
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involved in the execution of the access; procedures the access may entail and 
benefit-sharing arrangements; 
Consent or approval is the agreement of the Indigenous peoples and local 
communities who are holders of traditional knowledge or the competent 
authorities of those Indigenous peoples and local communities, as appropriate, 
to grant access to their traditional knowledge to a potential user and includes 
the right not to grant consent or approval; 
Involvement refers to the full and effective participation of Indigenous peoples 
and local communities, in decision-making processes related to access to their 
traditional knowledge. Consultation and full and effective participation of 
Indigenous peoples and local communities are crucial components of a consent 
or approval process.236 
This elaboration under the CBD, in particular the shared understanding of the elements 
of “free”, “prior”, “informed” and “consent” with the ones adopted by the PFII, 
supports the observation of legal scholars like Savaresi that the concept of PIC in the 
ABS framework overlaps with the concept of FPIC in the international human rights 
law.237 Admittedly, the ABS wording also includes other terms such as “approval and 
involvement”, which according to Morgera and others, reflects the reluctance by some 
CBD Parties to fully endorse the right to community PIC as developed in the 
international human rights law and enshrined in the UNDRIP.238  Thus, it can be 
observed that the core of the concepts is almost indistinguishable in both the ABS and 
human rights contexts, in the sense that PIC and FPIC, as a procedural prerequisite for 
the realisation of their respective objectives, contain certain standards and criteria.239 
This normative overlapping provides a crucial ground for a mutually supportive 
interpretation and implementation of PIC/FPIC-related rules. Yet, the key uncertainty 
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for applying the principle of mutual supportiveness is that State Parties of the Nagoya 
Protocol are not obliged to incorporate human rights standards of FPIC and the extent 
they might take the human rights elaboration of the term into consideration is largely 
up to their discretion. Another risk of interpreting and implementing PIC/FPIC is with 
the relatively weaker status of “local communities” recognised in international law.240 
Standards of FPIC that have been established for Indigenous peoples, especially those 
based on the assertation of the right of self-determination, do not directly apply in cases 
where local communities are concerned. However, it is still necessary to focus on the 
potential for a synergetic and systemic interpretation and implementation of PIC/FPIC 
in both areas of international law. For this reason, the following sections explore the 
elaboration of FPIC in the judicial practices of international human rights law.  
3.2.3 FPIC in the jurisprudential interpretation of UN human rights treaty bodies 
and regional human rights courts 
In this section, I investigate the jurisprudence of three UN human rights treaties 
bodies—the HRC, the CESCR and the CERD—and regional human rights courts with 
respect to IPLCs’ right to FPIC. An expansive jurisprudential interpretation of the 
human right to FPIC exists and its evolution is conspicuous through the rulings in some 
landmark cases, such as, Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname,241 the Endorois 
case,242 the Länsman et al v Finland case 243 and the Poma Poma v Peru case.244 The 
trend of establishing FPIC as a procedural human rights requirement of IPLCs in 
connection with their substantive human rights to lands, resources, culture and 
                                               
240 As discussed in the previous section 2 of chapter one. 
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Series C no 172. 
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development is present. The articulation of States’ duty to seek FPIC (sometimes more 
assertively as to “obtain” FPIC), adopt legislation on FPIC and recognise the 
importance of FPIC vis-à-vis IPLCs is also evident in numerous Concluding 
Observations provided by the HRC, the CESCR and the CERD. As will be 
demonstrated, the UNDRIP as adopted in 2007 has a significant impact on pushing 
this trend forward in the sense that the role and importance of FPIC is ever more 
enunciated. This supports the argument made before that although the UNDRIP is not 
a binding instrument, it nevertheless generates significant normative and practical 
impacts in international human rights law with respect to IPLCs. However, I 
acknowledge that the jurisprudential articulation of IPLCs’ right to FPIC is one thing, 
while the realisation in specific political, social and economic contexts could be quite 
another. There is limitation of forming a perspective of human rights law and its 
national implementation replying on the reports submitted by States,245 and the human 
rights courts and tribunals can only cover a fraction of human rights violations towards 
IPLCs around the globe. 246  However, to clarify the normative development as 
enshrined in the judicial practices and identify how international law could influence 
the interpretation of States’ responsibilities vis-à-vis IPLCs are imperative tasks. 
Investigating the possibilities and necessities of a mutually supportive interpretation, 
this section unpacks how the human rights standards of FPIC may shed light on 
interpreting the PIC-related provisions in the Nagoya Protocol, as well as how the 
ongoing implementation of the ABS rules of the Nagoya Protocol may complement 
the realisation of IPLCs’ human rights.  
                                               
245 For a detailed discussion about the UN human rights periodic review mechanism and its limitations, see Allehone 
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3.2.3.1 Human Rights Committee  
The HRC monitors the implementation of the ICCPR through reports submitted by its 
State Parties247 and considers inter-State248 or individual249 complaints about human 
rights violations. The HRC has addressed the issue of FPIC primarily through 
providing interpretation of minority’s right to culture, as enshrined in Article 27 of the 
ICCPR. Specifically, based on the observation that “culture manifests itself in many 
forms”, the HRC highlights that the understanding of the cultural rights of Indigenous 
peoples should be dynamic. 250  It further addresses the importance of lands and 
resources as they support Indigenous ways of life251 and urges States, to ensure the 
enjoyment of Indigenous peoples’ cultural rights and to have “positive legal measures 
to ensure the effective participation” in place.252 In this light, the HRC suggests that 
the right to culture entails a duty of States to consult with Indigenous peoples prior to 
any proposed initiatives that are likely to affect them. This can be observed in two 
cases regarding violations of Sami peoples’ cultural rights—Länsman et al v 
Finland 253  and Jouni E. Länsman et al. v Finland 254 —as well as a number of 
Concluding Observations.255 The following paragraphs discuss these cases in detail. 
                                               
247 ICCPR, art 28. 
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The authors of both communications submitted that the resource extraction 
activities conducted by private companies, namely, stone quarrying and logging, 
threatened their traditional way of life—reindeer herding; therefore, violated their 
rights to culture as enshrined in Article 27 of ICCPR. The Finnish Government had 
issued permits for these activities and claimed that in both cases, the Sami community 
has been consulted and their concerns accommodated. The HRC held that the Sami’s 
right to culture under Article 27 of ICCPR had not been violated, due to consultation 
and the limited impact of the extraction activities on their traditional practice of 
reindeer husbandry. 256  Conspicuously the HRC has considered Finland’s duty to 
consult with the Sami people fulfilled in both communications. It implies that the Sami 
people’s cultural right does impose a duty for their residential State to conduct 
consultation; however, Indigenous opinion would not necessarily influence the final 
decision on the concerned activity. Barelli has warned that this could suggest that, as 
far as the impact of such projects on Indigenous cultural practices is not disastrous, no 
right would be considered violated.257 Thus, even though the HRC does spell out that 
the aim of such a consultation process is for the effective participation of Indigenous 
peoples in the decision-making process in accordance with their right to self-
determination and the right to culture,258 the right to culture as accorded to minorities 
and Indigenous peoples appears passive rather than proactive. Arguably, this is due to 
the lack of substantial recognition of the Sami’s rights to land as a property, rather than 
                                               
Indigenous culture and way of life and to the participation of members of Indigenous communities in decisions that 
affect them, see HRC, 'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Chile' (24 March 1999) UN 
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mere cultural interests.259 As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three section 
2.3, property rights vis-à-vis ILCs’ lands and resources could provide a much stronger 
normative ground as to impose procedural obligations on States such as consultation, 
FPIC and even benefit-sharing.260 
States’ duty with respect to FPIC has been gradually recognised in addition to 
the duty to consultation by the HRC: the use of the term FPIC is especially perceptible 
after the adoption of the UNDRIP in 2007. In 2008, the HRC voices concern regarding 
the absence of a consultation process to secure FPIC to the exploitation of natural 
resources on Indigenous communities’ lands.261 In 2009, the HRC issues its decision 
on the Poma Poma v Peru case,262 in which the water diversion project authorised by 
the Peruvian Government has been found in violation of the right to enjoy cultural life 
of members of the Aymara community, because it destroys the natural surroundings 
for the community to continue their traditional economic activity—raising llamas. The 
HRC stresses that a minority or Indigenous community must be afforded the 
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process in relation to projects 
affecting their culturally significant economic activities. It also elaborates that such 
participation must be effective, “which requires not mere consultation but the free, 
prior and informed consent of the members of the community”.263 In the Concluding 
Observations issued by the HRC after the Poma Poma v Peru case, FPIC has been 
explicitly and consistently addressed. Specifically, the HRC considerers that States 
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bear a duty to adopt national legislation regarding prior consultations “with a view to 
guaranteeing” the FPIC of community members264 and Indigenous peoples need to be 
consulted properly in the process of adoption of law on consultation.265 Guidance on 
how to implement consultation and FPIC has been elaborated in more recent 
documents, including establishing representative institutions 266  and councils of 
Indigenous peoples.267 Thus, a trend of articulating States’ duty to seek FPIC, adopt 
legislation on FPIC and recognise the importance of FPIC in connection with 
substantive human rights to culture and lands is present. However, what is considered 
a “consent” is not defined and there is no procedural clarity as to the decision-making 
process within the IPLCs in order to reach a consent. Most problematically, it is not 
clear whether States’ duties to seek FPIC contains the duty to ensure the consent is 
eventually obtained. And when a consent cannot be reached, and whether the 
concerned IPLCs has a veto power on the concerned project or not.268 As discussed 
above, neither the UNDRIP or ILO Convention 169 goes as far as to grant Indigenous 
peoples a veto power while establishing their right to participation.269 Indeed, how, 
and to what extent the human rights of FPIC can be framed as to include a veto power 
is still a very controversial matter.270 
                                               
264 HRC, 'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Colombia ' (4 August 2010 ) UN Doc 
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3.2.3.2 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
The CESCR is the monitoring body of the implementation of the ICESCR. Similar to 
the practice of the HRC, it also has addressed State Parties’ duties with respect to 
consultation and FPIC for protecting cultural human rights, in light of the importance 
of maintaining the world’s cultural diversity.271 Evident in a number of its Concluding 
Observations issued pre-UNDRIP, while recognising the importance of consultation 
and FPIC for ensuring the participation of Indigenous peoples and minority groups, 
the CESCR provides no explicit affirmation on State’s duty to obtain FPIC.272 In 2009, 
the CESCR adopts the General Comment No. 21 on the right of everyone to take part 
in cultural life,273 which includes several explicit references to the ILO Convention 
169 and the UNDRIP on issues concerning Indigenous peoples.274 Listing specific 
rights accorded to Indigenous peoples by these two instruments such as the right to 
maintain, control, protect and develop their TK and GR, the CESCR demands that 
State Parties should respect the principle of FPIC of Indigenous peoples “in all matters 
covered by their specific rights”.275 Additionally, in the context of ensuring minority 
and Indigenous peoples’ right to take part in their cultural life, the CESCR highlights 
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a core obligation of State Parties to obtain FPIC when the preservation of their cultural 
resources is at risk.276  
Articulating the specific legal obligations imposed upon State Parties in 
relation to the right to culture, the CESCR explains that there are three levels of 
obligations—the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil.277 In light of the third 
level of obligation—to fulfil cultural human rights—the CESCR highlights repeatedly 
in its Concluding Observations that State Parties bear a duty to adopt legislation 
pertinent to consultation and FPIC in order to facilitate the participation of Indigenous 
peoples.278  It elaborates that FPIC should be systematically sought with effective 
consultation,279 based on intercultural dialogues280 that reflect the cultural difference 
of each people.281 It also stresses that effective FPIC mechanisms should aim to enable 
meaningful participation of Indigenous peoples in decision-making processes in 
relation to development projects on or near their lands or territories.282 The CESCR 
thus has taken a rather proactive approach in affirming State Parties’ obligations 
regarding FPIC especially when Indigenous peoples and minority groups are included. 
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Furthermore, recognising the “communal dimension” of Indigenous peoples’ 
cultural life that is indispensable to their existence, well-being and full development, 
as well as the inextricable relationship between Indigenous cultural rights and their 
rights to lands and resources, the CESCR has demanded State Parties to recognise and 
protect the rights of Indigenous peoples to own, develop, control and use their 
communal lands, territories and resources, and, where they have been otherwise 
inhabited or used without FPIC, take steps to return these lands and territories. 283 In 
other words, the absence of FPIC is capable of triggering State’s responsibility to take 
measures to ensure redress and restitution, even though the FPIC might not be required 
at the time when the lands were used. Thus, under the normative framework of 
ICESCR, the principle of FPIC does not only invoke a positive duty of State to secure 
FPIC, but can also, arguably, function as retroactive means to justify remedial claims 
and vindicate the past violations of Indigenous rights.284 However, in reality, it is 
difficult to observe whether and/or to what extent the standards articulated by the 
CESCR are fully respected and implemented at national and local levels.  
3.2.3.3 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination  
The CERD monitors the implementation of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).285 State Parties have 
been particularly called upon to ensure effective participation of Indigenous peoples 
in public life and that “no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests are 
taken without their informed consent”.286 In its Concluding Observations, the CERD 
has elaborated on the States’ duty to conduct consultation with Indigenous peoples in 
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situations where their interests and rights are relevant, for instance, resource 
exploration programmes that are conducted on Indigenous land,287 and developing and 
implementing domestic legislation288 and policy289 that concern Indigenous peoples. It 
has also stressed the importance of securing Indigenous peoples’ agreement in order 
to ensure their participation290 and in one case required a State to seek FPIC as well as 
ensure equitable benefit-sharing.291 Notably, in line with the CESCR, the CERD calls 
upon State to take steps to return Indigenous lands, if they have been inhabited or used 
without Indigenous peoples’ FPIC.292 
MacKay and Gilbert have demonstrated that the emphasis of CERD on 
Indigenous peoples’ right to informed consent and consultation has informed the 
drafting process of the UNDRIP and is reflected in Article 32(2) of the UNDRIP.293 
The explicit language of “FPIC” as a procedural requirement for safeguarding 
Indigenous peoples’ human rights is enunciated in the practice of the CERD especially 
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after the adoption of the UNDRIP. Specifically, the CERD occasionally adopts 
affirmative language when addressing State’s duty to obtain FPIC and urges State 
Parties to “consult the Indigenous population concerned at each stage of the process 
and obtain their consent in advance of the implementation of projects for the extraction 
of natural resources”.294 The CERD also explains that the purpose of an effective 
consultation mechanism is for obtaining Indigenous FPIC295 and elaborates that such 
mechanism should be “carried out systematically and in good faith”.296 The correlated 
duty for State Parties sometimes appear “mild” as they are required to establish 
appropriate regulations and mechanisms to ensure that prior consultations are 
conducted “with a view to securing” FPIC,297 while sometimes more affirmative as 
they are required to obtain “meaningful” FPIC of Indigenous peoples. 298  This 
oscillation manifests the fact that although FPIC unquestionably constitutes a human 
right of Indigenous peoples, the extent to which it shall be secured has not yet been 
established clearly by the CERD. Nevertheless, minimum standards for States to seek 
FPIC from Indigenous peoples are in place. Overall, CERD’s contribution to 
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articulating the human rights standards with respect to Indigenous peoples is widely 
recognised by international scholars.299 
3.2.3.4 Regional human rights courts and commissions 
In this section, I visit the decisions of four regional human rights judicial bodies with 
respect to IPLCs’ right to FPIC. These are the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (Inter-American Commission), the Inter-American Court on Human Right 
(Inter-American Court), the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Commission) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Court). What is common in these decisions is that FPIC has been reckoned as an 
important means to ensuring effective participation of IPLCs in decision-making 
process that might affect them. The right to FPIC is generally linked with other 
fundamental human rights pertaining to lands, freely disposing of natural resources, 
culture and development. In two landmark cases, the 2007 Saramaka case and the 2010 
Endorios case, it can also be observed that FPIC is considered as an extra procedural 
safeguard in addition to consultation, applicable in large-scale projects that might 
profoundly influence IPLCs.300 Nevertheless, the ways to identify condition in which 
FPIC is required in addition to consultation are not clear. 
Back in 1998, the Inter-American Commission approved the Merits Report No. 
27/98, in which it concluded that the State of Nicaragua had been actively responsible 
for violations of the right to property by granting concession to the construction work 
and logging exploitation on the Awas Tingni lands without their consent.301  The 
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Commission then brought the case before the Inter-American Court—the well-known 
ruling of the Inter-American Court on the Awas Tingni case.302 In this case, the Inter-
American Court held that the alleged property land rights had indeed been violated but 
it did not address the issue of FPIC. 303  In the 2006 Case of the Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v Paraguay, the Inter-American Court found that Paraguay had 
violated the property rights of the Sawhoyamaxa community by depriving their 
possession of land and their ability to participate in their culture, and by failing to 
provide effective remedies to allow them to regain access to these lands.304 As the 
Court specified the forms and measures of reparation, it held that “the State shall 
secure participation and informed consent by the victims, which must be expressed by 
their representatives and leaders”. 305  One year later, the Inter-American Court 
established in the landmark Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname three procedural 
safeguards that the State must abide in order to fulfil their obligation to ensure the right 
to property of Indigenous peoples, including effective participation, prior 
environmental and social impact assessments and benefit-sharing. 306  The case 
concerns the issuance of logging and mining concessions by the Suriname Government 
toward resources found within Saramaka territory. Recognising Saramaka’s right to 
property and self-determination, the Court has cited explicitly the ILO Convention 169, 
the UNDRIP, as well as the jurisprudence of the UN human rights treaty bodies.307 
With respect to the Indigenous right to consultation and the situation where it may 
contain “a duty to obtain consent”, the Court articulated that the States always have a 
duty “to actively consult with the community according to their customs and 
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traditions”.308 When the concerned development or investment projects are large-
scaled and would have a major impact within Saramaka territory, States also have a 
duty, to obtain their FPIC.309 In this light, in the 2015 Case of Kaliña and Lokono 
Peoples v Suriname, the Court found that the State had failed to ensure the effective 
participation of the Kaliña and Lokono peoples before undertaking or authorizing the 
exploitation of the bauxite mine within their traditional territory.310 One important 
reasoning that lead to this decision is the lack of any consultation processes aimed at 
obtaining the FPIC of the Kaliña and Lokono peoples.311 
In the African context, the African Commission established in the Endorois 
case that “failure to observe the obligations to consult and to seek consent…ultimately 
results in a violation of the right to property”.312 This case concerns the displacement 
of the Indigenous Endorois community from their ancestral lands in Kenya.313 The 
African Commission cited the ruling of the Saramaka case and decided that the 
absence of the procedural elements—impact assessment, FPIC and benefit-sharing is 
tantamount to a violation of the right to property and that “the failure to guarantee 
effective participation…also extends to a violation of the right to development”.314 In 
line with the Saramaka decision, the African Commission held that “any development 
or investment projects that would have a major impact within the Endorois territory, 
the State has a duty not only to consult with the community, but also to obtain their 
free, prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and traditions”.315 Based 
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on this observation, the African Commission established that the consultation 
conducted by the Kenyan Government was not sufficient because it did not obtain the 
FPIC of all the Endorois before designating their land as a Game Reserve and the 
consequential eviction.316  Another relevant case is the 2017 Ogiek case,317  which 
concerns the eviction of the Indigenous Ogiek community and other settlers of the Mau 
Forest by the Kenya Forestry Service in October 2009. In this case, although the 
Applicant has alleged consistently that, due to the absence of a FPIC from the Ogiek 
community, the Kenyan Government has violated the Ogieks people’ rights to freely 
dispose of their wealth and natural resources,318 to property,319 and to development,320 
the Court did not fully adopt the language of FPIC in its decision. Nevertheless, the 
Court found that these mentioned rights in relation to the property right to land were 
indeed violated “by expelling the Ogieks from their ancestral lands against their will, 
without prior consultation…the Respondent violated their rights to land”. 321  The 
African Court in this case also has cited the UNDRIP and suggested that the 
Indigenous right to lands shall be read in light of the UNDRIP.322  
3.2.4 Human rights implications 
The above analysis indicates that FPIC, as an emerging human rights principle, is 
designated to ensure effective and meaningful participation of Indigenous peoples, 
minority groups and local communities in decision-making processes in matters that 
might affect their rights. Under the jurisprudence of the CESCR, the CERD and in the 
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context of the UNDRIP, the absence of FPIC could also impose obligations on States 
to provide redress and fair compensation for the past violation of Indigenous peoples’ 
lands, resources, cultural and intellectual properties. The duty of State to conduct 
consultation, adopt legislation on FPIC and to seek FPIC has been enunciated, but the 
extent to which FPIC must be secured is not always clear. In particular, it remains 
unsettled whether the human right of FPIC could include a veto power on the concern 
projects or not. While the absent of a veto power in the current elaboration of FPIC in 
international human rights law is conspicuous, the benefits of doing so in fostering a 
stronger relationship between Indigenous peoples and their residual States have also 
been discussed, 323  Overall, the trend of establishing the connection between 
participatory rights such as consultation and FPIC with substantive rights such as the 
rights to property, development, culture and self-determination has been identified.324 
This is especially conspicuous after the adoption of the UNDRIP, which explicitly 
anchors Indigenous peoples’ rights to participation in their right to self-determination. 
The connection between substantive and procedural human rights is important as the 
right of self-determination, as provided in the Charter of the United Nations and two 
international Covenants on human rights, includes both economic and cultural 
dimensions. For many IPLCs, this means control over their lands and natural resources 
depends on which they maintain their traditional way of life and cultural practices.325 
As often the power of deciding on exploitation activities vests with State governments, 
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it is essential for these peoples and communities to participate in the decision-making 
processes of projects that might affect them.  
Could ABS and human rights be complementary to each other’s interpretation 
and implementation with respect to IPLCs’ right to PIC/FPIC? There are two 
perspectives to approach the possibility and necessity of a mutually supportive 
interpretation. First, the human rights standards on FPIC may provide normative 
ground for clarifying the interpretation of the ABS provisions, recalling the 
interpretative ambiguity of PIC-related provisions in the Nagoya Protocol as discussed 
in section 2.2.326 Specifically, the human rights standards on IPLCs’ right to FPIC 
would suggest that the narrow reading of Article 6 of the Nagoya Protocol, which 
implies that Parties do not have to ensure ILCs’ PIC unless ILCs’ right to grant access 
to GR is explicitly established, is unsound.327 This is because, even though there is no 
explicit assertion of a “right” of IPLCs to grant access, there are correlated duties 
imposed upon States to ensure FPIC and foreseen legal consequences if the FPIC is 
absent in certain circumstances. In other words, States’ duty to ensure FPIC exists as 
a human rights requirement regardless of whether IPLCs’ right to “grant access” has 
been explicitly established by domestic laws or not. Furthermore, the connection 
between IPLCs’ right to FPIC and other fundamental human rights implies their 
entitlement to grant access is not just an extrinsic normative creation by States, but an 
intrinsic right derived from the identity of such peoples and communities. This means 
IPLCs’ right to grant access regarding their GR and TK is established by the minimum 
standards of human rights and has intrinsically taken root in their fundamental human 
rights of property, culture and self-determination. This also means that States Parties’ 
discretion to interpret and implement the ABS provisions in the Nagoya Protocol need 
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to be in accordance with their human rights obligations, in particular, to recognise, 
establish and protect IPLCs’ rights to FPIC. Admittedly, the ground for Indigenous 
peoples to make human rights-based claims of FPIC is much stronger than that for 
local communities. It might be easier for Indigenous peoples to request a more robust 
protection of the right of FPIC in a domestic context.  
In turn, the ongoing process of interpreting and implementing the Nagoya 
Protocol could contribute to the understanding of human rights standards with respect 
to IPLCs. As examined, the international ABS framework provides a specific context 
where the principles and measures of a PIC/FPIC system are elaborated, domestic 
consultative initiatives, procedural requirements and facilitative responsibilities of 
State governments articulated, innovative solutions and good practices encouraged and 
increasingly established. 328  These legal advances and institutional developments 
provide timely normative guidance and practical evidence on how to transpose the 
abstract yet fundamental human right standards, that FPIC should be, inter alia, 
effective, meaningful and culturally appropriate, into a feasible agenda for State 
governments and private entities. The impacts might be limited as the ABS rules of 
the Nagoya Protocol only concern GR and associated TK, but the lessons can be learnt 
for other areas as well. Furthermore, as the traditional FPIC mechanisms focus on the 
coercion and infringement of Sate vis-à-vis IPLCs, PIC mechanism in the Nagoya 
Protocol could help to address the emerging concern of violations to IPLCs’ rights 
carried out by private entities. This is especially the case with multinational 
corporations that are involved in bioprospecting and utilising GR and TK accessed 
from IPLCs around the globe.329 Finally, in situations where States retain ownership 
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of GR and TK, or IPLCs’ human rights to GR and TK are not recognised,330 the ABS 
rules of the Nagoya Protocol could ensure their status as beneficiaries, if not owners 
of GR and TK. It could enable IPLCs to participate in and benefit from the economic 
development and technological advancements vis-à-vis GR and TK. These 
implications contribute especially to the process of articulating legal standards of 
including the often-neglected local communities in the decision-making processes that 
might affect their rights. 
However, normative uncertainties persist. For instance, the extent to which the 
States bear responsibility to secure that the consent is obtained from IPLCs, or whether 
Indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC implies a veto power of the project concened. 
Underlying these uncertainties is the political reluctance of relating IPLCs’ 
participatory rights such as consultation and FPIC to more substantive human rights to 
property and self-determination. This disjuncture between participatory rights and 
substantive rights is also evident in the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, as these 
environmental law instruments only incorporate the procedural elements such as FPIC, 
but abstain from referring to IPLCs’ human rights explicitly. This might be explained 
from a rather State-centric perspective, suggested by Bluemel, that the practical pursuit 
of a functional, effective and workable ABS framework determines the level of 
discretion accorded to State governments on matters relating to IPLCs and their 
rights.331 However, the protection of IPLCs’ human rights should not be restricted by 
States’ political agendas. It is in this regard, a mutually supportive understanding of 
the Nagoya Protocol in light of international human rights law may level the normative 
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ground of ABS towards better accommodating IPLCs’ needs and aspirations instead 
of States governments’ conveniences and priorities. 
3.3 Human rights pertaining to ILCs’ customary laws  
This section looks at human rights standards in recognising and protecting customary 
laws of IPLCs in relation to the previous analysis in section 2.3 about how ILCs’ 
customary laws and community protocols are addressed under the Nagoya Protocol. 
There is no consensus on the terminology to describe laws and customs developed by 
ILCs in international human rights law.332 A variety of terms, including, customs, 
traditions, institutions, laws, values and customary laws, has been adopted in the 
contexts of the ILO and the UNDRIP.333 Scholars including Coombe, Williams and 
Hardison have observed that this concept is closely related to TK that are developed 
by IPLCs. 334  The following analysis provides a closer examination of the ILO 
Convention 169 and the UNDRIP, as well as the judicial and legislative practices at 
regional and national levels pertaining to the recognition of IPLCs’ rights relating to 
their customary laws. It concludes with remarks on how the ABS procedures and 
normative recognition of ILCs’ customary laws and community protocols may 
contribute to their realisation, as well as how human rights pertaining to customary 
law may help to set the benchmark on how and to what extent the ILCs’ customary 
rules shall be respected.  
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The only binding international instrument that addresses Indigenous peoples’ 
human right to customary law is the ILO Convention 169. Noting that the “laws, values, 
customs and perspectives” of Indigenous and tribal peoples have often been eroded,335 
the Convention 169 obliges its Parties to respect Indigenous and tribal peoples’ 
customs, traditions and institutions while “promoting the full realisation of the social, 
economic and cultural rights of these peoples”, as a means to guarantee respect for 
their integrity.336 Specifically, Article 8 requires Parties, in applying national laws and 
regulations to the peoples concerned, to pay due regard to their customs or customary 
laws. 337  The extent to which Indigenous peoples are entitled to retain their own 
customs and institutions, however, is conditioned by the requirements that they are 
“not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and 
with internationally recognised human rights”. 338  The apparent limitation of the 
normative power of these provisions under the Convention 169 is that only 23 States 
have ratified it since its entry into force in 1991.339  
The customary laws of Indigenous peoples are recognised explicitly in various 
connections under the UNDRIP. For instance, custom and traditions were established 
as a baseline for Indigenous peoples’ right to self-identification.340 They shall also be 
given due consideration when Indigenous peoples exercise their right of access to 
justice.341 In addition, the right to practise and revitalise Indigenous cultural traditions 
and customs imposes an obligation for States to provide redress when Indigenous 
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peoples’ cultural and intellectual property are taken “in violation of their laws, 
traditions and customs”.342 Most importantly, Article 27 requires States to “recognize 
and adjudicate the rights of Indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and 
resources”, while giving due recognition to “Indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, 
customs and land tenure systems”.343 Article 34 recognises the right of Indigenous 
peoples to “promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their 
distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases 
where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human 
rights standards”.344  
In judicial practice, the Inter-American Court has issued decisions that demand 
respect for Indigenous culture and local customs.345 In the Aloeboetoe v Suriname case, 
as there are different opinions between Parties about who the successors of the victims 
(which are members of the Saramaka tribe) are, the Court decided to apply the 
Saramaka customs, instead of Suriname’s civil law.346 As a result, the Court accepted 
two spouses as successors in cases in which the victim had two wives since polygamy 
was accepted in Saramaka customary law.347 However, as the Court reckoned that the 
gender distinction in customary law of recognising only male ascendants contradicts 
the American Convention on Human Rights, it has determined that both male and 
female ascendants shall be recognised as successor, even if that might be contrary to 
the Saramaka custom.348 This decision, although adopted before the UNDRIP, is in 
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line with the requirement of the ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP. It is especially 
so in the sense that while the Court upholds the Saramaka custom of polygamy, it 
prioritises the fundamental human rights principle of gender equality and non-
discrimination, by which it denies the validity of the gender distinction of male and 
female successors. This approach is important because, as Tobin has argued, the 
recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights to their own legal regimes, customs and 
institutions could safeguard the realisation of their human rights.349 Furthermore, in 
situations where the customary rules of IPLCs are incompatible with fundamental 
human rights, human rights standards could protect especially the vulnerable members 
of the communities against unfair treatments that might otherwise be justified by 
customary laws.350 
At the national level, Indigenous peoples, minority groups, local communities, 
and their rights to autonomy, customary legal systems, traditional authorities, 
customary lands, resources, and/or cultures are recognised to varying degrees in many 
national constitutions or judicial and administrative practices.351 In India, for example, 
measures to prevent interference with the land rights and customary laws of “scheduled 
tribes” (a term favoured by Indian government to refer to their IPLCs) are given 
constitutional protection.352 In China, 55 officially recognised ethnic minorities enjoy 
a distinct set of rights and freedoms established by the Constitution and the national 
law on regional autonomy, which includes the collective rights to territorial autonomy, 
to manage their own cultural affairs and to have national laws and regulations adjusted 
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in accordance to their local customary rules. 353 Indeed, autonomous governance often 
plays an imperative role for IPLCs in gaining control over the development of their 
distinctive cultures, management and utilisation of land and resources in their 
traditional ways against undue interference by powerful economic interests or State 
governments. 354  However, the actual impact of this legal recognition in specific 
political and economic contexts needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.355  
It can be observed that international human rights standards require respect for 
the customary laws of IPLCs although what exactly these laws might be have not been 
defined. There is a certain level of judicial and legislative preparedness and willingness 
to recognise IPLCs’ customary laws, given that it is compatible with other fundamental 
human rights. So, how could the Nagoya Protocol contribute to safeguarding IPLCs’ 
human rights pertaining to their customary laws in light of the principle of mutual 
supportiveness? In the context of accessing IPLCs’ GR and TK for commercial or 
scientific utilisation, the Nagoya Protocol recognises IPLCs’ customary laws and 
community protocols and impose obligations for users to obtain PIC and/or ensure 
approval and involvement of IPLCs in the ABS processes taking into account such 
laws and protocols. The explicit recognition of IPLCs’ customary rules, thus, has the 
ability to integrate the customary norms of IPLCs into national and international ABS 
transactions and practices. As a result, respecting the customary laws of IPLCs could 
                                               
353 Constitution of the People's Republic of China [2018] (CH), art 4 and Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Regional National Autonomy [2001] (CH), ch 3. See also Xiaoou Zheng, ‘Key Legal Challenges and Opportunities 
in the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol: The Case of China’ (2019) 28 (2) Review of European, Comparative 
and International Environmental Law, 177. 
354 Pereira and Gough (n 190) 158. 
355 For scholarly discussion on the interplay between principle and effectiveness, law and policy in both environmental 
and human rights contexts, see Louka (n 58) 59, Ronagh J. A. McQuigg, International Human Rights Law and 
Domestic Violence: The Effectiveness of International Human Rights Law (Routledge 2011) 1. For a quantitative 
analysis of the effectiveness of human rights treaties and its critics, see Oona A. Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights 
Treaties Make A Difference?’ (2002) 111 (8) Yale Law Journal, 2020 and Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, 
‘Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties’ (2003) 14 (1) European Journal Of International Law, 172. 
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facilitate adequate and culturally appropriate realisation of fair and equitable benefit-
sharing with IPLCs. The values, worldviews and traditional approaches of IPLCs 
reflecting their needs and aspirations could then be communicated through each and 
every ABS negotiation from local and Indigenous contexts to broader domestic and 
international contexts. In practice, it is often the domestic legislation, especially 
contract laws, that oversees the negotiation and compliance with ABS measures such 
as MAT. In this connection, it is also possible to rely on private law and its compliance 
mechanism to safeguard IPLCs’ rights pertaining to their customary laws, especially 
when MAT contains explicit reference to IPLCs’ customary rules.356 
Furthermore, recognising IPLCs’ customary laws and ensuring compliance 
with their customary rules may prove essential in demonstrating compliance with 
human rights obligations. 357  For example, the identification of the legitimate 
representatives of IPLCs to issue PIC and the establishment of culturally appropriate 
procedures to include ILCs in the decision-making processes and the negotiation of 
benefit-sharing terms. In this connection, the recognition of IPLCs’ customary laws 
may provide an opportunity to bridge State Parties’ obligations to the Nagoya Protocol 
and their commitments to human rights standards in a systematic manner. 
Safeguarding the customary laws of IPLCs’ may also provide legal certainty 
throughout the ABS processes and to raise awareness of the legal status of IPLCs’ 
customary law in the broader context of international law. Ideally, this process may 
facilitate the establishment of sound national and international legal practices and 
governance of GR and TK held by IPLCs. As suggested by the CBD Working Group 
on ABS, recognising IPLCs’ rights to GR and TK is perhaps the most effective way to 
                                               
356 ABS, Study on Compliance in Relation to the Customary Law of Indigenous and Local Communities, National 
Law, Across Jurisdictions, and International Law (n 154) para 9. 
357 Tobin, Indigenous Peoples, Customary Law and Human Rights - Why Living Law Matters (n 156) 5. 
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ensure respect also for customary laws in the context of ABS and beyond. 358 
Nevertheless, the extent to which this mutually supportive interpretation of the ABS 
law and human rights law pertaining to IPLCs’ customary law could be realised 
depends largely on States governments’ political willingness and capability to comply. 
Finally, in terms of how human rights standards may contribute to the interpretation 
and implementation of the Nagoya Protocol, I argue that human rights may help to set 
the benchmark in particular for the vulnerable members of IPLCs as to ensuring their 
rights to PIC and fair and equitable benefit-sharing. In other words, the human rights 
requirements that the customary law shall not be incompatible with fundamental 
human rights could be used to guide the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol and 
to prevent unfair terms and treatments within IPLCs. This is important especially when 
traditional practices of IPLCs contradict the principles such as gender equality and 
non-discrimination.359  
4. Conclusion  
The principle of State sovereignty underpins access-related provisions in the CBD and 
the Nagoya Protocol. This means that States have the authority to determine how their 
GR may be accessed and under what procedural requirements. However, as discussed, 
States’ sovereign rights are neither unconditional nor absolute. In the ABS context, the 
Nagoya Protocol imposes obligations on State Parties to ensure that GR and TK held 
by IPLCs are accessed and obtained with their PIC and that IPLCs’ customary laws 
and community protocols are taken into consideration. The intra-State obligations of 
State Parties owed towards IPLCs in order to ensure fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
entail many procedural requirements, such as consultation, PIC, impact assessments 
                                               
358 ABS, Study on Compliance in Relation to the Customary Law of Indigenous and Local Communities, National 
Law, Across Jurisdictions, and International Law (n 154) 4. 
359 The human right to equality and non-discrimination is discussed further in section 2.1 of chapter three. 
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and capacity-building, as enshrined in the normative standard-setting process under 
the CBD. In the human rights context, States’ obligation to respect, protect and fulfil 
IPLCs’ rights of self-determination, property, development and culture are also 
complemented by procedural requirements such as consultation and FPIC. In this 
chapter, the IPLCs’ rights of self-determination and to FPIC have been examined in 
order to convey the implications of international human rights. 
Specifically, I argued that Indigenous peoples’ right of self-determination takes 
shape as a human right obligation for States to exercise their sovereign rights for the 
purpose of promoting national development and ensuring the well-being of all peoples. 
With respect to the emerging human rights principle FPIC, I identified its versatile 
functions—of not only ensuring effective and meaningful participation of IPLCs in 
decision-making processes, but also as a retroactive means for IPLCs to claim redress 
and fair compensation for the past violation. I visited the relevant provisions in the 
ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP, the jurisprudence of three UN human rights 
treaties bodies (the HRC, the CESCR and the CERD) and regional human rights courts 
and tribunals. The observation is that the duty of States to conduct consultation, adopt 
legislation on FPIC and to seek FPIC has been articulated, but the extent to which 
FPIC must be secured is not always clear. To study the evolution of international 
human rights law pertaining to FPIC in the past two decades, a trend of connecting 
IPLCs’ participatory rights such as consultation and FPIC with substantive rights such 
as the rights to property, development, culture and self-determination is present. This 
connection is increasingly established by the judicial practices of international and 
regional human rights bodies especially after the adoption of the UNDRIP in 2007.  
In light of the principle of mutual supportiveness, I argued that the human 
rights standards on FPIC would invalidate the narrow reading of Article 6 of the 
Nagoya Protocol. Specifically, ILCs’ rights to grant access shall not be solely subject 
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to domestic recognition but indeed is required by the minimum standards of 
international human rights. Based on the intrinsic link between IPLCs’ right to FPIC 
and other fundamental human rights, I suggested that their entitlement to grant FPIC 
is not just an extrinsic normative creation by States, but an intrinsic right derived from 
the identity of such peoples and communities. Accordingly, States’ duty to ensure 
FPIC is imposed by human rights principles regardless of whether IPLCs’ right to 
“grant access” has been explicitly established in the domestic context or not. In other 
words, States Parties’ discretion to interpret and implement the Nagoya Protocol needs 
to be understood and exercised in accordance with their human rights obligations, 
especially to recognise, establish and protect IPLCs’ rights to FPIC. In turn, the 
ongoing process of interpreting and implementing the Nagoya Protocol could 
contribute to understanding the human rights norms by providing specific contexts, 
timely normative guidance and practical evidence on how to transpose human right 
standards into feasible agendas of States governments and private entities with respect 
to utilising GR and TK and fair and equitable benefit-sharing. Opportunity of a 
mutually supportive interpretation also exists as to expand the focus of traditional FPIC 
mechanisms from coercion and infringement of States vis-à-vis IPLCs, to the emerging 
tension between IPLCs and powerful multinational corporations. Further research is 
needed to fully unpack the role and responsibility of multinational corporations.360 
Political uncertainties also persist. For instance, it depends on State governments to 
decide to what extent they are willing to balance their human rights commitments 
against the pragmatic pursuit of a workable ABS framework in their domestic 
                                               
360 I discuss this point as a potential avenue for future work in section 2 of chapter five. For scholarly discussion on 
especially human rights obligations of multinational corporations as non-State actors, see Peter T. Muchlinski, 
‘Human Rights and Multinationals: Is there a Problem?’ (2001) 77 (1) International Affairs, 31, Andrew Clapham, 
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press 2006) 195, John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Business 
and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda’ (2007) 101 (4) American journal of international law, 819 
and essays in Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge University Press 2013) 1. 
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legislation and policies. A mutually supportive interpretation of the Nagoya Protocol 
and the human rights law cannot address all above uncertainties. However, as 
demonstrated, it can shed light on the ways in which States’ responsibilities of 
protecting IPLCs’ human rights could be integrated into the Nagoya Protocol and the 
scholarly discussion of why this is necessary. Furthermore, such an approach could 
provide guidance on how to interpret and implement the Nagoya Protocol in a way 
that can better accommodating IPLCs’ needs and aspirations instead of States 
governments’ conveniences and priorities. 
Finally, based on the novel recognition of IPLCs’ customary laws, community 
protocols and procedures in the Nagoya Protocol, I investigated the human rights 
recognition of the customary norms of IPLCs. Although remain the term remains 
undefined, the importance of the customary laws is recognised in the ILO Convention 
169 and the UNDRIP as well as some jurisprudential interpretations. I suggested that 
such recognition could facilitate adequate and culturally appropriate realisation of 
IPLCs’ right vis-à-vis their GR and TK and communicate their traditional approaches 
and worldviews to a broader national and international context. In light of a mutually 
supportive interpretation, I argued that the ABS rules of the Nagoya Protocol may help 
to realise the customary rules of IPLCs in specific benefit-sharing agreements, which 
are protected by domestic laws such as private contract law. Meanwhile, to recognise 
IPLCs’ customary laws and ensure compliance with such rules may prove essential in 
demonstrating compliance with their human rights obligations for State Parties. Last 
but not least, I demonstrated the potential of using human rights principles to oversee 
equal and fair treatment within IPLCs, in particular for those who are vulnerable to 
discriminatory or unfair customary rules. Many of these observations are not stand-
alone in the context of access to GR and TK, but also resonate with respect to fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing, which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Three 
Benefit-sharing and human rights implications for benefit-sharing 
related provisions of the Nagoya Protocol 
The fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic 
resources (GR) is at the core of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its 
Nagoya Protocol, regarded as one of the three pillars of the access and benefit-sharing 
(ABS) framework.1 This chapter investigates the provisions in the Nagoya Protocol 
with respect to benefit-sharing and examines the applications of relevant international 
human rights. Often cited as the “grand bargain”,2 benefit-sharing is established by the 
CBD in 1992 in order to provide biodiversity-rich countries and communities with the 
incentives and financial support for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use of 
its components.3 It is also the logical consequence of the recognition of the rights of 
the provider countries and the Indigenous and local communities (ILCs). According to 
the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, benefit-sharing should be “fair and equitable”, a 
standard underlined by the principle of equity that demands benefits to be fairly 
distributed among those who have created, managed and developed the concerned GR 
and associated traditional knowledge (TK).4  
Built upon the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol elaborates the rights and obligations 
related to benefit-sharing and provides detailed guidance on a range of key issues of 
                                               
1 In addition to “access” and “compliance” being another two pillars, see Thomas Greiber and others, An Explanatory 
Guide to the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing (IUCN 2012) 12. 
2 Michael A Gollin, ‘An Intellectual Property Rights Framework for Biodiversity Prospecting’ in Walter V. Reid and 
others (eds), Biodiversity Prospecting: Using Genetic Resources for Sustainable Development (World Resources 
Institute 1993) 191. 
3 See Greiber and others (n 1) 83 and Kerry Ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity: Access 
to Genetic Resources and Benefit-sharing (Earthscan 2002) 75. 
4 Greiber and others (n 1) 83. 
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implementing benefit-sharing.5 It addresses questions of what it is to be shared and 
how to share them through provisions relating to, inter alia, monetary and non-
monetary benefits, 6  measures for capacity-building 7  and negotiations of mutually 
agreed terms (MAT).8 It envisages benefit-sharing at both inter-State and intra-State 
levels, that is, between provider Parties and user Parties as well as between States and 
ILCs, who live within States’ territories. Based on various binding and non-binding 
instruments, the normative standards of fairness and equity have also been articulated 
to guide the implementation of benefit-sharing obligations.9 In the broader context of 
international law, benefit-sharing is an emerging legal principle in the standard-setting 
processes and scholarly discussions of issues relating to, inter alia, health, the use of 
marine biological resources, and ILCs’ human rights pertaining to lands and natural 
resources. 10  In scholarly literature, benefit-sharing has been conceptualised by 
                                               
5 See Matthias Buck and Clare Hamilton, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2011) 20 
(1) Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, 47, Elsa Tsioumani, ‘Access and Benefit 
Sharing: The Nagoya Protocol’ (2010) 40 (6) Environmental Policy and Law, 288 and discussions in Elisa Morgera, 
Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing in Perspective: 
Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Brill Nijhoff 2013) 9. 
6 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization [adopted 29 October 2010, entered into force 12 October 2014] CBD Decision 10/1, anx 1. 
7 ibid art 22(5)(j). 
8 ibid art 6(3)(g). 
9  The standards and implications of fair and equitable have been debated from different perspectives, see Elisa 
Morgera, ‘The Need for an International Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing’ (2016) 27 (2) 
European Journal Of International Law, 362, Kimberly R. Marion Suiseeya, ‘Negotiating the Nagoya Protocol: 
Indigenous Demands for Justice’ (2014) 14 (3) Global Environmental Politics, 104 and Konstantia Koutouki and 
Katharina Rogalla Bieberstein, ‘The Nagoya Protocol: Sustainable Access and Benefits-sharing for Indigenous and 
Local Communities’ (2012) 13 (3) Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, 516. 
10 For a discussion about benefit-sharing in various sections see essays in Evanson C. Kamau and Gerd Winter (eds), 
Common Pools of Genetic Resources: Equity and Innovation in International Biodiversity Law (Routledge 2013). 
More specific discussion about marine GR and ILCs’ human rights, see Bevis Fedder, Marine Genetic Resources, 
Access and Benefit Sharing: Legal and Biological Perspectives (Routledge 2013) 18 and Jérémie Gilbert, 
Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors (Second edn, Brill Nijhoff 
2016) 267. 
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Morgera as a “concerted and dialogic process aimed at building partnerships in 
identifying and allocating economic, socio-cultural and environmental benefits among 
State and non-State actors”, encompassing a number of normative elements such as 
the nature and format of the shared benefits, the legitimate beneficiaries and the 
standards of fairness and equity.11 This chapter builds upon Morgera’s proposition of 
a “fully-fledged” mutually supportive interpretation between international biodiversity 
law and international human rights law of benefit-sharing12 and aims at addressing the 
particular normative gap as well as overlap between the Nagoya Protocol and relevant 
human rights law. I focus on the interpretation and implementation of the provisions 
on benefit-sharing of the Nagoya Protocol with respect to ILCs and look at the human 
rights implications on States’ obligations.  
The chapter consists of three sections. It starts with a section unpacking the 
fundamental elements of benefit-sharing envisaged by the Nagoya Protocol. It 
addresses the following questions. What are the benefits and how to share them? Who 
are the beneficiaries? What are the rights and obligations of these beneficiaries, 
especially the ILCs? What are the obligations of State Parties in order to ensure 
benefit-sharing, especially with respect to intra-State benefit-sharing with ILCs? What 
are the normative and practical implications of the standards “fair and equitable”? The 
second section investigates the relationship between the ABS rights and the human 
rights of ILCs as well as the correlated obligations imposed upon States via the lens of 
three substantive human rights, namely, the right to equality and non-discrimination, 
the right to development and to property. This is because the realisation of fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing as envisaged by the Nagoya Protocol requires an articulation 
of Parties’ intra-State obligations owed to ILCs and a comprehensive understanding of 
                                               
11 Morgera (n 9) 382. 
12 Elisa Morgera, ‘Under the Radar: Fair and Equitable Benefit-sharing and the Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
and Local Communities related to Natural Resources’ (2019) (Online) International Journal of Human Rights, 13. 
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the fact that ILCs, as the stewards of biodiversity and holders of TK, have intrinsic 
rights and claims over their GR and TK.13 In this regard, I argue that the emerging 
trend in incorporating benefit-sharing in the international human rights law to realise, 
for instance, ILCs’ rights to equality, development and property provide the most 
significant normative ground for theorising the conceptual elements and procedural 
standards of benefit-sharing.14 I thus analyse the extent to which these two sets of 
rights may/or may not assist one another in their realisation and explore the 
implications of States’ human rights obligations in the context of benefit-sharing with 
respect to ILCs. These remarks are elaborated in the final section.  
1. Fair and equitable benefit-sharing under the Nagoya Protocol 
Fair and equitable benefit-sharing is the objective of the Nagoya Protocol, which is 
expected to be achieved through access to GR, the transfer of relevant technologies 
and funding.15 Built upon relevant provisions of the CBD, a range of operative clauses 
in the Protocol articulates the core rights, obligations and procedural requirements of 
benefit-sharing.16 The Annex of the Protocol also includes an indicative and non-
exhaustive list of potential monetary and non-monetary benefits for benefit-sharing.17 
This section unpacks these benefit-sharing provisions in four sections. The first section 
asks what the benefits are and how to share them. An essential means for this 
purpose—technology transfer—is analysed in depth based on the treaty provisions as 
well as their current implementation. The second section addresses the core ABS 
                                               
13 Elisa Morgera, Elsa Tsioumani and Matthias Buck, Unraveling the Nagoya Protocol: A Commentary on the 
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Brill 2014) 374 and 
Siegfried Wiessner, ‘The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges’ (2011) 
22 (1) European Journal Of International Law, 140. 
14 Morgera (n 12) 13. 
15 Nagoya Protocol, art 1. 
16 ibid arts 5 9 10 19 20 and 23. 
17 Greiber and others (n 1) 28. 
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beneficiaries, namely, the provider Party and ILCs of the concerned GR and TK and 
their relationship. 18  The third section examines Parties’ obligations to implement 
benefit-sharing at both inter-State and intra-State levels, while focusing on the intra-
State level where ILCs are identified as ABS beneficiaries. MAT as a procedural 
safeguard for ensuring fair and equitable benefit-sharing is also analysed. The final 
section looks at the core normative standard for benefit-sharing, “fair and equitable”, 
and discusses its implication with a sharpened focus on ILCs.  
1.1 Realisation of monetary and non-monetary benefits: technology transfer in 
contexts 
Three means for realising fair and equitable benefit-sharing are provided in the Nagoya 
Protocol: A) appropriate access to GR, B) appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, 
and C) appropriate funding.19 The Preamble of the Nagoya Protocol emphasises on the 
importance of legal certainty and the standards of equity and fairness in the process of 
negotiations between users and providers of GR. 20  Article 5(4) of the Protocol 
articulates that the benefits may be monetary or non-monetary and an indicative and 
non-exhaustive list of what these benefits may entail is further provided in the Annex. 
Specifically, taken verbatim from Appendix II of the Bonn Guidelines,21 monetary 
benefits may include, inter alia, access fees and payments, licence fees in case of 
commercialisation, research funding, joint ventures and relevant intellectual property 
ownership.22 Non-monetary benefits may include, inter alia, sharing of research and 
development results, collaboration, cooperation and contribution in scientific research 
and development programmes, education and training for capacity-development in the 
                                               
18  Note that in domestic context, this might vary according to different national approaches to establish ABS 
beneficiaries.  
19 Nagoya Protocol, art 1 and Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 13) 48. 
20 Nagoya Protocol, pmbl. 
21 Greiber and others (n 1) 28. 
22 Nagoya Protocol, anx 1. 
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provider Party, transfer to the provider of the GR of knowledge and technology under 
fair and most favourable terms, institutional capacity-building, social recognition and 
access to scientific information and technology relevant to conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity.23 Furthermore, based on Articles 15, 16, 18 and 
19 of the CBD, Article 23 of the Nagoya Protocol requires Parties to collaborate and 
cooperate in technical and scientific research and development programmes on the one 
hand, and foresees its Parties to undertake to promote and encourage access to 
technology by, and transfer of technology to, developing country Parties on the other 
hand.24 
These articulations of monetary and non-monetary benefits demonstrates the 
various ways in which research, development and commercialisation of GR could be 
considered for fair and equitable benefit-sharing. They provide Parties with a toolbox 
from which they may decide what benefits and/or a combination of benefits are the 
most desirable for individual ABS transactions on a case-by-case basis.25 Particular 
attention is placed on technology transfer, which is regarded not only as a subject of 
benefit-sharing,26 an essential means for the realisation of the overall objectives of the 
Nagoya Protocol, 27  but also as a standalone obligation for Parties in relation to 
collaboration and cooperation.28 This indicates the key role attributed to technology 
transfer in the context of benefit-sharing. Nevertheless, it remains unclear how 
technology transfer and its related obligations are linked to other benefit-sharing 
provisions under the Nagoya Protocol, especially with respect to ILCs. The following 
                                               
23 ibid anx 2. 
24 ibid art 20. 
25 Greiber and others (n 1) 28. 28. 
26 Technology as non-monetary benefits. 
27 In addition to access to GR and appropriate funding, see Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 13) 314. 
28 Nagoya Protocol, art 23. 
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paragraphs thus look at relevant provisions of technology transfer and the current 
implementation at both international and national levels.  
As mentioned, Article 23 of the Protocol provides two sets of obligations for 
Parties in the context of technology transfer and cooperation. It first states, “Parties 
shall collaborate and cooperate in technical and scientific research and development 
programmes” and then provides that “Parties undertake to promote and encourage 
access to technology by, and transfer of technology to, developing country Parties”.29 
This Article builds upon the CBD provisions. Specifically, Article 16 of the CBD 
obliges Parties to provide or facilitate access to, and transfer of, relevant technologies 
to provider countries under fair and most favourable terms, including on concessional 
and preferential terms.30 It further requires Parties to take legislative, administrative or 
policy measures, with the aim that provider Parties of GR are provided access to and 
transfer of technology with respect to the utilisation of those resources based on MAT. 
Contracting Parties are also obligated to take measures with the aim that the private 
sector facilitates access to, joint development and transfer of technology for the benefit 
of both governmental institutions and the private sector of developing countries.31 To 
contrast and compare these provisions, it can be observed that although Article 23 of 
the Protocol clearly subtracts its content from the technology transfer-related 
provisions in the CBD, the CBD imposes an obligation for Parties of technology 
transfer more assertively. The Nagoya Protocol suggests a “softer” responsibility by 
using a best-endeavours clause, “to undertake”, that implies a general commitment, 
instead of a concrete obligation as it is established for collaboration and cooperation.32 
In other words, the Nagoya Protocol does not impose an obligation for Parties to take 
                                               
29 ibid art 23. 
30 Convention on Biological Diversity [adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993] 1760 UNTS 79, 
art 16(2).  
31 ibid art 16(3). 
32 Greiber and others (n 1) 216. 
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measures to ensure technology transfer or articulate its standards.33 It also abstains 
from addressing the role of the private sector in relation to technology transfer. This 
approach has been criticised by Nijar in the sense that it creates “a fundamental 
imbalance” in the Protocol, as “its access provisions build upon and advance those in 
the CBD, while, in stark contrast, the technology transfer provisions detract from the 
CBD provisions”.34  
To counter-balance this shortcoming, it is plausible to suggest that, since the 
Nagoya Protocol is adopted under the CBD framework and that all Parties to the 
Nagoya Protocol are also Parties to the CBD, their obligations shall be understood in 
the context of the CBD; therefore, the States Parties of the Nagoya Protocol also bear 
the more elaborated obligations vis-à-vis technology transfer as enshrined in the 
CBD.35 The Conference of Parties serving as the meeting of Parties (COP-MOP) to 
the Nagoya Protocol has not yet taken up this approach to interpret Parties’ obligations 
but is increasingly engaging in elaborating the terms and methods for promoting and 
supporting the effective access to and transfer of relevant technology among Parties to 
the Convention. 36  For instance, the COP-MOP has reiterated the importance of 
developing specific approaches to technology transfer and cooperation to address the 
prioritised needs 37 and meanwhile, avoiding non-specific, global approaches to this 
issue.38 To look at the current implementation at the international level, an overarching 
programme “The Bio-Bridge Initiative (BBI)” is founded under the CBD in 2014, 
                                               
33 That is, according to the CBD, under most favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms. 
34 Gurdial Singh Nijar, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing of Genetic Resources: Analysis and 
Implementation Options for Developing Countries’ (2011), 30. 
35 See Greiber and others (n 1) 216 and Nijar (n 34) 36. 
36  CBD COP Decision X/16, 'Technology Transfer and Cooperation' (29 October 2010) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/16 para 1.  
37  CBD COP Decision VIII/12, 'Technology Transfer and Cooperation' (15 June 2006) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VIII/12 pmbl. 
38 X/16 (n 36) para 3. 
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aiming at catalysing and facilitating technical and scientific cooperation.39 One of its 
ongoing project, Francophone African ABS Legal Network Project, explicitly 
addresses technology transfer in the context of benefit-sharing.40 At the national level, 
as identified in the most recent report on the effectiveness of the Nagoya Protocol, 
released at the 2018 COP 14 held in Egypt, about half of Parties claim that they had 
collaborated and cooperated in technical and scientific research and development 
programmes as a means to achieve the objective of the Protocol as provided in Article 
23.41 Thus, it can be observed that the implementation of technology transfer takes 
place in various forms even though the normative connotation of technology transfer 
under the Nagoya Protocol has not been sufficiently clarified in COP decisions.  
What is the role of ILCs in technology transfer? Three contexts are relevant for 
understanding Parties’ obligations on technology transfer and its potential impacts on 
ILCs. First, as an essential means to facilitate “a flow of goods and knowledge”, 
technology transfer is capable of providing opportunities for learning and capacity-
building in developing countries.42 It can be further realised through scientific and 
technological cooperation with ILCs when their GR and associated TK is sought and 
utilised. In this connection, Article 22 of the Protocol explicitly requires Parties to 
facilitate the involvement of ILCs and support the capacity needs and priorities of ILCs 
as identified by themselves.43 Thus, technology transfer can support the capacity-
building of ILCs and indicate whether Parties have fulfilled their obligations in this 
regard. Second, via financial resources and technology transfer provided by developed 
country Parties, the developing country Parties could be better equipped to implement 
                                               
39 CBD, ‘Bio-Bridge Initiative’ (CBD, 2014) <https://www.cbd.int/biobridge/> accessed 02/01/2019. 
40 For more information see ibid. 
41 As of 22 February 2018, see NP MOP 3 Draft Decision, 'Assessment and Review of the Effectiveness of the 
Protocol' (21 November 2018) UN Doc CBD/NP-MOP/3/L.2 14. 
42 Greiber and others (n 1) 216. 
43 Nagoya Protocol, arts 22(1)(3). 
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their commitments under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol.44 At the national and local 
levels, Greiber and others have suggested that technology transfer as non-monetary 
benefit-sharing could contribute to acknowledging and recompensing the related rights 
and contribution of provider countries and ILCs.45 Last but not least, the development, 
adaptation, transfer and diffusion of technology in building of related capacity in 
achieving sustainable development goals also support and interlink with the ABS 
objectives.46  For instance, the Rio Declaration calls upon States to co-operate to 
strengthen capacity-building for sustainable development through technology 
transfer. 47  The transfer of environmentally sound technology, co-operation, and 
capacity-building, including biotechnology, has been regarded as an essential means 
for implementation in the Agenda 21. 48  The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development provides further guidance on this issue. In line with the Agenda 21, the 
2030 Agenda elaborates that, as a fundamental means of implementation, the 
mobilisation of financial resources as well as capacity-building and the transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies to developing countries shall be on favourable 
terms, including on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed. 49 
Transferring technology with respect to specific areas, including climate change, 
conservation and sustainable use of marine resources and revitalise global partnership 
for sustainable development, are also highlighted.50 Thus, in above-identified contexts, 
the implications of technology transfer as an essential means to achieve fair and 
                                               
44 CBD, art 20. 
45 Greiber and others (n 1) 218. 
46 ibid 217. 
47 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development [12 August 1992] UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Principle 
9. 
48 UNGA, 'Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development' (June 1992) UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/26 ch 34. 
49 UNGA Res 70/1, 'Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development' (21 October 2015) 
UN Doc A/RES/70/1 para 41.  
50 ibid paras 35 14(a) and 17(7). 
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equitable benefit-sharing can be further stretched, in which ILCs should be an 
important concern of States not only to fulfil their obligations under the CBD and the 
Nagoya Protocol, but also under general international law with respect to sustainable 
development.  
1.2 Beneficiaries and their interpretative and implementation dilemmas 
This section examines the issue of ABS beneficiaries. The Nagoya Protocol addresses 
the question of who shall benefit from the utilisation of GR and associated TK via 
three paragraphs in Article 5 in following terms: 
1. In accordance with Article 15, paragraphs 3 and 7 of the Convention, 
benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources as well as subsequent 
applications and commercialization shall be shared in a fair and equitable way 
with the Party providing such resources that is the country of origin of such 
resources or a Party that has acquired the genetic resources in accordance with 
the Convention. Such sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms. 
2. Each Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as 
appropriate, with the aim of ensuring that benefits arising from the utilization 
of genetic resources that are held by Indigenous and local communities, in 
accordance with domestic legislation regarding the established rights of these 
Indigenous and local communities over these genetic resources, are shared in 
a fair and equitable way with the communities concerned, based on mutually 
agreed terms. 
5. Each Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as 
appropriate, in order that the benefits arising from the utilization of traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources are shared in a fair and equitable 
way with Indigenous and local communities holding such knowledge. Such 
sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.51 
                                               
51 Nagoya Protocol, art 5. Emphasis added.  
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As emphasised, the Nagoya Protocol envisages two types of beneficiaries. The first is 
the provider Party of the concerned GR, which shall be either the country of origin of 
such resources, or a Party that has acquired the resources in accordance with the 
Convention.52 The second is ILCs in situations where they have established rights over 
concerned GR or it is benefit-sharing in relation to TK associated with GR held by 
them.53 The following paragraphs discuss each beneficiary in turn.  
1.2.1 Country of origin 
Proposed by developing countries to the CBD Working Group on ABS just before the 
adoption of the Protocol in 2010, the term “country of origin” is included in the core 
provisions of benefit-sharing as well as access.54 According to the CBD, it means the 
country that possesses GR in in-situ conditions—where generic resources exist within 
ecosystems and natural habitats—and, in the case of domesticated or cultivated species, 
in the surroundings where they have developed their distinctive properties.55 There are 
several facts about GR that might result in practical difficulties of identifying the 
country of origin under the CBD definition. First, plants, animals and microorganism 
that contain GR are subject to natural reproduction processes, which could, and often 
do, span across political boundaries. 56  Anthropogenic interventions, such as 
crossbreeding and trading, could also introduce species across countries and result in 
“new” species through cultivation.57 As species become extinct and/or new species 
                                               
52 ibid art 5(1) and CBD, art 15(3)(7). 
53 Nagoya Protocol, art 5(2)(5). 
54 ibid arts 5 and 6 and CBD Working Group on ABS, 'Report of the First Part of the Ninth Meeting of the Ad Hoc 
Open Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing' (26 April 2010) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/3 
paras 31 43 and 44. 
55 CBD, art 2. 
56  See essays in T. Luoma-aho and others (eds), Forest Genetic Resources Conservation and Management 
(International Plant Genetic Resources Institute 2004). 
57 For scientific evidence see Kenneth F. Raffa and others, ‘Cross-scale Drivers of Natural Disturbances Prone to 
Anthropogenic Amplification: The Dynamics of Bark Beetle Eruptions’ (2008) 58 (6) BioScience, 501. 
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discovered/cultivated, the country of origin of a certain species may not be so in the 
future, or be replaced by another country that provides more hosting habitats due to 
various factors, for instance, climate change. Thus, the term country of origin is not a 
static concept, which may complicate the process of identifying legitimate 
beneficiaries for ABS purposes. Furthermore, as it becomes popular to seek GR from 
genebanks and ex situ collections, instead of the country where the sought GR exists 
in in-situ conditions, users of GR may favour provider countries with the minimum 
ABS requirements. Essentially, these facts pose challenges to identifying which 
country is the country of origin and raise concerns about how to ensure fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing with the country of origin. These two concerns are equally 
valid in a community context, in which the same GR and associated TK might be held 
simultaneously by several ILCs.  
1.2.2 ILCs or IPLCs? A sleight of hand of the CBD Parties 
The term “ILCs” is not defined in the Nagoya Protocol or the CBD. Nevertheless, 
Parties of the CBD has accepted a “potentially useful”58 list of key characteristics of 
“local communities” submitted by the CBD Working Group on Article 8(j). This 
“broad and inclusive” list highlights ILCs’ right to self-identification,59  including 
characteristics such as traditional lifestyle, definable territory and existence of 
customary rule.60 With respect to the Indigenous communities, the CBD term “ILCs”, 
as it eschews recognising Indigenous peoples as “peoples”, has been criticised by 
                                               
58  CBD COP Decision XI/14, 'Article 8(j) and related Provisions' (5 December 2012) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XI/14 para 19. 
59 CBD Working Group on Article 8(j), 'Report of the Expert Group Meeting of Local Community Representatives 
within the Context of Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity' (4 September 
2011) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG8J/7/8/Add.1* anx. 
60 ibid anx. 
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advocates of Indigenous peoples.61 However, as discussed, “Indigenous people” itself 
is also an undefined term in international law.62 In scholarly literature, Morgera has 
observed that the understanding of the key characteristics of local communities under 
the CBD actually has much in common with the debated term of Indigenous peoples.63 
While the discourse over the exact meaning of the term ILCs and its relationship with 
other alternatives, such as Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs), remains 
inconclusive, it is in general accepted under the CBD that self-identification is the most 
appropriate way to establish who may be Indigenous and/or a local and/or a traditional 
community representative.64 
ILCs appears to be the authoritative term for interpretation as established by 
the Nagoya Protocol and the CBD. It has also been explicitly adopted in a range of 
voluntary guidelines, such as the Bonn Guidelines (2002),65 the Akwé: Kon Guidelines 
(2004),66 and the Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct (2011).67 Nevertheless, in the 
COP decisions and voluntary guidelines adopted more recently under the CBD 
                                               
61 The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (PFII), for example, has suggested to the CBD to use 
the term "Indigenous peoples", see CBD Working Group on Article 8(j), 'Compilation of Views Received on Use 
of the Term "Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities"' (17 September 2013) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/WG8J/8/INF/10/Add.1 secs 3 and 4. 
62 See discussions about IPLCs in previous sections 1.2 and 2.1.2 of chapter one and section 3.1 of chapter two. 
63 Morgera (n 12) 3. 
64CBD Expert Group Meeting of Local Community Representatives, 'Guidance for the Discussions concerning Local 
Communities within the Context of the Convention on Biological Diversity' (7 July 2011) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/AHEG/LCR/1/2 para 7. 
65 CBD COP Decision VI/24, 'Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization ' (27 May 2002 ) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20. 
66 CBD COP Decision VII/16, 'Akwé: Kon Guidelines for the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment regarding Developments Proposed to Take Place on, or which are Likely to Impact on, Sacred Sites 
and on Lands and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by Indigenous and Local Communities' (13 April 2004) 
UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/16. 
67 CBD COP Decison X/42, 'The Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct to Ensure Respect for the Cultural and 
Intellectual Heritage of Indigenous and Local Communities' (29 October 2010) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/42. 
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framework, the term “IPLCs” has replaced ILCs, for instance, in the Mo’otz Kuxtal 
Voluntary Guidelines (2016)68 and the Rutzolijirisaxik Voluntary Guidelines (2018).69 
This terminological change is decided in the COP 12 in 2014.70 In this meeting, in 
response to the recommendations made by the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues (PFII) that the CBD shall use the terminology IPLCs and recognise in full its 
legal implications,71 the CBD Parties agreed that the IPLCs would be used in their 
future decisions and secondary documents as appropriate. However, they meanwhile 
have rejected almost all the legal implications that might be derived therefrom. In 
particular, the CBD Parties stress that this usage is only on an exceptional basis, which 
according to the UN Office of Legal Affairs, would not be construed as a “subsequent 
agreement” and should not be taken into account for purposes of interpreting or 
applying the CBD.72 Specifically, the CBD Parties have decided that the term IPLCs; 
A) shall not affect in any way the legal meaning of Article 8(j) and related provisions 
of the Convention, B) may not be interpreted as implying for any Party a change in 
rights or obligations under the Convention, and C) shall not constitute a context for the 
purpose of interpretation of the CBD as provided for in Article 31, paragraph 2, of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) or a subsequent agreement or 
                                               
68  CBD COP Decision XIII/18, 'Mo’otz Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines for the Development of Mechanisms, 
Legislation or other Appropriate Initiatives to Ensure the “Prior and Informed Consent”, “Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent” or “Approval and Involvement”, depending on National Circumstances, of Indigenous Peoples and Local 
Communities for Accessing their Knowledge, Innovations and Practices, for Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
arising from the Use of their Knowledge, Innovations and Practices relevant for the Conservation and Sustainable 
use of Biological Diversity, and for Reporting and Preventing Unlawful Appropriation of Traditional Knowledge' 
(17 December 2016) UN Doc CBD/COP/DEC/XIII/18. 
69 CBD COP Decision 14/12, 'Rutzolijirisaxik Voluntary Guidelines for the Repatriation of Traditional Knowledge 
of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities Relevant for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological 
Diversity' (30 November 2018) UN Doc CBD/COP/DEC/14/12. 
70  CBD COP Decision XII/12, 'Article 8(j) and related Provisions' (13 October 2014) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XII/12 sec F. 
71 XI/14 (n 58) sec G para 2. 
72 CBD Secretariat, 'Analysis on the Implication of the Use of the Term “Indigenous peoples and local communities” 
for the Convention and its Protocols' (25 June 2014) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/12/5/Add.1 para 14. 
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subsequent practice among Parties to the CBD as provided for in Article 31, paragraph 
3 (a) and (b) or special meaning as provided for in Article 31, paragraph 4, of the 
VCLT.73 The Parties further articulate that any change to the legal meaning of the 
original terminology “ILCs” should be done via the amendment procedure set out in 
Article 29 of the CBD.74 Thus, although the term IPLCs has made its way into the 
CBD framework, its legal implications are greatly limited by the Parties. The event 
seems like a technical sleight of hand deployed by the CBD Parties: accepting the 
politically correct term Indigenous peoples on the surface, while blocking almost every 
possible way for it to make a substantive legal implication by posing complex 
restriction on its interpretation. Nevertheless, the door for a systemic interpretation on 
the basis of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT remains open. Perhaps more importantly, the 
Parties have also implicitly envisaged the possibility of altering the obligations 
imposed by the CBD via an amendment, which could be and shall be guided by the 
principle of mutual supportiveness. This is quite significant as it does not only 
indicated the willingness of the CBD Parties to accept interpretation of their 
obligations in light of other relevant rules of international law,75 but also to update 
their obligations in accordance with the development of international law in the future. 
It is especially important in understanding the implications of IPLCs in light of 
international human rights standards.  
To conclude, both types of ABS beneficiaries face interpretative and 
implementation dilemmas. On the one hand, the term “country of origin” is explicitly 
defined under the CBD, but the practical complexity of identifying whom exactly is 
the country of origin remain difficult to address. On the other hand, the term “ILCs”, 
as the authoritative term for interpreting and implementing ABS-related provisions of 
                                               
73 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980] 1155 UNTS 
331 and XII/12 (n 70) 16. 
74 XII/12 (n 70) 16. 
75 As discussed in section 2.1.3 of chapter one. 
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the Nagoya Protocol and the CBD, has undergone some terminological changes.76 The 
CBD Parties have decided to use “IPLCs” instead of ILCs—a gesture of recognising 
Indigenous peoples as peoples—but only superficially. From the first sight, this might 
be seen as a victory in a battle long fought by the advocates of Indigenous peoples as 
the CBD Parties finally agree to integrate concerns of “Indigenous peoples” into its 
future agenda—a term that implies stronger international legal recognition and human 
rights protection. However, as demonstrated, this terminological change might only be 
a sleight of hand by the CBD Parties, as it has created only minimum space for 
interpretation and implementation in light of international human rights standards vis-
à-vis Indigenous peoples. This event indicates the political reluctance of States to fully 
endorse the IPLCs and their legal significance, and meanwhile the increasing 
international pressure for States to do so. The possibility of a systemic interpretation 
based on Article 31(3)(c) of VCLT and a mutually supportive implementation at the 
law-making level, as suggested by scholars such as Morgera and Savarasi, thus is ever 
more relevant to be scrutinised.77 I pursue this goal in the following section 2, in light 
of the international human rights standards established for IPLCs.  
1.3 Obligations of Parties vis-à-vis benefit-sharing 
Builds upon the previous analysis of the means for benefit-sharing and its beneficiaries, 
this section examines Parties’ obligations to implement benefit-sharing in two parts. 
The first part addresses the obligations of Parties to ensure fair and equitable benefit-
sharing at both inter-State and intra-State levels based on Article 5 of the Nagoya 
Protocol. Focusing on the intra-State level that concerns ILCs as beneficiaries, I 
                                               
76 8(j), Compilation of Views Received on Use of the Term "Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities" (n 61) 5. 
77 Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The International Human Rights Law Implications of the Nagoya Protocol’ in Elisa Morgera, 
Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective: 
Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Brill Nijhoff 2013) 60 and Morgera, 
Tsioumani and Buck (n 13) 147. 
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distinguish the obligations imposed upon Parties with respect to GR over which ILCs 
have established rights, and TK associated with GR held by ILCs. The outstanding 
feature of the latter obligation vis-à-vis ILCs’ TK is highlighted, as it appears the only 
occasion in the Protocol where the reference to domestic law is absent. In this light, I 
suggest this feature opens the floor to consider the ABS rights of ILCs of TK in a 
broader context of international law, especially the international human rights 
standards. Specifying different situations in which ILCs may be considered as 
legitimate beneficiaries, it is also observed that not only State Parties, but also non-
State actors or even ILCs themselves bear duties in terms of ensuring fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing. The second part investigates the “mutually agrees terms” (MAT) as a 
procedural safeguard for ensuring fair and equitable benefit-sharing. Parties’ 
obligation to encourage the development and use of model contractual clauses, 
voluntary codes of conduct, best practices and ILCs’ customary rules is highlighted.78 
This part concludes with an analysis of the potential risks of implementing MAT as a 
private-law contract, which links to the next section on fair and equitable standards. 
1.3.1 Obligations of benefit-sharing at inter-State and intra-State levels 
According to Article 5 of the Nagoya Protocol, Parties are obliged to take legislative, 
administrative or policy measures: A) as appropriate, to ensure that benefits arising 
from the utilisation of GR as well as subsequent applications and commercialisation 
are shared in a fair and equitable way with the provider Party; 79 B) with the aim of 
ensuring, that the benefits arising from the utilisation of GR held by ILCs are shared 
with the concerned ILCs, in accordance with domestic legislation regarding their 
established rights over GR; and C) as appropriate, in order that benefits arising from 
                                               
78 See in general Tomme R. Young and Morten W. Tvedt, Drafting Successful Access and Benefit-sharing Contracts 
(Brill 2017) 22 and Winter Gerd and Kamau Evanson Chege, ‘Model Clauses for Mutually Agreed Terms on 
Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing’ (2016) 12 (1) Law, Environment and Development Journal, 18. 
79 Nagoya Protocol, art 5(3). 
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the utilisation of TK associated with GR are shared in a fair and equitable way with 
ILCs holding such knowledge.80 These obligations foresee the implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol at both inter-State and intra-State levels. With respect to inter-State 
benefit-sharing, paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 5 envisage Parties’ benefit-sharing 
obligations to take measures to ensure fair and equitable benefit-sharing between the 
users and the provider Parties.81 In this context, the benefits that shall be shared are the 
ones arising from the “utilization of GR” as well as “subsequent applications and 
commercialization”. Based on the benefit-sharing obligations established under the 
CBD about “commercial and other utilization” of GR, the Nagoya Protocol defines the 
term “utilisation of GR” as “conduct research and development” (R&D) on the genetic 
and/or biochemical composition of GR, including through the application of 
biotechnology.82  It further clarifies that “biotechnology” means any technological 
application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to 
make or modify products or processes for specific use.83 In comparison, the term 
“subsequent applications and commercialization” remains undefined in the Protocol. 
Nevertheless, it reflects the understanding achieved in the negotiation process, that 
benefit-sharing needs to cover the whole value chain, which often contains different 
stages of R&D and can lead to various products.84 
Intra-State benefit-sharing concerns ILCs as beneficiaries. Specifically, in 
situations where, A) GR over which ILCs have “established rights” in accordance with 
domestic legislation, and/or B) TK associated with GR held by ILCs, are utilised, 
Parties are obliged to take measures to ensure fair and equitable benefit-sharing with 
the concerned ILCs. The Nagoya Protocol does not define what exactly “utilisation of 
                                               
80 ibid art 5(5). 
81 Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 13) 114. 
82 Nagoya Protocol, art 2(c). 
83 ibid art 2(d). 
84 Greiber and others (n 1) 85. 
Benefit-sharing and Human Rights Implications 
138 
TK” means. Nevertheless, it imposes assertive benefit-sharing obligations with respect 
to ILCs, compared to the CBD that only “encourages” Parties to ensure benefit-sharing 
subject to their national legislation. Furthermore, when addressing benefit-sharing 
based on ILCs’ TK, the Nagoya Protocol uses far fewer caveats and does not refer to 
domestic legislation at all, compared to the provisions on GR that are conditioned by 
several qualifies such as “with the aim of ensuring” and “in accordance with domestic 
legislation”.85 This is worth noting because it appears the only occasion where the 
reference to domestic law is absent when articulating Parties’ obligation to ensure 
benefit-sharing.86 This could be read in light of the international legal developments 
of recognising and protecting ILCs’ rights over TK in other fields, especially human 
rights and intellectual property rights (IPRs) of ILCs.87 The implication is that the 
protection of TK and ILCs’ rights over TK is a matter of international human rights 
obligation that requires States to take into account international standards when 
formulating domestic laws and policies, rather than subjecting the protection of TK to 
their respect domestic legal framework.88  
Furthermore, benefit-sharing at the intra-State level links to the issues about 
capacity-building and development of ILCs.89 Developing country Parties are required 
to support “the capacity needs and priorities” of ILCs and relevant stakeholders as 
identified by themselves, while identifying their own national capacity needs and 
                                               
85 Nagoya Protocol, art 5(5). 
86 See the discussion in chapter two about the fact that the access-related provisions in the Protocol have made constant 
references to “domestic law”. ibid arts 6 and 7. 
87 See in general, Volker Heins, ‘Human Rights, Intellectual Property, and Struggles for Recognition’ (2008) 9 Human 
Rights Review, 217 and Peter K. Yu, ‘Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights 
Framework’ (2007) 40 (3) UC Davis Law Review, 1149. 
88 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 'Intellectual Property Rights and Human 
Rights' (2000) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 paras 3-6 and Greiber and others (n 1) 89. A detailed discussion 
on this point continues in the following section 2.3 in this chapter. 
89 Nagoya Protocol, art 22. 
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priorities through “national capacity self-assessment”. 90  An indicative and non-
exhaustive list of possible measures for capacity-building is also provided, including, 
special measures to increase the capacity of ILCs with emphasis on enhancing the 
capacity of women within those communities. 91  This reflects in the consensus 
achieved under the Nagoya Protocol that the COP-MOP of the Nagoya Protocol is 
obliged to take into account the capacity needs and priorities of ILCs, including women 
within these communities, when providing guidance with respect to the financial 
mechanism.92 The concern of capacity-building of ILCs thus is embedded in Parties’ 
obligations with a particular focus on the inclusion of women within ILCs.93 In the 
most recent COP 14 in November 2018, while assessing the effectiveness of the 
Protocol, Parties have identified the need to support the capacity-building of IPLCs 
with respect to ABS issues, for instance, minimum requirements for MAT.94  
When considering the intra-State obligations of State Parties via-a-vis ILCs, it 
is necessary to distinguish specific situations in which the content of such obligations 
may vary. These situations include: A) States share benefits with ILCs who live within 
their territories; B) non-State actors negotiate MAT and share benefits with ILCs under 
the supervision and/or facilitation of State governments; C) benefit-sharing among 
ILCs and within communities. Each situation illuminates a distinctive dimension of 
the relationship involved in intra-State benefit-sharing among States, ILCs, and other 
non-State actors. It demonstrates the fact that not only State Parties, but also non-State 
actors or even ILCs themselves may bear duties in terms of ensuring fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing. Consequentially, the obligations of State Parties may not only contain 
regulating the benefit-sharing process between governments and ILCs, but also 
                                               
90 ibid art 22(3). 
91 ibid art 22(5)(j). 
92 ibid art 25 (3).  
93 The issue of the rights of women in benefit-sharing is addressed in detail in the following section 2.1.2. 
94 Decision (n 41) anx 10. 
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ensuring the fair and equitable benefit-sharing in the situations B and C via appropriate 
facilitation and administrative measures. Having said that, it is also fundamental to 
note the fact that there persist enormous power disparities among stakeholders, in 
particular between multinational corporations and ILCs, as well as State governments 
and ILCs.95 This fact should not be overlooked in articulating States’ benefit-sharing 
obligations, and is discussed in greater details in conjunction with the human rights 
obligations of States in the following section 2 below.  
1.3.2 MAT as a procedural safeguard 
In accordance with Article 5 of the Nagoya Protocol, the obligations vis-à-vis benefit-
sharing at both inter-State and intra-State levels shall be upon MAT.96 MAT as a 
procedural requirement is also included in several CBD provisions with respect to 
access to GR and benefit-sharing,97 access to and transfer of technology98 and handling 
of biotechnology and distribution of its benefits.99 Often established in a form of “a 
private-law contract”, MAT implies a negotiation between the Party granting access 
to GR and any entity aiming to utilise those resources, such as individuals, companies, 
or research institutions. 100  Ideally, it should construct an “effective and easily 
enforceable way” to ensure the realisation of benefit-sharing obligations through 
compliance with international and domestic private laws. 101  This objective is 
facilitated by a range of procedural requirements and there are divergent opinions 
                                               
95 Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 13) 7. 
96 Nagoya Protocol arts 5(2)(5). 
97 ibid arts 15(4)(7). 
98 ibid arts 16(2)(3). 
99 ibid art 19(2). 
100 Greiber and others (n 1) 9. 
101 Nagoya Protocol, art 18. Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 13) 131. 
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about its actual effectiveness.102 The following paragraphs firstly investigate the legal 
text and then discuss the challenges facing its implementation. 
A list of minimum requirements on the content of MAT is provided in the 
Nagoya Protocol in relation to Parties’ obligations to regulate PIC for accessing GR, 
including, dispute settlement clauses, terms on benefit-sharing, subsequent third-party 
use and changes of intent.103 Detailed model contractual terms for MAT have also been 
proposed by legal scholars, taking a rather neutral position vis-à-vis the interests of 
both the providers and users.104 With a sharpened focus on ILCs, the Protocol also 
obliges Parties to support ILCs to develop minimum requirements for MAT and model 
contractual clauses for benefit-sharing with respect TK associated with GR.105 To 
support the implementation of MAT, Articles 19 and 20 of the Nagoya Protocol 
impose obligations on Parties to encourage “the development, update, and use of 
sectoral and cross-sectoral model contractual clauses”,106 as well as “voluntary codes 
of conduct, guidelines, and best practices and/or standards”.107 The COP-MOP is also 
obliged to take stock of the use of these model and voluntary standards periodically.108 
Against this background, a COP-MOP decision is adopted in 2014 to encourage tools 
developed under Articles 19 and 20 of the Protocol to be shared openly on the Access 
and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House. 109  Notably, not only Parties and State 
Governments are encouraged to do so, but also international organisations, ILCs and 
                                               
102 See Brendan Tobin, ‘Biodiverstiy Prospecting Contracts: The Search for Equitable Agreements’ in Sarah A. laird 
(ed), Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge: Equitable Partnerships in Practice (Earthscan 2010) 291 and Young 
and Tvedt (n 78) 2. 
103 Nagoya Protocol, art 6(3)(g).  
104 Gerd and Evanson Chege (n 78) 20 and Young and Tvedt (n 78) 22. 
105 However, this obligation does not refer to GR held by ILCs. See Nagoya Protocol, arts 12(3)(b)(c).  
106 ibid art 19(1). 
107 ibid art 20(1). 
108 ibid arts 19 (2) and 20(2). 
109 NP MOP 1 Decision NP-1/5, 'Model Contractual Clauses, Voluntary Codes of Conduct, Guidelines and Best 
Practices and/or Standards (Articles 19 and 20)' (20 October 2014) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/NP/COP-MOP/DEC/1/5. 
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relevant stakeholders.110 Specifically, the decision includes legal tools that have been 
developed prior to the Nagoya Protocol (2010), as well as ILCs’ customary laws, 
community protocols and procedures.111 If fully implemented, these provisions could 
create a facilitative environment for successful negotiations and efficient executions 
of fair and equitable benefit-sharing agreements, while supporting the development 
and respecting ILCs’ customary rules in the process of negotiating and implementing 
benefit-sharing terms.112  
While MAT serves as a procedural safeguard for realising the objective of ABS, 
its implementation face several challenges. First, as MAT are usually negotiated at the 
point of access, it does not necessarily promise a fair and equitable outcome of benefit-
sharing as the utilisation takes place.113 Second, envisaging a contractual relationship 
between the providers and the users, MAT relies on domestic private law, especially 
contract law, for its establishment and enforcement. 114  Scholarly discussion has 
revealed the multifaceted problems embedded in this construction, including, inter alia, 
unequal bargaining power between the providers and the users in negotiating 
contractual clauses for MAT; differences in the conditions of and approaches taken by 
different jurisdictions to ensure equity and fairness in which MAT are negotiated; 
varying legal, social and economic capacities of the companies, institutions and ILCs 
                                               
110 ibid para 1. 
111 ibid paras 2 and 3. 
112 CBD Working Group on ABS, 'Study on Compliance in Relation to the Customary Law of Indigenous and Local 
Communities, National Law, Across Jurisdictions, and International Law' (6 March 2009) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/INF/5 4. 
113 Gurdial Singh Nijar, ‘Incorporating Traditional Knowledge in an International Regime on Access to Genetic 
Resources and Benefit Sharing: Problems and Prospects’ (2010) 21 (2) European Journal Of International Law, 
463. Also, see the ABS related laws of Afghanistan, Australia, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Guyana, India, Malawi, Pakistan, 
Philippines, and South Africa. 
114 Shakeel Bhatti and others (eds), Contracting for ABS: The Legal and Scientific Implications of Bioprospecting 
Contracts (IUCN 2009) 39. 
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to negotiate a fair and equitable arrangement.115 Thus, the CBD Working Group on 
ABS suggests that contract law alone cannot guarantee fairness and equity for ABS 
purposes and “a domestic legislative and international instrument-based counter 
balance” is needed. 116  Even in situations where MAT are negotiated between 
competent national authorities on behalf of ILCs or other stakeholders, it still lacks 
legal clarity as to how to ensure the concluded terms are in accordance with ILCs’ 
needs, aspirations and customary laws and if not, how to redress the issue.117 What 
appears crucial in the above-identified problems is the understanding of “fair and 
equitable”—what it entails and how it relates to international human rights standards 
with respect to ILCs. Thus, in order to fully unravel the potential of MAT as a 
procedural safeguard and understand its limitations in achieving the Protocol’s 
objective, an exanimation of “fair and equitable” is continued in the following section 
1.4 and further investigation of the implication of relevant human rights standards is 
provided in section 2.  
1.4 Normative standards of benefit-sharing  
Fair and equitable are the core normative standards for benefit-sharing under the 
international ABS framework, reiterated throughout the text of the CBD and the 
Nagoya Protocol. They are also increasingly elaborated by the COP decisions and a 
range of voluntary guidelines adopted by the CBD Parties, especially with respect to 
                                               
115 See, in general, Saskia Vermeylen, ‘Contextualizing ‘Fair’ and ‘Equitable’: The San's Reflections on the Hoodia 
Benefit-Sharing Agreement’ (2007) 12 (4) Local Environment, 427, essays in Evanson C. Kamau and Gerd Winter 
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benefit-sharing with ILCs.118 However, these instruments fall short of defining the 
notions of “fair” and “equitable”. In scholarly discussion, fair and equitable have been 
approached from difference perspectives and in various contexts.119 This section looks 
at the interpretation of the normative standards of fair and equitable as established in 
the ABS context, focusing on their implications for IPLCs. 
1.4.1 Development under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol 
Fair and equitable as standards for benefit-sharing are phrased in several different ways 
in the binding ABS instruments—the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol. First, as the treaty 
objective, fair and equitable sharing of the benefits is established in Article 1 of the 
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. Second, elaborating the obligations of Parties to 
benefit-sharing, Article 15(7) of the CBD requires that each contracting Party to take 
measures, with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of R&D and 
the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilisation of GR. This phrase has 
been inherited in Article 5 of the Protocol, which articulates that Parties are obliged to 
ensure that benefits are shared in a fair and equitable way with the provider Parties 
and/or ILCs.120 Moreover, in Article 19 of the CBD, Parties are required to “take all 
practicable measures to promote and advance priority access on a fair and equitable 
basis by Contracting Parties, especially developing countries, to the results and 
benefits arising from biotechnologies based upon genetic resources provided by those 
                                               
118 Seethe discussion about the normative development under the international ABS framework in the previous section 
2.2.2 of chapter two. See also Stephen Tully, ‘The Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit 
Sharing’ (2003) 12 (1) Review of European Comparative and International Environmental Law, 84 and Morgera 
(n 9) 360. 
119 As will be discussed, for instance, Vermeylen analyses fair and equitable from a legal anthropological perspective 
and Francioni discusses the international legal implication of fair and equitable in the context of applying 
biotechnology, see Vermeylen (n 115) 423 and Francesco Francioni, ‘International Law for Biotechnology: Basic 
Principles’ in Francesco Francioni and Tullio Scovazzi (eds), Biotechnology and International Law (Hart 2006) 24. 
120 Although to varying degrees of vigorousness, see the discussion in previous section 1.3. 
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Contracting Parties”.121 Furthermore, recalling the fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
objective, the Preamble of the Nagoya Protocol highlights the importance of promoting 
equity and fairness in negotiation of MAT between providers and users. In the same 
line, the Nagoya Protocol explicitly includes “promotion of equity and fairness in 
negotiations” as a measure of capacity-development and provided one example of 
what this may entail—training to negotiate MAT.122  
Articles 9 and 10 of the Nagoya Protocol are also relevant in understanding the 
normative standards of benefit-sharing. Article 9 addresses the direction in which 
shared benefits should flow— “towards the conservation of biological diversity and 
the sustainable use of its components”.123 Greber and others have suggested that this 
could be understood in connection with the possible options for shared benefits,124 
especially the non-monetary ones that could be “more direct, immediately available, 
long-term, and suited to contributing to conservation”. 125  Article 10 envisages a 
procedural obligation for Parties to “consider the need for and modalities of a global 
multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to address the fair and equitable benefit-
sharing in transboundary situations or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain 
PIC”.126 If shared through this potential mechanism, it is also required that the benefits 
shall be used to support the first two objectives of the CBD on a global scale.127 Thus, 
both Articles provided a legal basis for considering the purpose of benefit-sharing that 
it shall not only be fair and equitable between users and providers, but also in a way 
                                               
121 CBD, art 19. 
122 Nagoya Protocol, art 22(5)(b).  
123 Greiber and others (n 1) 28. 
124 See discussions in the previous section 1.1. 
125 Greiber and others (n 1) 88. 
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that could contribute to the overall objectives of the CBD and even beyond the bilateral 
user-provider paradigm.128  
These standards imply that not only the shared benefits per se shall be fair and 
equitable, but also the methods and means agreed by the provider and user during the 
benefit-sharing process.129 However, as fair and equitable remain undefined under the 
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, there are divergent opinions about how to interpret and 
implement these terms in specific contexts.130 It remains unclear whether the standards 
of fairness and equity are to be understood in the context of international law, or 
outside the law as an autonomous source of principles that are assumed to inspire 
contractual arrangements.131 In light of these normative developments vis-à-vis IPLCs 
under the international ABS framework, 132  it also raises questions about how to 
integrate IPLCs’ perspectives of fair and equitable into ABS negotiations.133 In general, 
Tvedt has argued that the Nagoya Protocol does not set any substantive or procedural 
criteria for establishing MAT to provide for fair and equitable benefit-sharing.134 In 
addition, Vermeylen has also pointed out that the CBD as a construct has some 
structural shortcomings, for instance, relying on the Western notion of exclusive 
                                               
128 For a discussion of the potential ways where bilateral approach and multilateral approach to benefit-sharing might 
be mutually supportive, see Michael Halewood and others, ‘Implementing Mutually Supportive Access and Benefit 
Sharing Mechanisms under the Plant Treaty, Convention on Biological Diversity, and Nagoya Protocol’ (2013) 9 
(1) Law, Environment and Development Journal, 74. 
129 It has been suggested that the terminology “fair and equitable” serves to make explicit both procedural dimensions 
of justice (fairness) that determine the legitimacy of certain courses of action, as well as substantive dimensions 
(equity), see Morgera (n 9) 381. 
130 See Shane P. Mulligan, ‘For Whose Benefit? Limits to Sharing in the Bioprospecting ‘Regime’’ (1999) 8 (4) 
Environmental Politics, 35, Anthony Artuso, ‘Bioprospecting, Benefit Sharing, and Biotechnological Capacity 
Building’ (2002) 30 (8) World Development, 1355 and Vermeylen (n 115) 424. 
131 Francioni (n 119) 24 and Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 13) 132. 
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133 Vermeylen (n 115) 424. 
134 Morten W. Tvedt, ‘Beyond Nagoya: Towards a Legally Functional System of Access and Benefit sharing’ in 
Sebastian Oberthür and G. Kristin Rosendal (eds), Global Governance of Genetic Resources Access and Benefit 
Sharing after the Nagoya Protocol (Routledge 2013) 161. 
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ownership of knowledge, for fully accommodating requests of IPLCs.135 In a recent 
endeavour to normalise fair and equitable benefit-sharing in the context of 
international law, Morgera stresses the importance of international human rights law 
notions such as procedural fairness, non-discrimination and proportionality for 
interpreting “fair and equitable” standards as a way of realising the cross-fertilization 
between these two bodies of international law.136 As this research focuses on IPLCs 
and their human rights, I will elaborate how a mutually supportive interpretation in 
light of relevant international human rights law may shed light on the standards of fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing with IPLCs in the following section 2.1. Nevertheless, I 
am aware the actual outcome would greatly depend on the process of establishing 
MAT and the articulation of private contractual terms in the ABS transactions.  
1.4.2 Fair and equitable in Indigenous and local contexts 
The standards of fair and equitable sharing of benefits in Indigenous and local contexts 
have been elaborated through recent COP decisions, in particular the 2016 Mo’otz 
Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines.137 In general, the Guidelines provide that the benefits 
received by IPLCs should be fair and equitable based on MAT.138 Specifically, the 
Guidelines highlight that benefit-sharing should be fair and equitable at both inter-
community and intra-community levels, “taking into account relevant community 
level procedures and as appropriate gender and age/intergenerational 
considerations”.139 Focusing on the capacity of IPLCs, the Guidelines also stress that, 
“Parties, other Governments, and others seeking access to TK should ensure that the 
holders of that TK can negotiate on a fair and equitable basis” when developing 
                                               
135 Vermeylen relies on the theory of distributive, procedural and interactional justice and points out IPLCs often have 
very different values and traditions but very weak and vulnerable social positions. See Vermeylen (n 115) 433. 
136 Morgera (n 9) 382. 
137 XIII/18 (n 68). 
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MAT.140 Furthermore, the importance of community protocols of ILCs is emphasised 
because they “may provide guidance from the community perspective on the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits”.141 The role of MAT for securing fair and equitable and 
the importance of developing community protocols are also evident in earlier COP 
decisions.142 
Thus the recent normative development under the ABS framework reflect the 
scholarly debates that fair and equitable standards should take into account IPLCs’ 
perspectives and notions of fairness and equity. The COP decisions have emphasised 
on the customary laws and community protocols of IPLCs, as well as capacity-building 
measure in order to achieve this goal. This emerging consideration indicates that the 
standard of “fair and equitable” is not only “part and parcel of the object and purpose 
of the Protocol”, but also fundamentally embedded in the procedural requirements of 
ABS, including capacity-building, MAT negotiation and the development of ILCs’ 
community protocols. 143 In order to clarify the rights and duties of the legal key 
stakeholders (States, ILCs and private entities) involved in the benefit-sharing process, 
I focus on the human rights of equality and non-discrimination of IPLCs in the next 
section, as they may help to define “fair and equitable” more precisely in the CBD and 
the Nagoya Protocol specifically in Indigenous and local contexts. 
                                               
140 ibid para 23 (d). 
141 ibid para 23 (b). 
142 CBD COP Decision XI/1, 'Status of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
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2. Human rights implication on benefit-sharing related provisions 
The above analysis elaborated the points that ILCs are legitimate beneficiaries in ABS 
transactions concerning their GR and TK and that State Parties of the Nagoya Protocol 
are obliged to ensure the realisation of fair and equitable benefit-sharing at both inter-
State and intra-State levels. Various means and procedural safeguards are envisaged 
under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol to facilitate the realisation of this core ABS 
objective, for instance, based on the negotiated MAT, benefit-sharing can be achieved 
via technology transfer and funding. The normative standards of “fair and equitable” 
remain undefined yet they demand respect for ILCs’ customary laws and community 
protocols. In the scholarly debate, benefit-sharing has been appraised in light of the 
discourse on justice. For example, Schroeder argues that fair and equitable benefit-
sharing is a small but important step forward to redress distributive injustices.144 
Concerns about unjust treatment and social inequities are especially conspicuous in 
the context of exploitation and utilisation by non-owner of ILCs’ GR and TK without 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing, as such resources and knowledge are closely related 
to ILCs general well-being.145 There is also a growing attention on how to include and 
empower women in the decision-making process of benefit-sharing and in the 
distribution of shared benefits, demonstrating gender equity and equality as a concern 
central to the demand of social justice.146 Nevertheless, as discussed, there persist 
many deficiencies and loopholes of the current benefit-sharing mechanism under the 
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol: from not enough focus or implementation on the “user-
                                               
144 Doris Schroeder, ‘Justice and Benefit Sharing’ in Rachel Wynberg, Doris Schroeder and Roger Chennells (eds), 
Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Benefit Sharing (Springer 2009) 11. 
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side measures”147 to the lack of capacity of especially developing countries and ILCs 
to put ABS policies in place and monitor the utilisation of GR and TK.148  
What, then, are the implications of human rights of IPLCs in the context of 
benefit-sharing? The 2018 report of the Special Rapporteur Saad Alfarargi on the right 
to development could offer a glimpse of how human rights norms may contribute to 
ensure fair and equitable benefit-sharing. Specifically, in addressing the inequality in 
economic, social, cultural and political development, he states that, States shall ensure 
“inclusive and meaningful participation of relevant stakeholders at all levels of 
decision-making” in order to enable and ensure “the equal sharing of benefits”.149 In 
fact, there is also an emerging trend in incorporating benefit-sharing in the 
international human rights standards to realise, for instance, IPLCs’ rights to 
environment, equality and development. 150  For example, in April 2018, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment John Knox proposes a series 
of framework principles relating to human rights and the environment, in which the 
Framework Principle 15 requires States to ensure that Indigenous peoples and 
members of traditional communities “fairly and equitably share the benefits from 
activities relating to their lands, territories or resources”.151  
                                               
147 Morten W. Tvedt and Tomme R. Young, Beyond Access: Exploring Implementation of the Fair and Equitable 
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Indeed, widely recognised as the stewards of biodiversity and holders of TK, 
IPLCs have intrinsic rights and claims over their GR and TK, which requires a 
perspective that looks beyond the environmental framework of the CBD and the 
Nagoya Protocol to consider also ILCs’ human rights, especially with respect to their 
land, resources and culture. 152 In this mind-set, this section examines the human rights 
to equality and non-discrimination, development, and property respectively, because 
they provide the most significant normative ground for theorising the concept, 
standards and procedures of fair and equitable benefit-sharing with respect to IPLCs. 
The ongoing development in the process of international law-making, jurisprudential 
interpretation by human rights courts and human rights treaty bodies, as well as 
scholarly debates offers ample legal sources for investigating the interaction between 
the ABS norms of fair and equitable benefit-sharing with international human rights 
standards, which remains an area extremely understudied.153  
2.1 Right to equality and non-discrimination 
Equality and non-discrimination are well-established international human rights, and 
together they constitute a basis for the protection of other fundamental human rights.154 
This principle prohibits any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference that is 
based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, or has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons 
of all rights and freedoms.155 This right is grounded in the principle of equality that all 
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people are born “free and equal in dignity and rights”, as enshrined in Article 1 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Right.156  While non-discrimination is commonly 
reckoned as a negative restatement of the principle of equality in the human rights 
realm, the positive dimension of equality requires States to take affirmative measures 
to ensure the realisation of equality among all people.157 In addition to the general 
guarantees to the rights to equality and non-discrimination provided by the 
international human rights law, various instruments are also in place to address specific 
forms of discrimination in relation to particular individuals or groups, including 
children, older people, people with disabilities, minorities and Indigenous peoples.158 
The following analysis focuses on Indigenous peoples, minorities and women and their 
rights to equality and non-discrimination and examines the implications of their rights 
in the context of benefit-sharing as envisaged in the Nagoya Protocol.  
The first section investigates the right to equality and non-discrimination of 
Indigenous peoples and minorities based on relevant provisions in human rights 
treaties and the works of human rights treaty bodies. The observation is that the right 
to equality and non-discrimination serves as a legal basis for claiming fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing from exploitative activities of their resources.159 This right 
also offers a perspective of understanding fairness and equity in ABS negotiations at 
both inter-community and intra-community levels. The second section focuses on the 
issue of gender equality, based on the frequent yet largely overlooked reference to 
                                               
156 Universal Declaration of Human Rights [10 December 1948] UNGA Res 217 A (III), art 1. 
157 Natan Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law (Second edn, Nijhoff 2003) 25 and HRC (n 
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women in the Nagoya Protocol. I argue at the end of the analysis that the States’ 
responsibility to ensure fair and equitable benefit-sharing must be underlined by their 
international human rights obligations to secure equality and non-discrimination of all 
individuals and peoples, especially IPLCs and women within these communities.  
2.1.1 Indigenous peoples and minority groups 
The principle of equality and non-discrimination lies at the core of international human 
rights law. It requires that the general human rights as set out in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and all the subsequent international human 
rights instruments to be equally enjoyed by everyone, including members of 
Indigenous peoples and minority groups.160 In particular, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) addresses the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to 
use their own language. 161  Aiming at protecting a group from discrimination on 
grounds of race, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
has made it clear that discrimination against Indigenous peoples is to be considered as 
racial discrimination; therefore, covered by the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).162 Furthermore, two 
human rights declarations focusing on discrimination regarding religion or belief and 
minorities—the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief163 and the Declaration on the Rights of 
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Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities164–also 
provide protection of Indigenous peoples and minority groups against discrimination. 
For instance, the former Declaration guarantees to everyone the right to “have a 
religion or whatever beliefs of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in 
community with others…to manifest his religion or belief”, which conspicuously 
covers ILCs’ own worldviews, values and customary rules.165  
These human rights instruments, albeit with varying degrees of binding force 
and recognition among States, provide a set of obligations and measures to ensure 
compliance.166 According to Article 26 of the ICCPR, State Parties must “guarantee to 
all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground”.167 
This means that States are obliged to effectively address instances of structural and 
systemic discrimination by taking positive measures.168 Along the same lines, the 
ICERD envisages positive obligations to ensure development and protection of racial 
groups for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal protection of human 
rights in economic, social and cultural fields.169 In this context, the HRC has provided 
an example of what an affirmative action might contain:  
                                               
164 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities [18 
December 1992] UNGA Res 47/135. 
165 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, art 
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166 At the time of writing, the CERD has 88 signatories and 180 parties, see UNTC, ‘International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination’ (UN Treaty Collection, 1966) 
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in a State where the general conditions of a certain part of the population 
prevent or impair their enjoyment of human rights, the State should take 
specific action to correct those conditions. Such action may involve granting 
for a time to the part of the population concerned certain preferential treatment 
in specific matters as compared with the rest of the population. However, as 
long as such action is needed to correct discrimination in fact, it is a case of 
legitimate differentiation under the Covenant.170  
Thus, under the general obligation to take positive measures, State Parties are also 
required to be observant of the special conditions and act in according to domestic and 
local circumstances in order to effectively correct discrimination. 
Important linkages between this principle and benefit-sharing have been 
increasingly elaborated by the human rights treaties bodies including the CESCR, the 
CERD and the HRC. On the one hand, in the Concluding Observations provided by 
the CESCR and the CERD, the right to equality and non-discrimination have been 
constructed as a legal basis for asserting States’ obligations to ensure benefit-sharing 
with IPLCs. For example, in light of the right to non-discrimination and the right to 
culture,171 the CESCR observed that New Zealand had not given sufficient protection 
of the inalienable rights of Indigenous Māori people to their lands, territories, waters 
and maritime areas; therefore, urged the State Party to ensure that Māori receive proper 
compensation and enjoy tangible benefits from the exploitation of their resources.172 
Referring to its General Recommendation No. 23 on Indigenous peoples, the CERD 
stressed that merely consulting the communities prior to exploiting their subsoil 
                                               
170 HRC (n 154) para 10. 
171 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
3 January 1976], arts 1(2) and 15. 
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resources is not enough, because PIC of these communities and the equitable sharing 
of benefits to be derived from such exploitation must be ensured.173 
 Under the jurisprudence of the HRC, the right to equality and non-
discrimination plays an important role in securing IPLCs’ right to culture both as a 
group and as individuals at different levels. Specifically, based on the recognition that 
the ability of a minority group to maintain its culture, language or religion is the 
precondition for realising Article 27, the HRC has suggested that State Parties shall 
take positive measures to protect not only the individuals’ rights within the minorities, 
but also the identity of minority groups as a whole.174 In this connection, the HRC 
highlights that “such positive measures must respect the provisions of Articles 2(1) 
and 26 of the Covenant both as regards the treatment between different minorities and 
the treatment between the persons belonging to them and the remaining part of the 
population”.175 Thus, by linking the minority rights with the right to equality and non-
discrimination, the HRC has unpacked two important aspects that are often overlooked. 
That is, the tension related to equality does not only exist between societal minorities 
and the majorities, but also among IPLCs themselves as minority groups and within 
IPLCs among individual members of the group. In order words, State Parties must pay 
attention to equality and non-discrimination at both inter-community and intra-
community levels when fulfilling their obligations to respect and protect minorities’ 
right to culture. In practice, Sami people have attempted to claim violations of their 
rights to culture in combination with their right to non-discrimination to the HRC.176 
However, as demonstrated in the Paadar v Finland case, it seems rather difficult to 
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prove the discriminatory intention or effects to support such a claim.177 It has to be 
noted that the inter-community equality is also relevant for communities whose 
identities are not recognised as “peoples” or “minorities”. From a human rights 
perspective, their rights in connection with land, natural resources, culture and 
knowledge shall also be taken into account so that there is no inter-community 
discrimination at the domestic level.178 At both inter-community and intra-community 
levels, discriminatory acts may be practised by different entities, including public 
authorities, communities, and private persons or bodies.179 
2.1.2 Women and gender equality 
Gender equality is emphasised in both International Covenants. Asserting the general 
principle of equality, the ICCPR obliges State Parties to ensure the equal right of men 
and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights180 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) addresses the equal 
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights.181 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) is adopted in 1979 to address in particular discrimination against women, 
monitored by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (the 
CEDAW Committee).182 Article 1 of the CEDAW describes “discrimination against 
women” as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which 
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
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178 Olivier De Schutter, ‘The Emerging Human Right to Land’ (2010) 12 (3) International Community Law Review, 
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exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men 
and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil or any other field”. 183  It is worth noting that the CEDAW 
explicitly addresses conduct attributable not only to State, but also to non-State 
actors.184 To date, the CEDAW has almost universal recognition with 189 State Parties 
by ratification.185 
The CEDAW Committee has rendered strong emphasis on the obligations of 
State Parties to take positive and affirmative measures to fulfil and facilitate the 
realisation of equality regarding women in its General Recommendations and 
Concluding Observations.186 Three points are of particular relevance to inform benefit-
sharing related obligations at the intra-State level. First, recognising that de jure 
equality is a prerequisite for achieving de facto equality of women, the CEDAW 
Committee has stressed the importance of the elimination of discriminatory 
legislation.187 With respect to domestic legal frameworks, the CEDAW Committee 
notes that State Parties are obliged to make legislative efforts to establish and 
strengthen the principle of equality of all persons before the law in their domestic 
constitutions and legal systems.188  As recommended by the CEDAW Committee, 
                                               
183 ibid art 1. 
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these may include: A) to adopt a comprehensive definition of discrimination against 
women and girls and to ensure that that legislation covers all prohibited grounds of 
discrimination; B) to review its legislation, and if needed, to repeal any provisions that 
discriminate against women in order to ensure domestic legal compliance with the 
CEDAW; C) to raise public awareness about women’s rights.189 Second, in the context 
of economic and social benefits and economic empowerment of women, the CEDAW 
Committee has addressed the issues about, inter alia, the inadequate management of 
development processes, the lack of a coherent policy on social protection and 
compensation programmes for women, and the barriers that women face in accessing 
financial services.190 It recommends that State Parties to “take measures to improve 
the economic empowerment of women, in particular among Indigenous women…and 
establish adequate mechanisms for monitoring, evaluation and impact analysis of 
social development programmes directed at women and ensure the participation of 
women”.191 In relation to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the CEDAW 
Committee calls for the realisation of “substantive gender equality”, in accordance 
with the provisions of the Convention.192 
The scholarly discussion about women’s rights vis-à-vis group rights also 
merits attention, in particular at the intra-community level where the concern of gender 
equality might clash with the one of community’s cultural tradition.193 Addressing the 
tension between multiculturalism and feminism, Okin argues that “defenders of 
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cultural and groups rights for minority culture have failed to notice that there are 
considerable differences of power within those cultures, and that those differences are 
gendered, with men having power over women”.194 Based on this observation, Okin 
has suggested that gender equality must be reckoned as a non-negotiable condition for 
any policies of multiculturalism and any recognition of minority rights195 and that 
“when liberal arguments are being made for the rights of groups, special care must be 
taken to look at intra-community inequalities”.196 In response to Okin’s criticism, 
Kymlicka clarifies that the literal idea of multiculturalism does not tolerate “internal 
restrictions” on members of minority groups—as these violate the autonomy of 
individuals and create injustice within the group—and further recognised the right to 
gender equality as a limiting condition of minority rights.197 This line of thought 
provides that gender equality is a principle underlining the scope and content of group 
rights, especially in connection with certain cultural practices of the group that might 
undermine women’ rights. Admittedly, Okin’s arguments, in particular about how the 
tension between women’s rights and group rights could be diffused, is not without 
controversy.198 To pursue further in this debate is outwith the scope of this section.199 
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The key message, nevertheless, is that the issue of gender equality is not only relevant 
to benefit-sharing at the intra-State level but also at the intra-community level.200  
Women, especially women from ILCs, and their role in ABS have been 
addressed six times in the Nagoya Protocol, but attracted little scholarly attention. The 
Preamble of the Nagoya Protocol recognises the “vital role” that women play in the 
ABS processes and affirms the need for the “full participation of women at all levels 
of policy-making and implementation for biodiversity conservation”.201 With respect 
to TK associated with GR, the Protocol requires Parties to support ILCs, “including 
women within these communities” to develop community protocols, minimum 
requirements for MAT and model contractual clauses for benefit-sharing. Furthermore, 
in the context of capacity-building,202 Parties are required to support the capacity needs 
and priorities of ILCs and relevant stakeholders, while “emphasizing the capacity 
needs and priorities of women”.203 The Protocol also provides possible measures for 
capacity-building that may include special measures to increase the capacity of ILCs 
with “emphasis on enhancing the capacity of women within those communities”.204 At 
the inter-State level, the COP-MOP of the Nagoya Protocol is obliged to take into 
account the capacity needs and priorities of ILCs, including women within these 
communities, when providing guidance with respect to the financial mechanism.205 
These provisions reflect the importance of recognising and respecting the needs, 
priorities and right of women when implementing the Nagoya Protocol, and arguably, 
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also imply the fact that women within ILCs are not always included in the decision-
making process.  
Thus, it can be observed that the issue of gender equality, especially the 
protection of the rights of women from ILCs, has been taken into account by the 
Nagoya Protocol. However, it has not attracted much attention among Parties or 
scholarly literature in relation to how ABS obligations could be fulfilled in a way that 
is in line with the international human rights standards on women’s rights. No 
substantive or procedural safeguards are in place for protecting women within IPLCs 
in the process of ABS negotiations and implementations. Against this background, 
international human rights standards for protecting women’s rights may contribute to 
articulate provisions in the Nagoya Protocol vis-à-vis women within IPLCs. A 
mutually supportive understanding is explained in detail in the next section.  
2.1.3 Human rights implications 
The right to equality and non-discrimination underlines the international human rights 
framework.206 All above-examined human rights conventions against discrimination 
boasted high numbers of ratifications and bear “strong moral force of virtually 
universality”.207 In general, the human rights to equality and non-discrimination may 
serve to clarify the rights and obligations related to the intra-State dimension of fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing, including at inter-community and intra-community 
levels that remain extremely under-studied. This clarification may in turn contribute 
to contextualising the fairness and equity standards, (especially in terms of their 
implication and relevance towards IPLCs and women within these communities) 
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which remain a multi-dimensional international law concept208 with a focus on IPLCs 
and women within these communities. The procedural dimensions of justice (fairness) 
and substantive dimensions (equity) 209 may be clarified by integrating substantive 
human right to equality and non-discrimination and its procedural elements.  
Specifically, there are three relevant human rights implications. First, from a 
normative perspective, the ABS concept of fairness and equity are akin to equality and 
non-discrimination in human rights law, 210 in the sense that every individual and 
IPLCs shall be accorded with equal rights, equal opportunities and procedural 
safeguards in order to enjoy the optimal benefits from the ABS transactions. This 
requires State Parties of the Nagoya Protocol to eliminate discriminatory measures of 
any kind and take positive actions to address factual inequality when developing 
domestic legislative, administrative or policy measures. It also requires Parties to 
develop national ABS framework that envisages a level playing field for all 
stakeholders based on the principle of equality, taking the specific needs and situations 
of IPLCs into account. This could include providing extra resources and funds to 
support IPLCs’ capacity in participating in the ABS processes.  
Second, as observed in the previous section 1.3.1, the obligations of State 
Parties with respect to benefit-sharing exist at both inter-State and intra-State levels. 
At the intra-State level, all stakeholders including State Parties, non-State actors and 
IPLCs themselves bear duties to ensure fair and equitable benefit-sharing. This 
observation can be supported by the human rights concern related to equality, which 
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also exists at several levels—between minority and majority groups, among IPLCs as 
Indigenous and minority groups and within IPLCs among individual members of the 
group. In this connection, the human rights obligations of State Parties to address 
equality and non-discrimination at these inter-community and intra-community levels 
may shed light on the normative gap in the ABS framework, where the duties of State 
Parties to ensure intra-State fair and equitable benefit-sharing remain implicit.211 That 
is, State Parties of the Nagoya Protocol need to take into account factors that might 
affect intra-community and inter-community equality when sharing benefit with its 
IPLCs or facilitating in the benefit-sharing process negotiated between private entities 
and IPLCs. From a practical perspective, States’ obligations to take positive measures 
to ensure equal opportunities to eliminate discrimination may include fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing measures, in particular via capacity-building of IPLCs in 
order to empower their ability to fully enjoy their fundamental human rights. In this 
sense, the fulfilment of State Parties’ obligations under the Nagoya Protocol may assist 
the fulfilment of their human rights obligations.  
Last but not least, a sharpened focus on women unravels the rights and 
obligations relevant to intra-community benefit-sharing and its fair and equitable 
standards. To look at the provisions about women in the Nagoya Protocol through the 
lens of international human rights, I argue that State Parties’ obligation to take 
legislative, administrative and policy measures to implement ABS must be underlined 
by their human rights obligations to incorporate the principle of equality of all persons, 
especially women’s right to equality and non-discrimination. This means that when 
developing domestic ABS legal frameworks, State Parties shall endeavour to ensure 
de jure equality and prevent any policy of IPLC’s rights that might have adverse 
impacts on women’s rights. It also calls for special attention on women’s full 
participation in the process of developing community protocols, MAT and contractual 
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clauses, which should reflect the needs and priorities of women themselves. Perceiving 
women’ rights to non-discrimination and equality as part and parcel of the IPLCs’ ABS 
rights may offer an opportunity to redress gender inequality within IPLCs and 
empower women in the local economic processes with respect to GR and TK. This 
would be in particular meaningful in situations where gender inequality is embodied 
in traditional practices or customs of some IPLCs and where women are in a more 
vulnerable position in the community.212  
2.2 Right to development 
The right to development has proved to be controversial since its initial appearance on 
the international stage in the 1970s.213 Among extensive scholarly writing on the 
subject, opponents have questioned the normative grounds, nature, content and the 
usefulness of having a human right to development.214 Meanwhile, without eschewing 
the many deficiencies of the right, proponents have advocated for attention and efforts 
to enable the notion in a way that could influence the behaviour of States to respect 
fundamental human rights 215  and to endorse a rights-based approach to 
development216–if not to recognise the right to development per se as a legally binding 
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norm.217 Despite the fact that the right to development still faces a significant lack of 
conceptual clarity, it has been increasingly accepted by the international community 
and explicitly established in several international instruments. Specifically, the right 
to development is formally recognised as an international human right when the UN 
General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development (DRD) in 
1986. 218  Although the DRD is not legally-binding, it indeed receives a full 
international consensus; therefore, arguably represents customary international law.219 
The Preamble of the DRD states, "development is a comprehensive economic, social, 
cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-
being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free 
and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits 
resulting therefrom".220 The right to development is also recognised in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights for both individuals and groups.221 The 1992 
Rio Declaration incorporates the right to development as one of its 27 principles, so as 
to “equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future 
generations". 222  The 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) addresses the historic injustices suffered by Indigenous peoples that 
prevented them from exercising “their right to development in accordance with their 
own needs and interests" in the Preamble. Article 23 of the UNDRIP elaborates, 
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"Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies 
for exercising their right to development".223  
At the UN level, a Special Rapporteur on the right to development was 
appointed in September 2016.224 In his 2018 report, Saad Alfarargi notes, “inequality 
threatens long-term social and economic development and has an impact on the ability 
of individuals and communities to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, 
social, cultural and political development…within and across countries.” 225  He 
suggests an “inclusive and meaningful participation of relevant stakeholders at all 
levels of decision-making” in order to enable and ensure “the equal sharing of 
benefits”, which imposes obligations upon States. 226  Furthermore, the linkages 
between the right to development and benefit-sharing as well as their roles in achieving 
over-arching global goals, for instance, sustainable development, are also increasingly 
addressed. For instance, in its 2018 report on the right to development, the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stresses that, in 
implementing the 2030 Development Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals, 
States should promote fair and equitable distribution of the benefits resulting from 
development, globalization and global commons.227 The Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous peoples has also 
recommended that, in order to guarantee the human rights of Indigenous peoples in 
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relation to major development projects, States should “ensure mutually acceptable 
benefit sharing”.228 
Behind the discussion of the right to development, it is the North-South divide 
of the countries in the world of their capacities in sharing equally in the decision-
making privileges as well as the distribution of the benefits. 229  Admittedly, the 
international community has not been able to negotiate a binding instrument for the 
right to development after nearly 30 years’ debate. However, the core components of 
the right and their implications have been enunciated through the extensive literature, 
case law 230  and the work completed at the UN level. Meanwhile, the right is 
increasingly integrated into and connected with many other fundamental human rights, 
notably the social, cultural and economic human rights and the rights of Indigenous 
peoples.231 In the context of natural resource governance, Gilbert observes that the 
right to development has become “an important anchor” to support the right of ILCs 
to participation as well as to benefit from natural resources exploitation. 232  The 
principle of benefit-sharing is also increasingly recognised as an important procedural 
dimension of the somewhat “elusive and paradigmatic” right to development.233 These 
articulations pave the way to investigate the interaction between the ABS principle of 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing with international human rights standards, which 
                                               
228  Commission on Human Rights, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People' (21 January 2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90 para 66. 
229 Arjun K. Sengupta, ‘Conceptualizing the Right to Development for the Twenty-first Century’ in, Realizing the 
Right to Development (UN Publication 2013) 69. 
230 For instance, Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname [28 November 2007] (Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights) IACHR Series C no 172 and Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group 
International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya [2010] (ACHPR) 276/2003. 
231 HRC, 'Agenda and Annotations' (3 August 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/39/1 and Human Rights Council, 'Report of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' (6 July 2018) UN 
Doc A/HRC/39/37. 
232 Gilbert, Natural Resources and Human Rights: An Appraisal (n 159) 63. 
233 See Vandenbogaerde (n 214) 187 and Gilbert, Natural Resources and Human Rights: An Appraisal (n 159) 64.  
 Complementarity between the Nagoya Protocol and human rights 
169 
remains an area extremely understudied.234 The following paragraphs thus focus on 
the benefit-sharing dimension as embedded in the right to development via the 
Endorois case ruled by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (the 
Commission) in 2010,235 and explore its interaction with the fair and equitable benefit-
sharing as established under the Nagoya Protocol.  
The case concerns the displacement of the Endorois communities from their 
ancestral lands by the Kenyan government in the 1970s and the subsequent disruption 
of the community’s pastoralist way of life. In this case, the Commission found that the 
Kenyan government had violated the Endorois’ rights to religious practice, to property, 
to culture, to free disposition of natural resources and to development.236 Regarding 
the right to development, the Commission recalls the Saramaka case,237 in which 
benefit-sharing has been considered vital both in relation to the right to development 
and by extension to the right to own property.238 In the view of the Commission, 
benefit-sharing is key to the development process and the Endorois community are 
entitled to “reasonably share in the benefits made as a result of a restriction or 
deprivation of their right to the use and enjoyment of their traditional lands and of 
those natural resources necessary for their survival”.239 The Commission highlights 
States’ obligations to “ensure mutually acceptable benefit sharing” and suggested that 
it could be implemented in a form of “reasonable equitable compensation”.240 Further 
stressing States’ obligation to “ensure that the Endorois are not left out of the 
development process or benefits”, the Commission concludes that since the Kenyan 
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Government had failed to provide adequate compensation or benefits thus “did not 
adequately provide for the Endorois in the development process”, the Endorois 
community had suffered a violation of their right to development as enshrined in 
Article 22 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.241  
This case demonstrates that States should abide by their human rights 
obligations in the domestic development process, which include providing for an 
adequate, inclusive, equitable and mutually agreed process of benefit-sharing. Thus, 
the right to development can be perceived as one possible avenue where international 
human rights could accommodate concerns of IPLCs in the development processes 
that are based on their resources and knowledge, including the utilisation of their GR 
and TK as defined under the Nagoya Protocol. To elaborate the obligations of States 
in the context of the right to development, it is important to note that there are arguably 
an internal and an external aspect of the right.242 The internal aspect relates to the 
obligation of State to ensure the domestic realisation of the right to development, for 
instance, the rights of IPLCs who live within States’ territories, while the external 
aspect implies the obligation of all States to cooperate in order to ensure the right to 
development of all individuals and peoples around the globe.243 The internal aspect 
also connects to the collective characteristic of the right as recognised in the UNDRIP 
for Indigenous peoples. Thus, designed to benefit all individuals and peoples from the 
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development process, the right to development requires international recognition, 
cooperation and implementation in a holistic and interconnected manner.244 
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the principle of equitable distribution of 
the benefits of development as enshrined in the DRD echoes the objective of fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing established under the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol. Both 
reflect the concern about the inequalities embedded in the world’s development 
process and the significant power asymmetries among States, IPLCs and other non-
State actors. Although the right to development remains controversial, the elaboration 
of its core components, characteristics and relationship with other fundamental human 
rights have proved to be significant over the past three decades. In particular, the 
principle of benefit-sharing—an important procedural dimension of the right to 
development—demonstrates that the States are obliged to provide for an adequate, 
inclusive, equitable and mutually agreed process of benefit-sharing in the domestic 
development process. Recalling the analysis provided in the previous section 1.3.1, the 
right to development and the correlated obligations confirm that fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing is obligatory under the Nagoya Protocol. The detailed requirements put 
forward by the African Commission in the Endorois case that benefit-sharing should 
be “adequate, inclusive, equitable and mutually-agreed” also could inform domestic 
legislators and all stakeholders of ABS of what a benefit-sharing process should entail, 
if it is to be carried out in line with international human rights standards. Furthermore, 
the external aspect of the right to development may also be linked to Parties’ obligation 
to international cooperation in order to ensure fair and equitable benefit-sharing and to 
promote capacity-building of the IPLCs under the Nagoya Protocol. That is, States 
bear not only domestic obligations to ensure IPLCs under its jurisdiction to enjoy fully 
their right to development via benefit-sharing, but also IPLCs and provider countries 
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around the globe. Last but not least, the detailed list of both monetary and non-
monetary benefits as well as the procedural requirements including MAT and PIC, as 
provided in the Nagoya Protocol, could complement the realisation of the human rights 
to development by providing a toolkit for negotiating and implementing benefit-
sharing terms that could go well beyond just an adequate compensation.  
2.3 Property rights to lands, territories, natural resources and knowledge 
The international human rights instruments contain an explicit right to the protection 
of property, starting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that 
“everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others” 
and that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property”.245 This right has also 
been recognised in the key regional human rights instruments, including the European 
Convention,246 the American Convention247 and the African Charter.248 The fact that 
more than two third of the States has accepted the jurisdiction of a regional human 
rights court makes claims of property right a rather powerful one.249 Indeed, over the 
past two decades, the international and regional courts and tribunals have witnessed a 
growing body of jurisprudence of the right to property, especially with respect to 
Indigenous peoples and communities.250 However, there is significant analytical and 
practical distinction in terms of how the right to property is framed in domestic 
                                               
245 UDHR art 17. 
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contexts, for instance, in the process of developing land ownership policies.251 In 
scholarly discussion, whether the right to property could be regarded as a fundamental 
human right per se remains a controversial issue.252 However, it has been commonly 
agreed that the realisation of many fundamental human rights, such as the right to life 
and to food, would be impossible without the protection of the right to property.253  
For Indigenous peoples, the idea of securing rights of a proprietary nature is 
underlined by the fundamental right of self-determination, which requires that “in no 
case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence”.254 This connection is 
based on the recognition of the interdependence between Indigenous peoples and their 
lands and resources, in the sense that they typically rely on their “communal 
stewardship” over land and natural resources to ensure their economic, social and 
cultural viability and development.255 The same connection also exists in many local 
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255  See Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 'Indigenous Peoples and their 
Relationship to Land--Final working paper prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes' (11 June 
Benefit-sharing and Human Rights Implications 
174 
contexts as properties including lands and natural resources often provide sustentive 
means for local communities to maintain and develop their traditional ways of life.256 
A growing debate that is relevant to IPLCs is the discussion about the right of 
intangible properties, or “intellectual property rights” (IPRs), over the intellectual 
creations of IPLCs, such as their TK associated with GR. 257  Acknowledging the 
potential conflicts between the protection of IPRs and other human rights norms;258 it 
is generally agreed that human rights to property should inform the shaping and 
interpretation of IPRs rules, which include the protection of TK as enshrined in Article 
31 of the UNDRIP.259 This issue of protecting TK of IPLCs is also discussed at various 
international fora including human rights, the CBD and the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreements under the WTO, where the work of 
elaborating the scope and procedures of TK protection is still ongoing. Another closely 
related right is the right of non-discrimination as discussed in the previous section 2.1. 
As IPLCs often possess a different system of modalities and ownership of property, 
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the principle of non-discrimination also requires that their traditional and customary 
norms of property to be equally recognised, instead of marginalised or subdued under 
the domestic legal systems.260  
With a sharpened focus on IPLCs and their human rights, this section 
investigates the property rights of IPLCs and asks how they are substantiated and what 
relationship they have with IPLCs’ ABS rights as established under the Nagoya 
Protocol. I first visit the international human right instruments, in particular the 
Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries adopted under the International Labour Organization (ILO Convention 169) 
261  and the UNDRIP, and summarise relevant provisions on the rights of IPLCs 
pertaining to land, territories, natural resources and TK. Then an expansive 
jurisprudential and scholarly interpretation of these rights are examined, based on 
human rights case laws as well as the work of the UN human rights treaties bodies. 
The final section provides conclusion on the human rights implications for the Nagoya 
Protocol with respect to benefit-sharing with IPLCs. 
2.3.1 International human rights instruments 
The ILO Convention 169 addresses the land rights of Indigenous and tribal peoples in 
a distinctive Part II through seven Articles. A broad understanding of “land” is adopted, 
including “the concept of territories” and covering “the total environment of the areas 
which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use”.262 In particular, Article 13 
requires State governments to respect “the cultures and spiritual values” of the 
Indigenous peoples in relationship with their lands or territories, “in particular the 
                                               
260 Rights, Study on Indigenous Peoples and their Relationship to Land (n 255) 10. 
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collective aspects of this relationship”.263 Article 14 states that “the rights of ownership 
and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy 
shall be recognised” and the right to use lands that are not exclusively owned or 
possessed shall also be appropriately safeguarded. 264  In this connection, State 
governments are obliged to identify these lands, guarantee effective protection to their 
property rights and provide procedures for dispute settlement.265 Furthermore, the 
Convention addresses the rights of Indigenous peoples to the natural resources 
pertaining to their lands, including the right to “participate in the use, management and 
conservation of these resources”.266 In cases where the State retains the ownership of 
resources pertaining to lands, the Convention mandates States to consult with the 
concerned Indigenous peoples about any exploration or exploitation program and 
ensure that they participate in the benefits of such activities and receive fair 
compensation from any potential damages.267 Part II of the Convention 169 further 
adds on the rights and conditions of Indigenous people to relocation, transmission of 
land rights and penalties in cases of violation of land rights.268 Overall, Anaya suggests 
that the ILO Convention 169 provides an example of the legal development in 
contemporary international law, where modern notions of cultural integrity, non-
discrimination, and self-determination join property precepts in the affirmation of sui 
generis Indigenous land and resources rights.269  Significantly, the property rights 
envisaged in this instrument encompass Indigenous cultures, customs and 
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worldviews270 and underlines the procedural requirements of FPIC, participation and 
benefit-sharing.271  
The UNDRIP, adopted in 2007, is another important international human rights 
instrument that explicitly recognises property rights to land and resources of 
Indigenous peoples. In line with the ILO Convention 169, Article 25 of the UNDRIP 
frames Indigenous land rights in light of their “distinctive spiritual relationship” with 
their lands, territories, waters and resources.272 It recognises Indigenous peoples’ right 
to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources,273 as well as the 
right to redress and restitution for the lands they have lost without FPIC.274 Notably, 
Article 31 states that “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect 
and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural 
expressions…they also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their 
intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional 
cultural expressions”.275 Accordingly, States are obliged to “take effective measures 
to recognize and protect the exercise of these rights”.276 Thus, the property right to TK 
of Indigenous peoples is explicitly recognised in the UNDRIP. Admittedly, the 
UNDRIP does not spell out the right to benefit-sharing of Indigenous peoples. 
However, as will be demonstrated below, an expansive jurisprudential interpretation 
of Indigenous peoples’ human rights to land, territories and resources has indicated 
                                               
270 See Lee Swepston, ‘A new step in the international law on indigenous and tribal peoples: ILO convention No. 169 
of 1989’ (1990) 15 (3) Oklahoma City University Law Review, 698 and Ellen Desmet, Indigenous Rights Entwined 
with Nature Conservation (Intersentia 2011) 88. 
271 Morgera (n 12) 9. 
272 UNDRIP, art 25. 
273 ibid art 26. 
274 ibid art 28. 
275 ibid art 31 (1). 
276 ibid art 31 (2). 
Benefit-sharing and Human Rights Implications 
178 
that benefit-sharing is indeed embedded in the substantive property right pertaining to 
land and resources.277  
2.3.2 Jurisprudential and scholarly interpretation 
An expansive jurisprudential interpretation of the human right to property in an 
Indigenous context can be observed in the rulings of regional human rights tribunals 
and the works of UN human rights treaty bodies. The following paragraphs investigate 
the property right of Indigenous peoples to land and resources and to TK respectively. 
The property right to land and resources is analysed through the case law of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court), the African Court on 
Human and Peoples' Rights (African Court) and the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples' Rights (African Commission). Cases include, inter alia, Case of the 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua,278  Case of the Saramaka 
People v Suriname,279  Case of Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname280  and the 
Endorois case.281  Numerous Concluding Observations provided by the HRC, the 
CESCR and the CERD are also examined. The scholarly discussion commonly agrees 
that benefit-sharing has been progressively integrated in the international human rights 
law in various contexts relating to lands and natural resources.282 In comparison, the 
property right to intangible knowledge has not been widely established as a human 
                                               
277 Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
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right but is increasingly addressed by international law at various avenues, including 
human rights, the CBD and the regime regulating IPPs. 283  
2.3.2.1 Property right to land and resources 
In the Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, decided in 
2001, the Inter-American Court has confirmed the property rights of the Indigenous 
Awas Tingni community to their communal lands284 and concluded that Nicaragua had 
violated this right by granting permission to logging activities on the communities’ 
traditional lands and not adequately recognising and providing protection to the 
community’s traditional land tenure.285 The Court also issued monetary compensation 
for the benefit of the Awas Tingni Community based on mutual agreements.286 There 
was, nevertheless, no explicit recognition of benefit-sharing vis-à-vis the right to 
property pertaining to land and resources. Similarly, in the Case of the Yakye Axa 
Indigenous Community v Paraguay 287 and the Case of the Indigenous Community 
Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay, 288  decided in 2005 and 2006 respectively, the Inter-
American Court has established that the cultural ties of the Indigenous communities 
have with their land and resources shall be protected under property rights.289 And the 
property rights shall cover both the private property of individuals and communal 
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property of the members of the Indigenous communities. 290  In 2007, the Inter-
American Court decided the milestone Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname,291 in 
which Indigenous peoples’ property rights pertaining to their land and resources have 
been reaffirmed with an explicit reference to benefit-sharing. The case concerned the 
issuance of logging and mining concessions for the exploration and extraction of 
certain natural resources found within Saramaka territory. Recognising the special 
relationship of the Saramaka people as a distinct social, cultural and economic group 
with their ancestral territory,292 the Court established that their right to enjoy property 
in accordance with their communal tradition is underlined by the fundamental right of 
self-determination.293 In deciding the extent to which a State may restrict such property 
right by granting concessions for exploration and extraction activities, the Court 
stressed that the State may only do so when such a restriction does not deny their 
survival as a tribal people. 294  In this connection, the Court also articulated three 
procedural safeguards that the State must abide in order to fulfil their obligation to 
ensure the right to property of Indigenous peoples, including effective participation, 
prior environmental and social impact assessments and benefit-sharing. 295 
Significantly, based on Article 32 of the UNDRIP and Article 15(2) of the ILO 
Convention No 169, the Court considered benefit-sharing as an inherent element of 
the right to property.296 Thus, establishing the fact that the State failed to carry out the 
three obligatory procedural safeguards, the Court considered that the logging 
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concessions issued by the State violated the Saramaka people’s communal property 
rights.297  
This reasoning has been adopted by the African Commission in the above-
mentioned Endorios case, where the Commission similarly notes that, because benefit-
sharing serves as an important indicator of compliance for property rights, failure to 
duly compensate would result in a violation of the right to property.298 It has also been 
reiterated in the more recent Case of Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname in 2015, 
in which the Inter-American Court has concluded that because the State of Suriname 
failed to ensure the three identified safeguards when granting mining concessions, it 
had violated the right to property pertaining to the lands and natural resources of the 
Kaliña and Lokono peoples and its members.299  In this case, the Court has cited 
expansively the principles and provisions of the instruments under the CBD, including 
the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol, to address State’s obligations with respect to 
Indigenous peoples.300  In particular, recognising the State as a party to the CBD 
therefore abide by its commitments under the CBD framework, 301  the Court 
highlighted the obligations of Parties towards ILCs in accordance with Article 8(j) of 
the CBD302 and to share benefits with concerned ILCs in accordance with the Nagoya 
Protocol.303  
In the works of human rights treaty bodies, the connection among the 
fundamental right of self-determination, the right of ILCs over their lands and natural 
resources and the procedural safeguards including benefit-sharing is also evident. For 
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instance, based on the right of self-determination that requires “in no case may a people 
be deprived of its own means of subsistence”, the HRC has commented that Canada 
should reform its laws and internal policies in order to guarantee the Indigenous 
peoples can fully enjoy their rights over lands and natural resources.304 The CESCR 
has also suggested that the Congo Government should ensure the protection of 
Indigenous peoples’ rights to their ancestral lands and natural resources, and their 
benefits over natural resources exploitation when issuing logging concessions. 305 
Furthermore, the CERD has issued numerous Concluding Observations to urge State 
Parties to recognise and protect the rights of Indigenous peoples to own, develop, 
control and use their communal lands, territories and resources, 306  in which the 
procedural requirements of FPIC, reparation and compensation, equitable sharing of 
benefits and access to justice are explicitly addressed. 307 
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2.3.2.2 Property rights to traditional knowledge 
As mentioned above, Article 31 of the UNDRIP recognises the right of Indigenous 
peoples to cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions, 
including the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property 
over such resources. In this context, States are obliged to take effective measures to 
recognise and protect the exercise of these rights in conjunction with Indigenous 
peoples.308 Thus, the property right of Indigenous peoples over their TK, including 
particularly IPRs, is established by the UNDRIP.309 Stoll suggests that this human 
right to TK has two dimensions, including an internal dimension for Indigenous 
peoples themselves to use, maintain and develop their TK and an external dimension 
to prevent intervention and misappropriation of such knowledge by third parties.310 
Based on this observation, it can be argued that the internal dimension requires States 
to refrain from any kind of intervention that might affect Indigenous peoples’ right to 
use, practice and develop their TK—a negative obligation to respect Indigenous 
peoples’ right over TK. It also implies a possibility of ILCs claiming exclusive 
property right over TK themselves.311 Meanwhile, the external dimension of the right 
also imposes a positive obligation on States to take effective measures to assist the 
Indigenous peoples in controlling and protecting their TK. This may include, 
establishing national legislation to recognise the customary rules and community 
protocols of Indigenous peoples with respect to the use and development of their TK, 
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so that such TK is effectively controlled by Indigenous peoples and protected in 
accordance with their traditions and customs.312 Furthermore, the external dimension 
of the property right also requires not only governments but also non-State actors to 
respect the customary rules of the Indigenous peoples about their TK.  
There is very limited human rights jurisprudence on the property rights of 
IPLCs pertaining to TK. The only reference is provided by the CERD in 2017. In the 
Concluding Observations on the periodic reports of New Zealand, the CERD addresses 
the issue about the intellectual and cultural property rights of the Māori people. 
Specifically, the CERD is concerned about the lack of progress in the national 
implementation regarding Māori intellectual and cultural property rights and Māori 
treasured possessions as required by a national tribunal—the Waitangi Tribunal—
through its Wai 262 decision. 313  Against this background, the CERD has 
recommended that the State Party shall take measures to effectively implement the 
Wai 262 decision and address non-compliance with the Treaty of Waitangi as well as 
the UNDRIP.314 
The scholarly discussion about the interrelationship among different legal 
frameworks underlining the development of the property right to TK of Indigenous 
peoples also merits attention. Ni has observed that the stipulation in Article 31 of the 
                                               
312 Stoll (n 309) 313. 
313 The Waitangi Tribunal is a New Zealand permanent commission of inquiry established under the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act 1975, addressing the intellectual property rights and treasured elements of Māori culture. The Wai 
262 decision is a report released in 2011 with respect to the Wai 262 Claim. See Waitangi Tribunal, Ko Aotearoa 
Tēnei: a Report into Claims concerning New Zealand Law and Policy affecting Māori Culture and Identity. Te 
Taumata Tuatahi. (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010) 2 <https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/news/ko-aotearoa-tenei-
report-on-the-wai-262-claim-released/> accessed 28/01/2019. and CERD, 'Concluding Observations on the 
Combined Twenty-first and Twenty-second Periodic Reports of New Zealand' (22 September 2017) UN Doc 
CERD/C/NZL/CO/21-22 para 16. 
314 CERD, Concluding Observations on the Combined Twenty-first and Twenty-second Periodic Reports of New 
Zealand (n 313) para 17. 
 Complementarity between the Nagoya Protocol and human rights 
185 
UNDRIP was mostly built upon the development in international environmental law, 
in particular, the CBD.315 The UNDRIP has an impact on the Nagoya Protocol in turn, 
as noted in the Preamble of the Protocol and more implicitly in its operative clauses 
with respect to benefit-sharing with ILCs.316  Meanwhile, the ongoing articulation 
about the protection of TK from a property and commercial perspective under the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and WTO-TRIPS frameworks, 
which might specify a proprietary right of TK in a multilateral treaty in the future, 
echoes the explicit reference to IPRs of TK in Article 31 of the UNDRIP.317 These 
diverse legal perspectives reflect the dynamicity and the crosscutting nature of TK-
related issues,318 which might not be sufficiently addressed by any single international 
legal forum.319 It also implies that the property right to TK as a human right is still 
very young and needs further elaboration at both international and national levels. 
2.3.3 Human rights implications 
The human right to property is well established at the international level. As an 
important means of subsistence of many peoples and communities, the property right 
to lands, territories and natural resources is inextricably linked with the right of self-
determination and the cultural rights of Indigenous peoples and minority groups. In 
particular, the rights of Indigenous peoples to their land and resources are recognised 
in the ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP, in connection with notions of cultural 
integrity and procedural requirements such as FPIC and benefit-sharing. This 
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recognition imposes a range of responsibilities upon States, including, inter alia, to 
guarantee effective protection to Indigenous peoples’ property rights, ensure their 
participation in decision-making processes and provide fair compensation in cases of 
violation. On the one hand, the analysis of the jurisprudential interpretations provided 
under the Inter-American and the African systems demonstrate that benefit-sharing 
has been gradually substantiated as an inseparable element of IPLCs’ right to property 
with respect to their lands and tangible resources—regarded as a “procedural safeguard” 
as well as an “important indicator” of States’ compliance with their human rights 
obligations. On the other hand, the property right to intangible knowledge has not been 
widely established as a human right but is increasingly addressed at a number of 
international legal avenues, including human rights, the CBD and the WIPO.  
Against this background, three human rights implications can be drawn in 
relation to the benefit-sharing provisions in the Nagoya Protocol. First, the recognition 
of benefit-sharing as an essential element of human rights may strengthen the 
normative and procedural significance of benefit-sharing established by the Nagoya 
Protocol. As States bear human rights obligations to protect IPLCs’ property rights 
pertaining to lands, resources and TK, they shall not only refrain from intervening in 
the practices of IPLCs, but also take positive measures to ensure compliance by non-
State actors and provide adequate means to address non-compliance. This obligation 
is in particular relevant to the distinctive aspect of intra-State benefit-sharing when 
MAT is negotiated between non-State actors and IPLCs. In the ABS context, such 
obligation means that the States need to recognise the customary laws and community 
procedures of IPLCs in controlling and using their natural resources and TK and to 
support capacity-building of IPLCs. It also links to the realisation of fair and equitable 
standards, as discussed in the previous section 1.4, which demand respect for IPLCs’ 
perception of fairness and equity in accordance with their priorities and traditions. 
Thus, IPLCs’ human right to property could provide stronger ground for their benefit-
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sharing claims. It will also help to address the potential negative influence of benefit-
sharing on IPLCs, as the monetary implication may downplay the social and cultural 
value of TK for holders and their communities.320 Fundamentally, the strengthened 
procedural requirements of ABS, including capacity-building, benefit-sharing and the 
development of IPLCs’ community protocols could in turn contribute to safeguarding 
the human right to property of IPLCs.  
Second, the emerging human rights recognition of a property right to TK 
envisages a wider scope of TK protection and its subsequent interpretation and 
implementation may offer more robust protection to TK. As the Nagoya Protocol only 
covers TK that is associated with GR, it falls short of address issues relating to other 
types of TK held by IPLCs. In comparison, as Article 31 of the UNDRIP covers a 
broad spectrum of TK, Stoll has suggested that it could contribute to “generalising” 
rights of Indigenous peoples pertaining to TK, including the exclusive IPRs.321 In fact, 
there are already efforts to initiate cross-regime dialogue and cooperation among the 
Nagoya Protocol, the human rights and the WIPO frameworks with respect to TK 
protection.322 Procedural requirements such as PIC and benefit-sharing have been 
increasingly incorporated into these co-existing international frameworks.323 In the 
previous section 1.3.1, I highlighted the outstanding feature of the provisions of the 
Nagoya Protocol on Parties’ obligations vis-à-vis TK that they contained much fewer 
caveats and no reference to domestic legislation. In light of the human rights 
                                               
320 Graham Dutfield, ‘TK Unlimited: The Emerging but Incoherent International Law of Traditional Knowledge 
Protection’ (2017) 20 (5-6) Journal of World Intellectual Property, 148. 
321 Stoll (n 309) 315. 
322 Cooperation between the CBD and the UNPFII see Patricia W. Birnie, Alan E. Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, 
International Law and the Environment (Third edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 214. 
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development in articulating Indigenous peoples’ rights pertaining to TK, it can thus be 
confirmed that issues pertaining to TK protection cannot be subject to domestic laws 
but need to be considered against the broader context of international law. This 
indicates that TK, albeit in many domestic circumstances remains publicly accessible, 
must be obtained and used under certain procedural safeguards like FPIC and benefit-
sharing. This is important especially considering that the Protocol does not define what 
utilisation of TK means.  
Furthermore, the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol could provide detailed and 
practical international standards to support the interpretation of human rights norms in 
operationalising benefit-sharing. Based on the explicit reference to the CBD and the 
Nagoya Protocol in the 2015 Case of Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname, Morgera 
has argued that the jurisprudential practice of the Inter-American Court demonstrated 
the potential of the international biodiversity law to complement certain shortcomings 
in international human rights law, including conceptual inconsistency concerning 
benefit-sharing and the lack of detailed modalities for its application.324 She suggests 
that, as the ABS terms could offer a “contextual and evolutionally interpretation of 
human rights treaties”, they bear great potential to assist in the jurisprudential 
interpretations of international human rights bodies, regional human rights courts, and 
national courts.325 This observation is equally true in the context of elaborating the 
procedural elements of the property right to TK as a human right. It demonstrates the 
potential of a mutually supportive interpretation of the Nagoya Protocol and human 
rights in judicial practices. 
Finally, to interpret and implement the Nagoya Protocol in light of international 
human rights norms could reinforce the internationally-recognised values and 
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principles that are relevant to the protection of IPLCs’ rights. 326  This mutually 
supportive interpretation could also foster the realisation of a web of intertwined rights 
of IPLCs, including, not only the rights to land, resources and TK, but also the right to 
culture, development and right of self-determination. 327  Although the UNDRIP 
remains a non-binding instrument, its normative importance can be reinforced through 
the compliance mechanism and the national implementation of the CBD and the 
Nagoya Protocol. Indeed, as noted by Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, the UN Special 
Rapporteurs on the rights of Indigenous peoples, the international biodiversity law and 
human rights law are two interconnected and complementary bodies of law and that 
the CBD defends fully the rights of Indigenous peoples and requires full compliance 
of the State’s vis-à-vis their international human rights obligations.328 Arguably, this 
process could also contribute to alleviating the potential clash of cultures, national 
policies, enforcement strategies and normative conflicts, generated from the 
multilateral law-making processes and the varying degrees of national 
implementation. 329  Thus, I argue that the principle of mutual supportiveness is 
essential for achieving the respective goals of international legal frameworks and 
harmonising the common principles and procedural requirements in protecting IPLCs’ 
rights over their lands, territories, natural resources and TK. 
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3. Conclusion  
Benefit-sharing is at the core of the international ABS framework. In order to ensure 
the realisation of fair and equitable benefit-sharing with the provider Parties as well as 
IPLCs who live in sovereign States, the Nagoya Protocol sets out a range of normative 
and procedural principles and requirements. Receiving increasing international 
recognition, the provisions on benefit-sharing of the Nagoya Protocol have also been 
elaborated through a growing body of scholarly and jurisprudential interpretations. 
Practical lessons are also learnt from the process of national and international 
implementation. As demonstrated, these include elaborating normative standards of 
fairness and equity through various ABS instruments and COP decisions, clarifying 
the obligations of State Parties to benefit-sharing at both inter-State and intra-State 
levels, and substantiating MAT as a procedural safeguard for benefit-sharing while 
taking into account the capacity needs of IPLCs. The examined benefit-sharing 
provisions provide various entry points to facilitate a mutually supportive 
interpretation in conjunction with the international human rights standards. For 
instance, the understanding of fairness and equity in an Indigenous and local context, 
the obligations of the States to ensure intra-State benefit-sharing with IPLCs and the 
rights of IPLCs over their TK as recognised in international law.  
In this connection, I examined three substantive international human rights and 
discussed their implications in relation to benefit-sharing. In particular, in light of the 
human right to equality and non-discrimination, I argued that the ABS standards of 
fairness and equity are akin to equality and non-discrimination in human rights law, 
which imply that every individual and IPLCs shall be accorded equal rights, equal 
opportunities and procedural safeguards in order to pursue free and full development. 
This requires State Parties to eliminate any discriminatory measures and to ensure de 
jure equality, and pay special attention to the protection of women’s rights. This is 
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imperative in situations where gender inequality is embodied in traditional practices 
or customs of some IPLCs and where women are in a more vulnerable position in the 
community. Furthermore, built upon the observation that both the Nagoya Protocol 
and the human right to development reflect the global concern about the inequalities 
embedded in the world’s development process today, I examined the core components 
and characteristics of the right to development. I suggested that the elaborated 
standards of benefit-sharing as embedded in the right to development could inform 
domestic legislators and all stakeholders of ABS of what a benefit-sharing process 
should entail, in accordance with international human rights standards. In turn, the 
detailed procedural guidance provided in the Nagoya Protocol could complement the 
realisation of the human rights to development by providing a toolkit for negotiating 
and implementing benefit-sharing terms. Based on the ILO Convention 169 and the 
UNDRIP, as well as a wealth of jurisprudential and scholarly interpretation, I 
investigated the property rights of IPLCs to their lands, territories, natural resources 
and TK. I observed that benefit-sharing has been substantiated as an inseparable 
element of Indigenous peoples’ right to property and suggested that a mutually 
supportive interpretation of benefit-sharing may contribute not only to the 
strengthening of the ABS norms but also to supporting the human rights realisation of 
benefit-sharing.  
IPLCs’ human rights are a web of inextricably linked rights. The realisation of 
these rights depends on the international legal and political recognition as well as the 
effective implementation of the procedural requirements. Integrating human rights 
standards into the Nagoya Protocol may contribute to an integrated approach to the 
protection of IPLCs and the enunciation of the obligations of States, particularly at the 
intra-State level. It may also anchor the debate of fairness and equity into a human 
rights context, where the values and perspectives of the IPLCs, as well as their 
vulnerable members, can be heard, known, and respected.  
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Chapter Four 
Compliance and human rights implications for compliance related 
provisions of the Nagoya Protocol 
This chapter looks at the last pillar of the access and benefit-sharing (ABS) 
framework—compliance.1 How to ensure compliance of the Nagoya Protocol? What 
are the mechanisms to promote compliance with Parties’ obligations and address 
situations of non-compliance? How do Indigenous and local communities (ILCs), as 
providers of genetic resources (GR) and associated traditional knowledge (TK) 
therefore legitimate ABS beneficiaries, take part in the compliance process and seek 
remedy when there is a dispute? What are the applicability of human rights, especially 
the rights of access to justice, in the context of compliance with the ABS rules of the 
Nagoya Protocol? In order to address these questions, this chapter starts with an 
investigation of the compliance mechanism and measures envisaged in the Nagoya 
Protocol. They contain two aspects. The first is compliance with the international legal 
obligations set out by the Protocol for its Parties. 2  To understand this aspect of 
compliance, I need to clarify that, because the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) and the Nagoya Protocol are multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), I 
focus on the MEAs-based compliance mechanism and procedures. 3  International 
                                               
1  In addition to “access” and “benefit-sharing” being another two pillars, see Thomas Greiber and others, An 
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(1998) 19 (2) Michigan Journal of International Law, 347, Gunther Handl, ‘Compliance Control Mechanisms and 
International Environmental Obligations’ (1997) 5 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 32 and 
Edith Brown Weiss and Harold Karan Jacobson, ‘Assessing the Record and Designing Strategies to Engage 
Compliance and Human Rights Implications 
194 
compliance in this context often concerns the design of either “soft” and facilitative 
procedures, or “hard” and enforcement-oriented measures. 4  As will be discussed, 
cooperative procedures and institutional mechanism to promote international 
compliance is envisaged by Article 30 of the Nagoya Protocol and substantiated by the 
first meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
(COP-MOP) in 2014, 5  which are hereinafter referred to as the “international 
compliance mechanism” or “compliance mechanism”. The second aspect is that, in 
order to enhance the inter-operability of the ABS rules, Parties are required to ensure 
that the utilisation of GR within their jurisdiction complies with the other Parties’ ABS 
legislation or regulatory requirements.6 This aspect of compliance refers to provider 
countries’ domestic ABS rules as well as negotiated clauses in Mutually Agreed Terms 
(MAT).7 Articles 15-18 of the Protocol set out specific requirements for this domestic 
aspect of compliance, which is hereinafter referred to as the “domestic compliance 
measures” or “compliance measures”.  
                                               
Countries’ in Edith Brown Weiss and Harold Karan Jacobson (eds), Engaging Countries: Strengthening 
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Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing 
in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Brill Nijhoff 2013) 491. 
7 Nagoya Protocol, arts 15-18. See Elisa Morgera, Elsa Tsioumani and Matthias Buck, Unraveling the Nagoya 
Protocol: A Commentary on the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (Brill 2014) 251. 
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The function and objective of these two aspects of compliance are to ensure 
the Nagoya Protocol are complied with and that non-compliance is properly addressed 
at both international and domestic levels. In practice, a Compliance Committee has 
been elected in 2016 but its working measures are still undergoing elaboration.8 In 
comparison, practical impacts are more conspicuous in the context of domestic 
compliance measures. As will be discussed in section 2, there has accumulated a 
wealth of experience of State Parties incorporating ABS rules into their respective 
national legal systems, as well as good business practices and NGOs initiatives of ABS 
negotiations. The development in both international and domestic contexts of 
compliance poses opportunities for ILCs to participate in the compliance processes of 
the Nagoya Protocol, accompanied by challenges to make this participation and 
involvement effective as well as meaningful. Based on the observations of the previous 
chapters that ABS rules are increasingly integrated in international human rights law, 
I suggest that it could also be useful to approach the issue of compliance from a human 
rights perspective, especially ILCs’ right of access to justice and the human rights 
mechanism of ensuring compliance with inter-State obligations. In light of the 
principle of mutual supportiveness, this chapter demonstrates the possibilities where 
human rights norms and mechanism of compliance might inform the interpretation and 
implementation of the compliance related provisions in the Nagoya Protocol.  
This chapter consists of four sections. The first two sections provide an 
overview of international and domestic compliance mechanisms under the Nagoya 
Protocol in turn and investigate the role of ILCs in their respective context. Section 
three examines the implications of international human rights from the perspective of 
the right of access to justice of ILCs and an inter-State perspective through the lens of 
State Parties’ obligations. The final section concludes on the point where normative 
                                               
8  NP Compliance Committee, 'Annotations to the Provisional Agenda' (10 February 2016) UN Doc 
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Compliance and Human Rights Implications 
196 
and practical synergies between international human rights law and the Nagoya 
Protocol exist and also the challenges and risks persisting at this interface. 
1. International compliance mechanism under the Nagoya Protocol  
This section investigates the international compliance mechanism under the Nagoya 
Protocol and its relevance to ILCs in two parts. The first part provides an overview of 
the compliance mechanism as envisaged in Article 30 of the Protocol and established 
by the COP-MOP in 2014. The facilitative and non-confrontational characteristic of 
the mechanism is highlighted in comparison to the dispute settlement procedures under 
the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. The innovative features of the mechanism vis-à-
vis ILCs are emphasised in the sense that it enables affected ILCs to indirectly trigger 
the compliance procedures that are traditionally only made available to States. 
However, as will be demonstrated in the second part, under-elaborated procedures, 
problematic interpretation, and lack of experience constitute potential obstacles for 
clarifying the role of ILCs in the compliance mechanism and maximising the 
effectiveness of their participation. Overall, the opportunity for a greater level of 
engagement for ILCs in the inter-State compliance process of the Nagoya Protocol is 
foreseen, and its legal complexities and implications need to be examined in-depth and 
continuously in the coming years. 
1.1 Compliance mechanism and its relationship with dispute settlement  
Article 30 of the Nagoya Protocol mandates the COP-MOP to develop cooperative 
procedures and institutional mechanisms to promote compliance and to address cases 
of non-compliance in its first meeting.9 As a result, the compliance mechanism under 
the Nagoya Protocol is elaborated and established in 2014 by the COP-MOP Decision 
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NP-1/4.10  This mechanism aims at offering advice and coordinating assistance to 
Parties in order to encourage compliance, underlined by its non-binding, non-
confrontational and cooperative nature, similar to compliance mechanism adopted in 
many other MEAs.11 It is worth noting that the term “compliance” here refers only to 
the compliance of individual Parties to the Nagoya Protocol with all their obligations 
under the Protocol, which is to be differentiated from the compliance with domestic 
laws as will be addressed in section 2.  
The Compliance Committee of the Nagoya Protocol (the Committee) consists 
of 15 members nominated by Parties on the basis of three members endorsed by each 
of the five regional groups of the United Nations and two representatives of ILCs 
nominated by ILCs who serve as observers.12 Although in principle nominees of the 
members may include representatives of ILCs,13 the current Committee does not have 
representatives of ILCs to serves as members.14 The main difference between the 
function assigned to the members of the Committee and that to the observers is with 
the level of participation in the decision-making processes of the Committee. The 
observers are entitled to participate fully in the deliberations of the Committee, but not 
to take decisions. Furthermore, when the case concerned does not involve ILCs or 
relate to the interests of ILCs, Parties can choose to exclude the observers from the 
                                               
10 NP-1/4 (n 5) 2. 
11 For instance, inter alia, compliance mechanisms adopted under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer [adopted 16 September 1987, entered into force 1 January 1989] 1522 UNTS 3, Kyoto Protocol 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 
16 February 2005] 2303 UNTS 162 and Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety [adopted 29 January 2000, entered into 
force 11 September 2003] CBD EXCOP 1 Decision EM-I/3. See Handl (n 3) 29 and Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann, 
‘Constitutionalising Secondary Rules in Global Environmental Regimes: Non-Compliance Procedures and the 
Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2012) 24 (1) Journal of Environmental Law, 104. 
12 Committee (n 8) para 2. 
13 NP-1/4 (n 5) anx sec B para 2. 
14 Committee (n 8) para 2. 
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deliberation.15 Both members of the Committee and the observers need to possess 
competence in terms of technical, legal or scientific expertise in relation to the scope 
of the Protocol. 16  With a view to achieving consensus, the Committee can take 
decisions by a three-quarters majority of the presenting members or eight members, 
whichever is greater.17 
Three options for referral of a compliance problem to the Committee are made 
available under the Nagoya Protocol, including a Party-self trigger, a Party-to-Party 
trigger and a COP-MOP trigger.18 The overall triggering mechanism of the Protocol 
meets modestly the scholarly and public expectations even though it does not include, 
for example, a public trigger (stakeholders/NGOs) as has been adopted under the 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention).19 Nevertheless, 
the Committee is assigned with a novel function to proactively examine: A) systemic 
issues of general non-compliance, B) situations where a Party fails to submit its 
national report as requested by Article 29 of the Protocol, and C) situations where 
information indicates that the Party concerned faces difficulties to comply with its 
obligations under the Protocol.20 Based on the results of such proactive examination, 
the Committee may decide whether to proceed with the standard compliance 
procedures or not. Thus, it could be argued that the Committee also has a power of 
triggering the compliance procedures in addition to the three explicitly established 
                                               
15 However, the COP-MOP does not articulate the standards or the authority to determine whether the case relate to 
the interests of ILCs or not. 
16 NP-1/4 (n 5) anx sec B para 4. 
17 ibid anx sec B para 11. 
18 ibid anx sec D para 1. 
19  Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters [adopted 25 June 1998, entered into force 30 October 2001]. See Morgera, Tsioumani and 
Buck (n 7) 350 and IUCN, 'Submission of Views on Cooperative Procedures and Institutional Mechanisms to 
Promote Compliance with the Protocol and to Address Cases of Non-compliance' (2011) 4. 
20 NP-1/4 (n 5) anx sec D para 9. Emphasis added. 
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triggers. In this context, it is worth noting that one legitimate source of information for 
the examination is from directly affected ILCs. By enabling ILCs to submit 
information about non-compliance to the Committee, the compliance mechanism of 
the Nagoya Protocol facilitates ILCs’ participation and, arguably, provides them with 
a power to indirectly trigger the compliance procedures through the Committee. 
Furthermore, because the information-based examination is linked with the triggering 
procedures, the Committee’s function also expands from, traditionally, only 
addressing non-compliance between Parties, to monitor and address Parties’ 
compliance with their obligations towards ILCs. 21  These two pioneering 
characteristics of the compliance mechanism under the Nagoya Protocol are 
unprecedented in any MEAs at the time of writing.  
The measures established for the Committee to promote compliance and 
address non-compliance are mostly of a facilitative nature. The Committee may offer 
advice or facilitate assistance to the Party concerned, invite them to submit progress 
reports or request specific implementation plans with appropriate steps, agreed 
timeframe and assessment indicators.22 The COP-MOP may also take these measures 
upon recommendations of the Committee and facilitate more complicated measures 
on capacity-building, such as access to financial and technical assistance, technology 
transfer and training. Importantly, the COP-MOP reserves the discretion to decide on 
stronger and more serious measures in cases of grave or repeated non-compliance.23 
Overall, it has only been five years since the Nagoya Protocol entered into force. 
Consequently, there is a limited amount of experience with respect to the 
implementation of the Protocol and the operational performance of the Committee. 
                                               
21 Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 7) 356. 
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23 ibid, anx sec F para 3. 
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Indeed the compliance mechanism is still “in the process of establishing its procedures 
and ways of working”.24 However, the role of the Compliance Committee under the 
Nagoya Protocol will increase with time as its experience with implementation 
cumulates.25 
Dispute settlement. Article 30 of the Nagoya Protocol explicitly differentiates 
the compliance procedures from the dispute settlement procedures, which are pursuant 
to Article 27 of the CBD. According to Article 27, in the event of a dispute between 
Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the CBD (and its protocols 
unless otherwise provided), the Parties shall seek solution by negotiation.26 When an 
agreement cannot be reached by negotiation, the Parties may jointly seek the good 
offices of, or request mediation by, a third Party.27 If these two means do not solve the 
dispute, Parties may also declare the acceptance of arbitration or the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ.28 Finally, when the Parties to the dispute have not accepted the same or any 
procedure, the dispute shall be submitted to conciliation as provided in the Annex II 
of the CBD.29 Thus, “classical” means of conflict resolution including binding and 
non-binding procedures are provided under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, with a 
clear priority for non-binding procedures.30 Although judicial and arbitrational means 
are available for dispute settlement, in practice, such procedures have never been 
                                               
24 NP Compliance Committee, 'Synthesis of Views on the Need for and Modalities of Support to Address Challenges 
Related to Compliance With The Provisions of the Nagoya Protocol, with A View to Making Effective Use Of the 
Compliance Mechanism' (22 February 2016) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/ABS/CC/1/3 para 11. 
25 NP Compliance Committee, 'Future Work of the Compliance Committee for 2017-2018' (29 February 2016) UN 
Doc UNEP/CBD/ABS/CC/1/4 para 17. 
26 Convention on Biological Diversity [adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993] 1760 UNTS 79, 
art 27(1). 
27 ibid art 27(2). 
28 ibid art 27(3). 
29 ibid art 27(4). 
30 Greiber and others (n 1) 248. 
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triggered under the CBD framework and are rarely used under other MEAs.31 The 
Chayeses and Mitchell have termed this characteristic as “managerial”, in the sense 
that effective management and organisation to facilitate the compliance of treaty 
obligations is more important than penalising parties for failing to comply.32 The 
Chayeses have also explained that non-compliance with multilateral legal norms often 
stemming from the ambiguity of treaty language, limitations on Parties’ capacity to 
fulfil their obligations and the time lags between a State’s commitment and 
performance. 33  This approach could facilitates the understanding of compliance 
mechanism in the Nagoya Protocol and in MEAs in general. First, adequate 
information can be gathered, relying on the function of the treaty supervisory bodies 
through techniques like reporting, monitoring and assessing. This supports the 
questions of treaty interpretation and compliance to be dealt with in a multilateral 
manner and is in general more cost-effective compared to a lengthy and expensive 
judicial process. 34  Second, as Cardesa-Salzmann has suggested, the dynamic and 
complex nature of environmental issues requires a more holistic and managerial 
approach rather than the traditional reactive approach that is vulnerable to States’ 
forum shopping. 35  Finally, Victor and others have demonstrated that community 
political pressure and non-binding commitments might prove to be more effective in 
achieving collective goals in MEAs rather than binding obligations that are 
safeguarded by adversarial and confrontational methods of addressing non-
                                               
31 Brunnée (n 4) 387. 
32 Abram Chayes, Antonia H. Chayes and Ronald B. Mitchell, ‘Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective’ 
in Edith Brown Weiss and Harold Karan Jacobson (eds), Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with 
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34 Patricia W. Birnie, Alan E. Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Third edn, 
Oxford University Press 2009) 239. 
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compliance. 36  For these reasons, the following discussion only concerns the 
compliance mechanism, but not the dispute settlement procedures, under the Nagoya 
Protocol.  
1.2 Role of ILCs in the compliance mechanism  
The role of ILCs in the compliance mechanism under the Nagoya Protocol is threefold: 
A) ILCs’ representatives as observers and potentially as members in the Committee; 
B) directly affected ILCs may submit information to the Secretariat about non-
compliance; and C) ILCs experts may provide advice or consultation to the Committee 
when asked after the triggering of the procedures.37 As demonstrated, these figures 
distinguish the compliance mechanism of the Nagoya Protocol from its equivalents in 
other MEAs in the sense that it anticipates an unprecedented level of participation of 
ILCs. As a result, the Compliance Committee is capable of addressing Parties’ 
compliance with their obligations towards ILCs. Nevertheless, to what extent and how 
such possibility can be realised remain unclear in both theoretical and practical terms. 
This section discusses the role of ILCs in the compliance mechanism and its legal 
implications from an interpretative standpoint. 
The specific function and working methods with respect to the observers and 
the members of the Committee that are ILCs have not been elaborated under the 
Nagoya Protocol. Neither have the procedures of information-gathering nor 
consultation with affected ILCs or independent experts after the triggering of the 
procedures by the Committee. However, it is possible to observe that the current setup 
of the compliance mechanism renders considerable attention to issues relating to ILCs. 
ILCs’ observers and members are able to share opinions and participate in the process 
                                               
36 See essays in David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala and Eugene B. Skolnikoff (eds), The Implementation and Effectiveness 
of International Environmental Commitments : Theory and Practice (MIT Press 1998) 1. 
37 NP-1/4 (n 5) anx sec E. 
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of monitoring, examining, reviewing and elaborating before and/or during a 
submission and their situation may be re-assessed after the triggering by independent 
experts. Comparing this to the Aarhus Convention, which has a more elaborated 
compliance mechanism; it is also reasonable to suggest that it is too early to assess the 
functionality of the Protocol’s compliance mechanism in full, especially, the 
effectiveness of the ways in which ILCs are included. Entered into force in 2001 and 
had its first Compliance Committee elected in 2002, the Aarhus Convention is still in 
the process of elaborating its procedural guidance to the Compliance Committee.38 In 
addition, the compliance mechanism is mostly triggered by communications brought 
by public (166 communications at the time of writing), whereas only three submissions 
were made by Parties, 3 requests by its MOP and no referrals by the Secretariat.39 
Nevertheless, the procedures under the Nagoya Protocol with respect to the 
information from ILCs are problematic. According to the Nagoya Protocol MOP 
Decision 1/4, in addition to the information based on Parties’ national reports and the 
Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House (ABSCH), the Committee may also 
consider the information from the Secretariat submitted by the “directly affected” ILCs 
in order to examine situations of non-compliance. 40 The specific provision reads, 
“other information related to compliance with Article 12(1) of the Protocol; provided 
by a directly affected Indigenous or local community, related to provisions of the 
Protocol”. The confusing use of the semicolon in the provision is the first obvious 
obstacle for interpretation. As a result, it is not clear whether such information needs 
to relate to Article 12(1) in particular or its general relevance with the Nagoya Protocol 
                                               
38 The third draft of the revised Guide to the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee was prepared for discussion 
in open session at the 56th meeting of the Compliance Committee (Geneva, 28 February – 3 March 2017).  
39  Statistics available at UNECE, ‘Compliance Committee’ (UNECE, 2002) 
<https://www.unece.org/env/pp/cc.html> accessed 17/04/2019. 
40 NP-1/4 (n 5) anx sec D para 9(b). 
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would suffice.41 Second, there is no guidance on how to define the extent to which an 
ILC is affected and who has authority to determine whether any ILCs is directly 
affected or not.42 Third, not all the issues submitted by the ILCs will be transmitted to 
the Committee by the Secretariat. The issue will be viewed against the information 
from the Party concerned and solutions between the Party and the ILCs might be 
encouraged before submitting the issue to the compliance procedures.43 To conclude, 
the potential to broaden ILCs’ participation in the compliance mechanism under the 
Nagoya Protocol is foreseen but the processes need to be further elaborated by the 
COP-MOP.  
2. Domestic compliance measures under the Nagoya Protocol 
This section investigates the domestic compliance measures under the Nagoya 
Protocol and its relevance to ILCs. Contributing to a coherent and operational 
international ABS framework, this domestic aspect of compliance emphasises 
compliance with respective domestic ABS legislation and regulatory requirements. 
Based on an overview of the domestic compliance measures as established by Articles 
15-18 of the Protocol, I firstly address the conceptual difficulties that are embedded in 
the legal complexity of ABS transactions. Specifically, domestic compliance measures 
concern not only domestic public law (e.g. administrative procedures for PIC), but also 
private law (e.g. contractual terms in MAT), as well as private international law (e.g. 
applicable jurisdiction). I observe that the current implementation of compliance 
measures indicates an accelerated progression of transposing the ABS rules of the 
                                               
41 This provision is about TK that is associated with GR, which reads: “In implementing their obligations under this 
Protocol, Parties shall in accordance with domestic law take into consideration indigenous and local communities’ 
customary laws, community protocols and procedures, as applicable, with respect to traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources.” 
42 This links to the problem identified in the previous section 1.1 that there is no procedure of establishing whether a 
non-compliance case concerns ILCs’ interests or not. 
43 NP-1/4 (n 5) anx sec D para 9(b). 
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Nagoya Protocol into domestic contexts, underpinned by the variance in countries’ 
respective approaches. Examples of the EU legislation and the worldwide 
incorporation of disclosure requirements into domestic patent systems are provided in 
this regard. Acknowledging that little scholarly attention has been paid to this 
development especially with respect to its impacts on ILCs, I then examine potential 
contribution of the ongoing implementation of domestic compliance measures in 
safeguarding ILCs’ ABS claims and relevant rights, as well as persisting legal or 
practical uncertainties that would jeopardise this purpose. The possibility of a mutually 
supportive interpretation in light of relevant human rights standards is highlighted at 
the end of this section. 
2.1 Compliance with domestic ABS legislation and private contractual 
requirements 
Articles 15-18 of the Nagoya Protocol establish the compliance measures with respect 
to provider Parties’ domestic ABS legislation as well as bilateral clauses agreed by 
MAT. This set of obligations requires user Parties to ensure that the utilisation of GR 
and associated TK within their jurisdictions complies with providers’ domestic ABS 
requirements and private-law contractual agreements.44 These provisions are regarded 
as the cornerstone of the international ABS framework by many developing countries 
during the negotiation of the Protocol. 45  Specifically, Articles 15 and 16 impose 
qualified obligations on Parties to take measures to ensure domestic compliance vis-
à-vis GR and associated TK, address non-compliance, and cooperate in cases of 
alleged violations.46 Article 17 elaborates the ways in which domestic compliance can 
be supported in a non-exhaustive manner. These include a range of monitoring tools 
                                               
44 Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 7) 251. 
45 Gurdial Singh Nijar, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing of Genetic Resources: Analysis and 
Implementation Options for Developing Countries’ (2011), 5. 
46 For a thorough interpretation of arts 15 and 16, see Greiber and others (n 1) 159. 
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that aim to enhance transparency and legal certainty, for instance, the designation of 
checkpoint(s), ABS permits or its equivalents issued by domestic authority that 
constitute “an internationally recognized certificate of compliance” (IRCC), and the 
usage of the Clearing-House mechanism for monitoring and information-sharing.47 
Article 18 addresses compliance with contractual terms specifically, covering the issue 
of dispute resolution and the availability of judicial remedies.48 
Young has pointed out that these domestic compliance measures contribute to 
“a coherent and functioning” international ABS framework. 49  This argument is 
supported by many other scholars including Glowka and Normand, who add that this 
domestic aspect of compliance is imperative because it ensures the inter-operability of 
respective domestic ABS frameworks, especially considering that these ABS rules 
may vary as they are often tailored to fit national situations.50 While incorporating 
standard measures like PIC and MAT into domestic ABS frameworks may indeed 
secure a certain level of inter-operability,51 Morgera warns that it is not without some 
conceptual difficulties. 52  In particular, while PIC is usually presented as an 
administrative permit issued by domestic authorities, MAT are subject to private 
contractual law, even if it is concluded between the public authority and private 
entities.53 In situations where more than one jurisdiction is involved, MAT and the 
resolutions of potential disputes may also concern private international law, which 
                                               
47 Nagoya Protocol, art 17. 
48 For an analysis of art 18, see Greiber and others (n 1) 183. 
49 Young (n 6) 491. 
50  Lyle Glowka and Valérie Normand, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing: Innovations in 
International Environmental Law’ in Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya 
Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation 
Challenges (Brill Nijhoff 2013) 37. 
51 For a detailed discussion on interpretation and implementation of PIC and MAT see section 2.2 of chapter two and 
section 1.3.2 of chapter three.  
52 Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 7) 252. 
53 Greiber and others (n 1) 184. 
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governs issues like applicable jurisdiction, applicable laws within that jurisdiction, and 
enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards.54 In this connection, Greiber 
and others suggest that the applicability of the Nagoya Protocol may be questionable 
because it is a public international law instrument that is normally reckoned to tackle 
relationships between States.55 
In practice, the implementation of domestic compliance measures has 
accelerated since the Protocol came into force in 2014. Different regions and States 
have approached it with different means and to varying degrees. For instance, the 
European Union has enacted EU Regulation No 511/2014 and EU Commission 
Implementing Regulation 2015/1866 to implement the “compliance measures for 
users”, which put in place strict obligations for EU companies and research institutes 
to “exercise due diligence” to ascertain that GR and associated TK have been accessed 
in accordance with applicable ABS legislation or regulatory requirements, and that 
benefits are fairly and equitably shared upon MAT. 56 EU members are then expected 
to incorporate these obligations into their national legal systems. Germany and France, 
for example, have introduced detailed obligations with respect to the declaration of 
due diligence, including its scope, timelines, competent authority, format and 
administrative procedures via various general national decrees.57 Some countries have 
made the violation of ABS obligations enforceable under their criminal law with 
                                               
54 Claudio Chiarolla, Biopiracy and the Role of Private International Law under the Nagoya Protocol (IDDRI, 2012) 
5 <https://www.iddri.org/fr/publications-et-evenements/document-de-travail/biopiracy-and-role-private-
international-law-under> accessed 12/06/2019. 
55 Greiber and others (n 1) 184. 
56 Regulation (EU) No 511/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Compliance 
Measures for Users from the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from their Utilization in the Union [2014] OJ L 150/59, art 4(1). 
57  See Décret n° 2017-848 du 9 mai 2017 Relatif à L'accès aux Ressources Génétiques et aux Connaissances 
Traditionnelles associées et au Partage des Avantages Découlant de leur Utilisation [2017] (FR) and Gesetz zur 
Umsetzung der Verpflichtungen nach dem Nagoya-Protokoll, zur Durchführung der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 
511/2014 und zur Änderung des Patentgesetzes sowie zur Änderung des Umweltauditgesetzes [2015] (DE). 
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sanctions ranging from withdrawing the ABS permit, to economic penalties and 
imprisonment.58 Furthermore, worldwide, it has become common practice to set up 
checkpoints within the patent offices to ensure that the patent applications based on 
the utilisation of GR and associated TK comply with the domestic ABS rules.59 In this 
regard, numerous countries and regions, some of which are not yet Parties to the 
Nagoya Protocol, have put in place disclosure requirements for IPRs applications. 
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)’s 2017 update on 
disclosure requirements regarding GR and/or TK, there are at least 33 countries and/or 
regions have somehow included a specific disclosure requirement in their national 
laws or regulations. For instance, Andean Community, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, 
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 60 Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, France, India, Peru, the 
Philippines and South Africa.61 
Disclosures requirements are usually perceived as a useful measure for 
enabling mutual recognition among different legal systems, as they enhance the 
transparency of information. 62  However, scholars have generally agreed that 
disclosure requirements alone cannot fully address the issue of domestic compliance.63 
                                               
58  For instance, France and the Netherlands, information obtained from the Interim National Reports on the 
Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol submitted by Parties, available at CBD, ‘Access and Benefit-Sharing 
Clearing-House’ (CBD, 2014) < https://absch.cbd.int/> accessed 17/12/2019. 
59 UNCTAD, The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol: Intellectual Property Implications-
-A Handbook on the Interface between Global Access and Benefit Sharing Rules and Intellectual Property 
(UNCTAD 2014) 52. 




62  See in general, Archon Fung, Mary Graham and David Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of 
Transparency (Cambridge University Press 2007) 117 and Martin A. Girsberger, ‘Transparency Measures under 
Patent Law regarding Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge’ (2004) 7 (4) Journal of World Intellectual 
Property, 451. 
63 For a discussion of the limits of disclosure requirements, see Morten W. Tvedt and Tomme R. Young, Beyond 
Access: Exploring Implementation of the Fair and Equitable Sharing Commitment in the CBD (IUCN 2007) 35. 
 Complementarity between the Nagoya Protocol and human rights 
209 
A UN study of the relationship between the CBD and the Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) regime has suggested that disclosure requirements have to be woven into not 
only existing IPRs laws, but also general commercialisation rules and the CBD 
obligations, in order to be fully functional.64 In this regard, the EU’s implementation 
of the Nagoya Protocol sets a regional example of how disclosure requirements can be 
incorporated into ABS legislation as part and parcel of due diligence obligations. 
Nevertheless, the EU approach is also criticised for its limitations. As it centralises the 
“illegal use” of GR and TK in user countries, the EU legislation does not sufficiently 
facilitate legitimate claims of the providers of GR and TK in the procedures of 
accessing, storing, analysing, developing and commercialising these resources.65 For 
what the EU approach actually focuses on, Godt warns that the “due diligence 
obligations” might be reduced to mere documentation duties of the users.66  With 
respect to ILCs, Tobin has condemned that the EU implementation does not pay 
adequate attention to issues of TK. 67 Specifically, the EU Regulation defines TK for 
the purpose of protection as the TK “that is associated with genetic resources as 
described in benefit sharing agreements”.68 This definition, as pointed out by Tobin, 
could effectively exclude all TK that is accessed without a well-defined benefit-
sharing agreement or that is not subject to an agreement of any sort. 69 In reality, not 
all member States of the EU have fully supported the implementation of the EU 
Regulation or the Protocol itself: there is considerable leeway as well as deliberate 
                                               
64 UNCTAD (n 59) 52. 
65 Christine Godt, ‘The Multi-Level Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in the European Union’ in Brendan 
Coolsaet and others (eds), Implementing the Nagoya Protocol Comparing Access and Benefit-sharing Regimes in 
Europe (Nijhoff 2015) 319. 
66 ibid. 
67 Brendan Tobin, ‘Biopiracy by Law: European Union Draft Law Threatens Indigenous People's Rights over Their 
Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources’ (2014) 36 (2) EIPR: European Intellectual Property Review, 125. 
68 EU Regulation No 511/2014, rec 20 and art 3(7). 
69 Tobin (n 67) 127. 
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ambiguity embedded in the Protocol and the EU Regulation, which have left much 
space for the discretion of its Parties. 70 
Another perspective that is relevant to consider in the context of domestic 
compliance is the role of private entities. In practice, it is mostly companies and 
research institutes that manage transactions of GR, carry out research and development 
(R&D) and produce benefits that are to be shared.71 These private entities are often 
involved directly or indirectly in negotiating MAT with competent authorities or ILCs. 
In fact, the powerful multinational corporations do not only have the greatest capacity 
to utilise and commercialise GR and TK, their behaviour and willingness to comply 
also play key roles in determining the degree to which the ABS objectives of the CBD 
and the Nagoya Protocol are fulfilled. 72 In the same vein, Weiss and Jacobson have 
argued that “sometimes the most effective monitoring of compliance takes place in the 
private sector”, because “corporations have a keen interest in maintaining a level 
playing field by ensuring that competitors abide by the agreement” and “they also have 
the resources to monitor compliance, albeit quietly”.73 Incentive measures such as 
voluntary codes of conducts, guidelines, standard-setting schemes and best practices, 
may also support and facilitate domestic compliance by private entities.74 An example 
                                               
70 Florian Rabitz, ‘Biopiracy after the Nagoya Protocol: Problem Structure, Regime Design and Implementation 
Challenges’ (2015) 9 (2) Brazilian Political Science Review, 48. 
71 Matthias Buck and Clare Hamilton, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2011) 20 
(1) Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, 48. 
72 See Elisa Morgera, ‘Benefit-Sharing as a Bridge between the Environmental and Human Rights Accountability of 
Multinational Corporations’ in Ben Boer (ed), Environmental Law Dimensions of Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press 2015) 38 and Doreen J. McBarnet, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility beyond Law, through Law, 
for Law: the New Corporate Accountability’ in Doreen J. McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (eds), 
The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge University Press 
2007) 9. 
73 Weiss and Jacobson (n 3) 545. 
74 As envisaged in art 20 (1) of the Nagoya Protocol, see also Charles Victor Barber, Sam Johnston and Brendan 
Tobin, User Measures: Options for Developing Measures in User Countries to Implement the Access and Benefit–
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of an internationally practised ABS standard is the one prepared by the Union for 
Ethical BioTrade (UEBT) that promotes the “Sourcing with Respect” of ingredients 
from biodiversity. 75  UEBT has set a positive business tone, indicating that, by 
providing a clearer and more level playing field, the Protocol could open up 
opportunities for companies already working towards ethical practices in their 
sourcing of biodiversity.76 
2.2 Relevance to ILCs of the domestic compliance measures 
How does the ongoing implementation of domestic compliance measures affect ILCs? 
Could domestic compliance measures contribute to, if at all, safeguarding ILCs’ ABS 
claims and relevant rights? Are there any persisting legal or practical uncertainties that 
could jeopardise ILCs’ ABS claims and other relevant rights? This section addresses 
these questions based on the above analysis of the ongoing development of interpreting 
and implementing domestic compliance measures of the Nagoya Protocol in the EU 
and worldwide. It focuses on clarifying the legal and practical implications of Articles 
15-18 of the Nagoya Protocol vis-a-vis ILCs. 
2.2.1 Potential contribution to safeguarding the rights of ILCs 
Article 16 on compliance with domestic legislation with respect to TK and Article 18 
on compliance with MAT contain provisions that are of particular relevance to ILCs. 
Specifically, Article 16 (1) requires Parties to take measures to provide that TK utilised 
within their jurisdiction has been accessed in accordance with PIC or approval and 
                                               
Sharing Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity (UNU-IAS, 2003) 16 
<http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:3106/UNUIAS_UserMeasures_2ndEd.pdf> accessed 23/08/2018. 
75 See UEBT, ‘Ethical BioTrade Standard’ (UEBT, 2012) <https://www.ethicalbiotrade.org/setting-the-standard/> 
accessed 16/08/2018. 
76  See UEBT, ‘UEBT briefing note on the Nagoya Protocol’ (UEBT, 2016) 
<http://ethicalbiotrade.org/dl/benefitsharing/UEBT-ABS-Nagoya-Protocol.pdf> accessed 16/08/2018. 
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involvement of ILCs, and that MAT has been established, as required by the domestic 
ABS rules of the other Party where such ILCs are located.77 It thus explicitly imposes 
obligations on Parties to regulate user compliance and by doing so, promote users to 
act in accordance with domestic ABS legislation or regulatory rules.78 Encouraging 
both providers and users to include dispute resolution terms in MAT,79 Article 18 
further requires Parties to ensure that “an opportunity to seek recourse is available 
under their legal systems” and specifies that the effective measures shall consider 
“access to justice” as well as “the utilization of mechanisms regarding mutual 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards”.80 
Against this background, it could be observed that a certain level of protection 
is established for ILCs and their TK in cases where the State they live in has enacted 
relevant ABS rules. From a user countries’ perspective, in situations where domestic 
requirements do exist, obligations to respect the domestic rules, address non-
compliance and cooperate in cases of alleged violation are unquestionable. In light of 
Article 18, both user and provider Parties are required to take effective measures to 
ensure ILCs’ rights to access to justice and their opportunities to seek recourse under 
their legal systems. This implies that Parties need to facilitate effectively ILCs’ right 
of access to justice to courts, tribunals and non-judicial remedies. Moreover, private 
entities are obliged to comply with the legislation or regulatory requirements with 
respect to obtaining PIC or approval and involvement of the ILCs and negotiating 
MAT. Otherwise, they would be subject to sanctions in both their home jurisdictions 
and the providers’ jurisdiction where they have obtained the GR.  
                                               
77 Nagoya Protocol, art 16. 
78 Greiber and others (n 1) 30. 
79 Nagoya Protocol, art 18(1). 
80 ibid arts 18(2)(3). 
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In practice, the implementation of these terms has indeed yielded positive 
results with respect to facilitating access to GR and TK, promoting equitable and fair 
benefit-sharing and preventing misappropriation and misuse of GR and TK. Take India 
for example, since it enacted its Biological Diversity Act in 200281 and the Traditional 
Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) in 2001, about 200 patent applications filed by 
pharmaceutical companies from all over the world have either been set aside, 
withdrawn, amended or revoked by pre-grant oppositions submitted to various 
International Patent Offices along with prior-art evidences from TKDL. 82  Two 
hundred and twenty IRCC have been issued by India and published on the ABSCH, 
supporting disclosure requirements and the transparency of information. 83  Other 
examples include a case in which a French research institution, after being accused of 
biopiracy against ILCs in French Guiana, agreed to share patent benefits and negotiate 
ABS terms with the concerned ILCs in 2016. 84  In 2018, the Leibniz DSMZ in 
Germany—one of the largest biological resources collections in the world—became 
the first institution with its collections fully reviewed and examined in order to be in 
compliance with the due diligence requirements of the EU Regulation No 511/2014 
and the Nagoya Protocol.85 As mentioned in the introduction chapter, a court in the 
Netherlands has ruled that the Dutch patents for processing Teff, an ancient Ethiopian 
                                               
81 The 2002 Act is complemented by a serious of other legislation, including Biological Diversity Act [2002] (IN) and 
Guidelines on Access to Biological Resources and Associated Knowledge and Benefits Sharing Regulations [2014] 
(IN), see CBD, ‘Country Profiles: India’ (CBD, 2018) <https://absch.cbd.int/countries/IN> accessed 10/08/2018. 
82 Similar outcome is expected in about 1200 more cases, see CSIR and AYUSH, ‘Traditional Knowledge Digital 
Library’ (TKDL) <http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/Home.asp?GL=Eng> accessed 09/08/2018. 
83 In formation available at CBD, ‘Country Profiles: India’ (n 81) 
84  See Elisabeth Pain, ‘French Institute Agrees to Share Patent Benefits after Biopiracy Accusations’ (2016) 
<http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/02/french-institute-agrees-share-patent-benefits-after-biopiracy-
accusations> accessed 06/08/2018. 
85  See DSMZ, ‘DSMZ is Europe’s first Registered Collection’ (2017) 
<https://www.dsmz.de/home/details/entry/dsmz-is-europes-f.html> accessed 06/08/2018. 
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grain, are null and void on the basis of the EU Regulation in February 2019.86 These 
developments manifest the influence of implementing compliance measures in both 
provider and user countries. Some aspects are directly beneficial for safeguarding ILCs’ 
claims and rights, for instance, a combination of domestic legislation requiring PIC 
from ILCs in the provider Party and compliance measures enacted in the user Party. 
Some aspects may not link to ILCs directly but will have long-term and collateral 
effects on enforcing the ABS rules of the Nagoya Protocol in general, for instance, 
good practices promoted in the EU area by NGOs and biological resources collections. 
2.2.2 Persisting legal and practical challenges 
While good legislative and business practices are evident, there persist many legal and 
practical challenges in interpreting and implementing the domestic compliance 
measures in harmony with ILCs’ rights and ABS claims. First of all, as Articles 15 and 
16 require Parties to ensure compliance as required by domestic ABS legislation or 
regulatory requirements of the other Party,87 it suggests that the Protocol does not 
provide for compliance measures with respect to GR and TK held by ILCs who live in 
countries where there is no applicable ABS rules. This approach poses a risk of relying 
solely on domestic ABS legislative authority to address GR and TK held by ILCs. The 
risk may be alleviated with time as more States ratify the Nagoya Protocol, and the 
process of legislating ABS accelerates in both Parties and non-Party States. 
Nevertheless, this interpretative limit still excludes a large number of ILCs in the world. 
It is unfair especially considering many ILCs have no power of influencing domestic 
legislative processes. In addition, the absence of an explicit reference to the customary 
                                               
86  Information available at Rechtbank Den Haag, ‘Uitspraken’ (Rechtbank Den Haag, 07/12/2018) 
<https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2018:13960> accessed 08/05/2019. 
Background information on Teff case see Regine Andersen and Tone Winge, The Access and Benefit-Sharing 
Agreement on Teff Genetic Resources: Facts and Lessons (Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2012) 7 <http://www.abs-
initiative.info/fileadmin/media/Knowledge_Center/Pulications/FNI/FNI-R0612.pdf> accessed 09/07/2018. 
87 Nagoya Protocol, arts 15(1) and 16(1).  
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laws, community protocols, and procedures of ILCs, as envisaged in Article 12 of the 
Protocol, further limits the interpretation of the compliance obligations in relation to 
ILCs. That is, a narrow interpretation would suggest that the compliance obligations 
do not concern ILCs’ customary laws or community protocols unless they have been 
explicitly recognised and incorporated in the domestic ABS legislation or regulatory 
requirements of the Party concerned.88 This limitation is reflected in the current EU 
Regulation with respect to the scope of TK that the Regulation only covers TK if it is 
explicitly defined and included in the MAT.89 
Relying solely on the domestic legislative authority to address GR and TK held 
by ILCs or to recognise ILCs’ customary laws raises multifaceted concerns. It allows 
too much discretion on the Party governments and aggravates persisting power 
asymmetries between ILCs and State authorities in a domestic context.90  From a 
practical point of view, it would put ILCs in a vulnerable and passive position in terms 
of participating in the ABS process, negotiating MAT or claiming fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing. Fundamentally, I argue that this approach is not compatible with the 
international human rights standards established for ILCs and would potentially 
jeopardise the realisation of the overall objectives of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol.  
The CBD Working Group on ABS has identified that the issue of domestic 
legal recognition of ILCs’ ABS-related rights as well as ILCs’ customary rules touches 
upon the cross-cutting obligations of Parties under the Protocol to take due regard to 
                                               
88 Greiber and others (n 1), 169. 
89 EU Regulation No 511/2014 art 3(7) states that ‘traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources’ means 
traditional knowledge held by an indigenous or local community that is relevant for the utilisation of genetic 
resources and that is as such described in the mutually agreed terms applying to the utilisation of genetic resources. 
Emphasis added. 
90 For a discussion of power asymmetries, see Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck (n 7) 31. 
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ILCs who live within their jurisdiction.91 In other words, the intra-State obligations of 
Parties to the Nagoya Protocol vis-à-vis their ILCs is an obligation that is expected to 
be fulfilled in domestic context but shall be interpreted in light of broader international 
law. It requires a re-examination of how States’ sovereign rights are constructed and 
restrained under the international ABS framework.92 It also demands legal scrutiny of 
State’ specific obligations in ensuring domestic compliance vis-à-vis ILCs. Based on 
the previous analysis of Article 15-18 of the Nagoya Protocol, it is relevant to 
investigate whether Parties have an obligation to ensure and enhance the inter-
operability of the national ABS frameworks or not. If so, would it include obligations 
to: A) implement domestic compliance measure with due respect to ILCs’ rights over 
their GR and TK, B) cooperate in good faith in cases of disputes and alleged violations, 
and C) ensure ILCs’ right of access to justice at both international and domestic 
levels?93 These questions will be addressed in light of ILCs’ relevant human rights in 
the following sections.  
3. Human rights implications on compliance-related provisions 
Analysis above demonstrated the facilitative and non-confrontational features of the 
facilitative and non-confrontational features of the international compliance 
mechanism under the Nagoya Protocol and the opportunity opened for directly 
affected ILCs to take part in its procedures. I also discussed specific provisions in the 
Nagoya Protocol that oblige Parties to ensure ILCs’ access to justice with respect to 
                                               
91 Nagoya Protocol, art 12(1) and CBD Working Group on ABS, 'Study on Compliance in Relation to the Customary 
Law of Indigenous and Local Communities, National Law, Across Jurisdictions, and International Law' (6 March 
2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/INF/5. 
92 For a detailed analysis on the principle of States’ sovereignty and its limitations, see section 2.1 of chapter two. 
93 Greiber and others (n 1) 187 and Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The International Human Rights Law Implications of the 
Nagoya Protocol’ in Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access 
and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Brill 
Nijhoff 2013) 53. 
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compliance with MAT in the process of benefit-sharing. In both contexts, we have 
seen normative and practical limitations for ILCs to participate fully in the compliance 
procedures or domestic implementation processes. Would human rights norms and 
mechanisms be helpful in establishing a mutually supportive interpretation of access 
to justice and compliance? What are the applicability of human rights of Indigenous 
peoples and local communities (IPLCs) in the context of ABS, especially when they 
need to seek remedy? What are the implications of States’ human rights obligations in 
situations where they shall also comply with MEAs-based obligations, in particular, 
the Nagoya Protocol? In order to answer these questions, this section examines the 
implications of the human right of access to justice of IPLCs and the nature of State 
Parties’ obligations. This is because the right of access to justice is essential for 
substantiating and enforcing IPLCs’ human rights.94 An inter-State perspective could 
also help to unravel the ways in which States are obliged to fulfil their responsibilities 
and why they do so. 95  I will look at the expansive jurisprudential interpretation 
provided by international and regional human rights courts and tribunals on IPLCs’ 
human rights in cases concerning access to, utilisation and benefit-sharing of natural 
resources,96 as it provides the normative ground to consider the practicality of using 
human rights mechanism to protect IPLCs’ ABS rights. I will also investigate the 
nature of Parties’ obligations under the Nagoya Protocol and discuss possibilities of 
                                               
94 Francesco Francioni, ‘The Rights of Access to Justice under Customary International Law’ in Francesco Francioni 
(ed), Access to Justice as a Human Right (Oxford University Press 2007) 1. 
95 As elaborated in the following section 3.2, I look at the scholarly debate about the nature of States’ obligations. See 
in general, Frédéric Mégret, ‘Nature of Obligations’ in Daniel Moeckli and others (eds), International Human 
Rights Law (Third edn, Oxford University Press 2018) 86, Joost Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty 
Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?’ (2003) 14 (5) European Journal Of 
International Law, 907 and Cardesa-Salzmann (n 11) 103. 
96 For instance, the 2007 Saramaka case and the 2015 Kaliña and Lokono case in the Inter-American context, the 
2010 Endorois case, and the 2017 Ogiek case in the African context. Detailed discussion see the following section 
3.1.2. 
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inter-State legal proceedings, multilateral accountability, and cooperation in light of 
international human rights law. 
3.1 Access to justice in international human rights law 
In international law, access to justice generally refers to the possibility of an individual 
to bring a claim before a court and have a court adjudicate it in accordance with 
substantive standards of justice and fairness.97  In a human rights context, it also 
includes the necessary legal aid provided for persons who otherwise cannot afford the 
often-prohibitive cost of lawyers and administrative fees of legal proceedings.98 In fact, 
Francioni has argued that access to justice, as an essential component of the rule of 
law, is fundamental and imperative for guaranteeing the respect and protection of 
human rights.99 However, the right per se faces many controversies with respect to its 
scope, connotation and implications. 100 Specifically, Francioni argues that access to 
justice has been construed as “a procedural guarantee dependant on other substantive 
rights” rather than a human right in itself, although it equally merits legal protection.101 
Hughes warns that a narrow view would suggest that access to justice only entails 
access the procedures before a court.102 In the same line, McBride questions the scope 
                                               
97 Francioni differentiates the possibility and the substantive standards from one another a general meaning on the one 
hand, and a qualified meaning on the other. See Francioni (n 94) 1. See also, Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth, 
‘Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective’ (1978) 27 (2) Buffalo 
Law Review, 182. 
98 For instance, the legal aid mechanisms employed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as a 
human right-based approach to advance access to justice, see UNDP, ‘Access to Justice’ (2016) 
<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/democratic-governance-and-peacebuilding/rule-of-law--justice--
security-and-human-rights/access-to-justice.html> accessed 17/08/2018. 
99 Francioni (n 94) 1. 
100 Eilionóir Flynn, Disabled Justice? Access to Justice and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (Ashgate Publishing 2015) 21.  
101 Francioni (n 94) 32. 
102 Patricia Hughes, ‘Law Commissions and Access to Justice: What Justice Should We Be Talking About?’ (2008) 
46/4 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 778. 
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of the right and points out that it is not clear whether States’ obligations to ensure 
effective access to justice would imply only that the domestic courts and tribunals shall 
be open to all individuals, or it would also imply that a fair process and a just outcome 
shall also be somewhat secured.103 To push this argument further, scholars including 
Trindade, Cappelletti and Garth have asked whether access to justice may also include 
effective enforcement of the granted remedies.104 Thus, although a general acceptance 
of access to justice as human rights concept is evident on the international plane, the 
scope and connotation of the right remain unsettled. Specifically, it is not clear, 
whether access to justice, as a right or as a procedural guarantee, entails procedural 
and substantive requirements for States and other stakeholders to facilitate the process 
and realise the granted remedies, and if so, to what extent they are obliged to do so.105 
In order to unpack the implications of IPLCs’ human right of access to justice and 
discuss their relevance to the Nagoya Protocol, the following sections look at relevant 
international instruments and various ways in which the IPLCs’ right of access to 
justice could be realised. These include regional human rights courts and tribunals, 
international treaty bodies, ICJ and its advisory opinions and domestic tribunals.  
3.1.1 International human rights instruments 
In human rights instruments, various terms exist to refer to individual’s right to seek 
judicial or administrative remedies. Specific standards for States to fulfil their 
obligations to ensure the realisation of access to justice are also established to varying 
degrees. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers to the “right to an 
                                               
103 Jeremy McBride, Access to Justice for Migrants and Asylum-seekers in Europe (Council of Europe 2009) para 9. 
104 Antônio A. C. Trindade, ‘Some Reflections on the Right of Access to Justice in Its Wide Dimension’ in Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, Maja Seršić and Trpimir Šošić (eds), Contemporary Developments in International Law (Brill Nijhoff 
2015) 464 and Cappelletti and Garth (n 97) 181. 
105 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, Handbook on European Law relating 
to Access to Justice (Publications Office of the European Union 2016) 16. 
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effective remedy by the competent national tribunals”. 106  Similarly, the 1950 
European and the 1969 American Conventions on Human Rights recognise the “right 
to an effective remedy before a national authority” 107  and the “right to judicial 
protection” of “a competent court or tribunal” 108  respectively. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also recognises “effective remedy”,109 
but it goes further to establish that the affected rights shall be determined by 
“competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities”110 and granted remedies 
that shall be enforced.111 The ICCPR also provides that all persons shall be “equal 
before the courts and tribunals” and “entitled to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal”. 112  The Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR elaborates that “who have exhausted all available domestic remedies may 
submit a written communication to the Committee for consideration”.113 Making the 
first explicit reference, the 1980 Hague Convention on International Access to Justice 
requires the contracting Parties to “facilitate international access to justice”. 114 The 
1989 Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries adopted under the International Labour Organization (ILO Convention 169) 
                                               
106 Universal Declaration of Human Rights [10 December 1948] UNGA Res 217 A (III), art 8. 
107 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols 
Nos. 11 and 14 [adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953] ETS 5, art 13. 
108 American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose", Costa Rica [adopted 22 November 1969, entered 
into force 18 July 1978] 1144 UNTS 123, art 25. 
109 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 
1976] 999 UNTS 171, art 2 para 3(a). 
110 ibid art 2 para 3(b). 
111 ibid art 2 para 3(c). 
112 ibid art 14. 
113 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [adopted 19 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976] 999 UNTS 171, art 2. 
114 Convention on International Access to Justice [adopted 25 October 1980, entered into force 1 May 1988] HCCH 
Publications 29. 
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115 that focuses on Indigenous issues, requires its Parties to safeguard Indigenous rights 
and that Indigenous peoples “shall be able to take legal proceedings, either individually 
or through their representative bodies, for the effective protection of these rights”.116 
In Europe, the 1998 Aarhus Convention set out detailed standards for “access to justice 
in environmental matters” throughout its text.117  In 2007, the obligation of State 
Parties to “ensure effective access to justice” is also provided in the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities.118 In comparison, the UNDRIP, adopted in the 
same year, only provides that “States shall take effective measures to ensure 
that…Indigenous peoples can understand and be understood in political, legal and 
administrative proceedings”. 119  Furthermore, to expand on the non-binding 
international instruments, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
highlights the importance of “effective access to judicial and administrative 
proceedings, including redress and remedy”120 and the 2010 UNEP Guidelines for the 
Development of National Legislation on Access to Information, Public Participation 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters advocates for “broad interpretation of 
standing in proceedings…with a view to achieving effective access to justice” and 
suggested that “States should ensure that proceedings are fair, open, transparent and 
equitable”.121 
                                               
115 Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries [adopted 27 June 1989, 
entered into force 5 September 1991] ILO C169. 
116 ibid art 12. 
117 Aarhus Convention, arts 3(9) and 9. 
118 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [adopted 24 January 2007, entered into force 3 May 2008] 
UNGA Res 61/106, art 13. 
119 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [13 December 2007] UNGA Res 61/295, art 
13(2). 
120 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development [12 August 1992] UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Principle 
10. 
121 UNEP, 'Guidelines for the Development of National Legislation on Access to Information, Public Participation 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters' (26 February 2010) Decision SS.XI/5 Guidelines 18 and 19. 
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Thus, it can be observed that it is generally established that access to justice 
shall be effective. Some instruments envisage specific procedural standards, for 
instance, the Optional Protocol that specifies the condition for individuals’ access to 
international remedies is that domestic means shall be exhausted first and they must 
present a written communication.122 Some instruments incorporate both procedural 
and substantive requirements, for instance, the ICCPR requires not only that all 
persons shall be equal before the tribunals and the tribunals shall be competent, 
independent and impartial, but also that the granted remedies shall be enforced.123 
Standard setting in both procedural and substantive terms can also be found in the 
Aarhus Convention and the 2010 UNEP Guidelines. In contrast, the provisions in the 
ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP remain vague and conservative. They only 
imply that Indigenous peoples shall participate in or “understand and be understood 
by”, the legal and administrative proceedings. Such participation is not qualified in the 
language of right, nor its procedures specified in any substantive terms. Furthermore, 
it can be observed that human rights norms focus on domestic judicial remedy, whereas 
an international remedy is only made available when all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted. Admittedly, the European and American Conventions, as well as the 
Aarhus Convention have only regional applicability for a limited number of State 
Parties. The UNDRIP, the Rio Declaration and the UNEP Guidelines are not legally 
binding in nature. The ILO Convention and the Hague Convention are ratified by very 
few countries.124  
                                               
122 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, art 2. It is also the case with the Hague Convention as it stipulates the means and 
obligations for Parties with respect to facilitating access to justice. 
123 ICCPR, art 2. Emphasis added. 
124 Number of Contracting Parties to the 1980 Hague Convention is only 28 as of 11/5/2016, see HCCH, ‘Status 
Table: Convention of 25 October 1980 on International Access to Justice’ (HCCH, 2016) 
<https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=91> accessed 19/08/2018. 
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3.1.2 Regional human rights courts 
Adversarial means are available for adjudication of disputed human rights at the 
regional level. The European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights exemplify 
regional efforts for establishing adversarial systems for ensuring access to justice.125 
Over the past few decades, these tribunals have received an increasing number of 
petitions. The European Court, for instance, has decided on 85,951 applications in 
2017 and 42,761 applications in 2018, of which over eighteen thousand are by 
judgements.126 The Inter-American Court, in comparison, has received 2494 petitions 
in 2017 and published five merits reports. 127  The African Court, heard its first 
contentious case in 2008, has now received 202 applications and finalised 65 cases.128 
Compared to the statistics of a decade ago, the number of petitions dealt with 
by these courts has undergone a booming growth. It indicates the increasing influence 
of the jurisdictions of the regional human rights tribunals. However, some scholars 
such as Cavallaro and Brewer have also warned that supranational litigation still only 
affords access to a tiny fraction of victims, which makes its benefits more like a 
“lottery” to the handful of petitioners whose cases reach a court, as opposed to the vast 
                                               
125 Nihal Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law: National, Regional and International 
Jurisprudence (Second edn, Cambridge University Press 2017) 105 and James Cavallaro and Stephanie Erin 
Brewer, ‘Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-first Century: the Case of the Inter-
American Court’ (2008) 102 (4) American journal of international law, 768. 
126  Council of Europe, Annual Report 2017 of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR, 2018) 163 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2017_ENG.pdf> accessed 01/07/2019.and Council of 
Europe, Annual Report 2018 of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR, 2019) 167 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2018_ENG.pdf> accessed 01/07/2019. 
127 While the Inter-American Court had 1931 petitions at the admissibility stage, 691 cases at the merits stage and 
2622 petitions and cases still pending, see IACHR, ‘Statistics’ (IACHR) 
<http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/multimedia/statistics/statistics.html> accessed 22/08/2018. 
128  Statistic available at African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, ‘Contentious Matters’ (ACHPR, 2018) 
<http://en.african-court.org/index.php/cases> accessed 22/04/2019. 
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number of similarly situated victims.129 The particular popularity of the European 
Court also poses a severe administrative challenge to its own capacity—the massive 
number of applications has created a docket crisis and a “backlog” that is rapidly 
growing every year.130 Scholars remain sceptical about the actual level to which the 
judgements and decisions issued by the human courts could be complied with.131 In 
order for the European human rights system to provide more robust and effective 
remedies, Gerards and Glas have advocated for “a more substantive and general 
conception of access to justice”.132  Cavallaro and Brewer have proposed that the 
supranational human rights courts, while remaining impartial, shall adjudicate cases in 
ways that reflect the reality of a broader social, political and cultural climate prevailing 
in the domestic contexts, and eventually, to increase the relevance of domestic 
courts.133 
As discussed in the previous chapter three on benefit-sharing, there is an 
expansive jurisprudential interpretation of the human right to property of ILCs in the 
rulings of regional human rights courts that explicitly mentioned FPIC and benefit-
sharing.134 In particular, the 2007 Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname ruled by 
the Inter-American Court establishes that the right of self-determination, the right to 
lands and natural resources of the Saramaka people demands procedural safeguards, 
which States must abide to fulfil their obligations, including effective participation, 
                                               
129 Cavallaro and Brewer (n 125) 770. 
130 Laurence R. Helfer, ‘Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural 
Principle of the European Human Rights Regime’ (2008) 19 (1) European Journal Of International Law, 126. 
131 See for instance, Darren Hawkins and Wade Jacoby, ‘Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European and 
Inter-American Courts of Human Rights’ (2010) 6 (1) Journal of International Law and International Relations, 36 
and Emiliem Hafnerburton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, ‘Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty 
Promises’ (2005) 110 (5) American Journal of Sociology, 1374. 
132 Janneke H. Gerards and Lize R. Glas, ‘Access to justice in the European Convention on Human Rights system’ 
(2017) 35 (1) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 12.  
133 Cavallaro and Brewer (n 125) 770. 
134 See section 2.3 of chapter three. 
 Complementarity between the Nagoya Protocol and human rights 
225 
prior environmental and social impact assessments and benefit-sharing. 135  This 
reasoning is also evident in the 2010 Endorios case ruled by the African Commission 
as the Commission held that as benefit-sharing serves as an important indicator of 
compliance for property rights and failure to duly compensate resulted in a violation 
of the right to property.136 In 2015, the Inter-American Court reiterated in the case of 
Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname that because the State of Suriname failed to 
ensure the three identified safeguards when granting mining concessions, it had 
violated the property right to lands and natural resources of the Kaliña and Lokono 
peoples.137 In this case, the Court also held that the State of Suriname had failed to 
comply with its obligation under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol with respect to 
ILCs since Suriname is a Party to the CBD.138  
Thus, it could be argued that regional human rights courts provide an 
opportunity for IPLCs to seek judicial remedies when their human rights pertaining to 
lands and natural resource are at stake, which shall also include the rights over their 
GR and TK.139 In this light, ABS-related rights and claims could be seen as part and 
parcel of human rights of IPLCs, because benefit-sharing and participatory 
requirements are integrated into safeguarding human rights of IPLCs under the 
regional human rights jurisprudence. Most significantly, in the Kaliña and Lokono 
case, the Inter-American Court cross-referenced States’ obligations under the CBD to 
support its interpretation of human rights and highlighted the Nagoya Protocol even 
                                               
135 Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname [28 November 2007] (Inter-American Court of Human Rights) IACHR 
Series C no 172 para 129.  
136 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya [2010] (ACHPR) 276/2003 294. 
137 Case of Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname [25 November 2015] (Inter-American Court of Human Rights) 
IACHR Series C no 309 34. 
138 ibid paras 171-181. 
139 For a detailed discussion on property rights of IPLCs of their lands, natural resources, GR and TK see previous 
section 2.3 of chapter three. 
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though Suriname was not a Party to the Protocol. This indicates that a mutually 
supportive interpretation of States’ obligations imposed by international human rights 
law and ABS law could support the enforcement of one another and the State 
concerned do not have to be Party to the Nagoya Protocol for the Court to consider its 
ABS-related obligations. This approach, if widely adopted, could have a profound 
influence in safeguarding the right of access to justice of IPLCs before human rights 
courts because the CBD has almost universal ratification. Nevertheless, I acknowledge 
that the limitations of relying on regional human rights courts and tribunals persist. It 
is not accessible for all the IPLCs in the world and only covers a tiny fraction of victims 
of the IPLCs who have attempted to seek remedies from them. The lengthy procedures 
and cost could also discourage many ILCs to pursue remedies from this approach. 
3.1.3 Human rights treaty bodies 
In addition to the adversarial means to defend human rights, international human rights 
treaty bodies provide treaty-based complaints procedures, not only for inter-State 
communications but also for individuals. It is an important means to monitor and 
ensure compliance of States Parties with their treaty obligations and to provide 
international remedies to individuals in cases of violation.140 However, human rights 
treaties bodies are not of automatic competence over individual communications—
they can only consider cases where relevant States Parties have made the means 
effective via a declaration or ratifying an optional protocol.141 By 22 August 2018, 
there are eight human rights treaty bodies which may, under certain conditions, receive 
and consider complaints or communications from individual.142 In so far as the rights 
                                               
140 Ilias Bantekas, International Human Rights Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2013) 273. 
141 ibid 201. 
142 These include, CCPR, CERD, CAT, CEDAW, CRPD, CED, CESCR and CRC, see OHCHR, ‘Human Rights 
Bodies-Complaints Procedures’ <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx> 
accessed 10/06/2019. 
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of IPLCs are concerned, there are three most relevant human rights treaty bodies to 
receive individual communications. These are, the Human Rights Committee (HRC, 
its Optional Protocol entered into force in 1976 and now has 116 Parties),143 which 
monitors implementation of the ICCPR; the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR, its Optional Protocol entered into force in 2013 and has 23 
Parties),144 which monitors implementation of the ICESCR; and the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which may consider individual 
petitions alleging violations of the Convention by States parties who have made the 
necessary declaration under Article 14 of the Convention.  
Overall, individual complaints procedures in the human rights law equip 
individuals with a unique opportunity to seek quasi-judicial remedies at the 
international level. 145 Individual cases are also often supported by NGOs and human 
rights lawyers based on various organisational strategic objectives.146 However, it is 
not always easy for IPLCs to have their cases heard by human rights treaty bodies. The 
issue often vests with standing and admissibility.147 For instance, Tyagi has criticised 
the fact that the HRC only allows individuals to claim violations and does not 
                                               
143  See UNTC, ‘Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (1966) 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&clang=_en> accessed 
22/08/2018. 
144 See UNTC, ‘Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (UN Treaty 
Collection, 2008) <https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=ind&mtdsg_no=iv-3-
a&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 22/08/2018. 
145 Markus G. Schmidt, ‘Individual Human Rights Complaints Procedures Based on United Nations Treaties and the 
Need for Reform’ (1992) 41 (3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 645 and Sarah Joseph, Seeking 
Remedies for Torture Victims: A Handbook on the Individual Complaints Procedures of the UN Treaty Bodies 
(Boris Wijkstrom 2006) 39. 
146 Bantekas (n 140) 273. For a case study see Mónica Roa and Barbara Klugman, ‘Considering Strategic Litigation 
as an Advocacy Tool: A Case Study of the Defence of Reproductive Rights in Colombia’ (2014) 22 (44) 
Reproductive Health Matters, 31. 
147  The common steps of the compliance procedures concern admissibility, merits, decision, remedies and 
implementation.  
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recognise standing of a group alleging violation of its collective rights, for instance, 
the right to self-determination.148 Furthermore, the HRC has provided the notion of 
“victim” in its previous jurisprudence that individuals and groups need to prove that 
their rights have been directly affected in order to make their cases admissible.149 Only 
in exceptional circumstances, the case would also be admissible if the applicants can 
prove that the violation is reasonably foreseeable or imminent.150 Last but not least, 
Bantekas has suggested that the requirement of “exhaustion of domestic remedies” is 
one of the greatest admissibility hurdles as many cases have received an 
inadmissibility decision due to the failure to prove that the authors have exhausted 
domestic remedies.151  In practice, Bantekas’ concern manifests in the operational 
history of the CESCR: to date it has received 25 individual communications, in which 
14 of them are concluded with an inadmissibility decision.152  
According to the requirements of the Compliance Committee under the 
Nagoya Protocol, it is also that only “directly affected ILCs” may submit information 
to the Secretariat in order for the Committee to examine situations of non-
compliance.153 I argued that the criterion “directly affected” is problematic in the ABS 
context in the previous section 1.2 and that the same reasoning would apply in a human 
rights context too. In reality, IPLCs often lack financial or technical capacity to not 
only demonstrate that their rights have been directly affected, but also to prove that 
they have exhausted domestic remedies. Furthermore, since it is not settled whether 
                                               
148  For a detailed discussion, see section 3.1 of chapter two. See also, Yogesh Tyagi, The UN Human Rights 
Committee: Practice and Procedure (Cambridge University Press 2011) 401. 
149 See Shirin Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and 19 other Mauritian women v Mauritius [09 April 1981] (HRC) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/12/D/35/1978 para 9.1 and B. d. B. et al. v. The Netherlands [30 March 1989] (HRC) UN Doc A/44/40 
para 6.6. 
150 Toonen v Australia [31 March 1994] (HRC) UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 para 5.1. 
151 Bantekas (n 140) 275. 
152 Statistic at OHCHR, ‘Jurisprudence’ <https://juris.ohchr.org/Search/Results> accessed 14/07/2019.  
153 See the discussion in the previous section 1.2. 
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the rights over GR and TK held by IPLCs are collective (human) rights or not, it is 
very difficult to evaluate how useful the individual compliant mechanism might be for 
ABS purposes. To elaborate, in situations where there is clear and exclusive ownership 
of IPLCs over GR and TK recognised in domestic context, the mechanism could be 
used by certain individual right-holders. However, as most of the time TK is 
collectively managed among a community, it would be difficult for IPLCs to seek 
remedy in front of human rights treaty bodies that only recognise standing of 
individuals. From a normative perspective, when the communication contains ABS-
related rights and obligations, for instance, States’ obligations to consult and obtain 
FPIC, the enforcement of human rights obligations could meanwhile enhance States’ 
compliance with their obligations as envisaged under the ABS framework. This is 
evident in three cases regarding violations of IPLCs’ cultural rights—Länsman et al v 
Finland,154 Jouni E. Länsman et al. v Finland155 and the 2009 Poma Poma v Peru 
case.156 Admittedly, scholars remain sceptical about the actual impact of opinions 
issued by human rights treaty bodies because their views are not of a binding force for 
State Parties.157 However, to pursue further in this arguments requires empirical data 
and that exceeds the scope of the current thesis.158  
                                               
154 Länsman et al v Finland [26 October 1994] (HRC) UN Doc CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994).  
155 Jouni E. Länsman et al. v Finland [30 October 1996] (HRC) UN Doc CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (1996). 
156 Poma Poma v Peru [24 April 2009] (HRC) UN Doc CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006. 
157 See conclusions in Christof H. Heyns and Frans Viljoen (eds), The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights 
Treaties on the Domestic Level (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2002) 31 and James Crawford, ‘The UN Human 
Rights Treaty System: A System in Crisis?’ in Philip Alston and James Crawford (eds), The Future of UN Human 
Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge University Press 2000) 2. 
158 See in general, Oona A. Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?’ (2002) 111 (8) Yale Law 
Journal, 2020, Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties’ (2003) 14 (1) 
European Journal Of International Law, 172 and Oona A. Hathaway, ‘Why Do Countries Commit to Human 
Rights Treaties?’ (2007) 51 (4) Journal of Conflict Resolution, 588. 
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3.1.4 International Court of Justice  
Established in 1946, the ICJ functions as the principal judicial organ of the UN 
system.159 It provides contentious jurisdiction to States and offers advisory opinions 
upon request by authorised UN bodies, for instance, in relation to non-State peoples.160 
In particular, the issue of peoples’ right to self-determination is taken up by the ICJ 
via three cases, namely, the Namibia case in 1970, the Western Sahara case in 1975 
and the Israeli Wall case in 2004. In the advisory opinion on the Namibia case in 1970, 
the ICJ asserted the applicability of self-determination as a principle enshrined in the 
UN Charter to all peoples in colonial situations.161 This position has been confirmed 
by Judge Dillard in the Western Sahara case in 1975,162 where the ICJ formally 
acknowledged the existence of the Indigenous notion of land rights that is based on a 
non-European conception of title as generative of "legal ties" between the Mauritanian 
entity and the territory of Western Sahara.163 However, since no actual legal effect was 
given to the Indigenous notion of land rights as opposed to the title derived from a 
European colonial claim, Reisman regretted that it was a lost opportunity for 
empowering Indigenous form of political organisations. 164  In a more recent case 
concerning the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (the Israeli Wall case) in 2004, the ICJ reaffirmed that “the right 
of peoples to self-determination is today a right erga omnes”, citing the UN Charter 
                                               
159 Charter of the United Nations [signed 26 June 1945] 1 UNTS XVI, art 92. 
160 Statute of the International Court of Justice [18 April 1946] 33 UNTS 993, art 36. See Javaid Rehman, International 
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and the Human Rights Covenants.165 It concluded that the wall construction, along 
with measures taken previously, “severely impedes the exercise by the Palestinian 
people of its right to self-determination, and is therefore a breach of Israel’s obligation 
to respect that right”.166 Consequently, the ICJ reckoned that Israel is bound to comply 
with its obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination 
and its obligations under international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law.167  
This brief appraisal of the ICJ’s advisory opinions manifests the ongoing 
engagement of the ICJ in some of the most contentious human rights issues for non-
State peoples.168  Similar to the individual complaints procedures provided by the 
human rights treaty bodies, this function of the ICJ provides authorised opinion at an 
international level with significant judicial influence. For instance, Reisman has 
highlighted that the value and judgements enshrined in these advisory opinions could 
direct the international corpus juris to advance, “case by case, until the international 
legal system provides justice for all”.169 Rehman also demonstrates that, although in 
principle, it is not ICJ’s role to create law, the decisions and advisory opinions of the 
ICJ have nevertheless greatly influenced the advancement of international law.170 With 
a sharpened focus on Indigenous peoples, Morgan has argued for “reconfiguring” 
human rights concepts and how they are protected under the UN judicial system vis-
à-vis Indigenous peoples,171 and Magnarella has proposed a change of the Court’s 
                                               
165 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [9 
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Statute to expand standing further to non-State actors to provide better judicial support 
to Indigenous peoples’ right of self-determination.172 In light of the ongoing debate 
and practice of the ICJ, it is reasonable to suggest that its function of advisory opinions 
could be one of the most important legal avenues to address the issue of IPLCs’ human 
rights pertinent to their lands, natural resources, culture, TK and fundamentally, self-
determination. This potential is based on the premise that the realisation of IPLCs’ 
human rights of self-determination, development, culture, property and equality are all 
interlinked and many ABS rights are essentially human rights too.173 
3.1.5 Domestic remedies 
At the domestic level, institutional arrangements like national courts, ombudsperson 
(Human Rights Commissioners), State-appointed human rights defenders safeguard 
the realisation of human rights. Although national human rights institutions are not 
established in every State, Smith and other scholars have suggested that the remedies 
delivered at national level usually have a greater success of enforcement vis-à-vis 
international level.174 The importance of these domestic institutional arrangements 
with respect to access to justice is three-fold. First, access to justice at the domestic 
level functions as a prerequisite for the exercise of the international proceedings, as 
one must exhaust domestic remedies in order to make the case admissible before an 
international human rights tribunal. 175  Second, it is generally agreed that the 
application of internationally agreed norms in national court could render substantive 
power to treaty norms and internationally established standards. For instance, Diver 
and Miller have edited a collection of case studies demonstrating various ways of 
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enforcing human rights and securing effective remedies in different countries and the 
contributors have suggested that domestic judges and legislators are arguably best 
placed to protect human rights.176 Furthermore, Boyle, Anderson and others have also 
argued that some human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights, are becoming a significant basis for environmental claims and often applicable 
by national courts.177 Finally, to look at the practical impact, Cotula and Mathieu have 
suggested that creating domestic opportunities and enhancing IPLCs’ ability to use 
legal tools to tackle human rights issues could facilitate IPLCs to gain a greater level 
of control over decisions and processes that affect their lives and rights.178 
With respect to the Nagoya Protocol, the process of transposing its ABS rules 
into domestic contexts also has resulted in numerous national ABS legislation and 
policies. As demonstrated, many EU Member States such as the Netherlands, France 
and Germany, have incorporated ABS compliance rules into their national civil and 
criminal laws, thereby making the norms of the Nagoya Protocol domestically 
justiciable and enforceable. 179  In theory, ABS-related issues may be litigated in 
jurisdictions where the national implementation of the Nagoya Protocol has taken 
effect. While there are not yet judicial records on this subject, many cases of 
administrative remedies provided through patent offices and other means do exist.180 
                                               
176 For instance, Roberto Cippitani, ‘The ‘Contractual Enforcement’ of Human Rights in Europe’ in Alice Diver and 
Jacinta Miller (eds), Justiciability of Human Rights Law in Domestic Jurisdictions (Springer 2015) 307 and Alice 
Diver and Jacinta Miller, ‘Can Rights Be Ring-Fenced in Times of Austerity? Equality, Equity and Judicial 
‘Trusteeship’ over the UK’s Fairness Agenda’ in Alice Diver and Jacinta Miller (eds), Justiciability of Human 
Rights Law in Domestic Jurisdictions (2015) 25. 
177 Alan E. Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?’ in Ben Boer (ed), Environmental Law 
Dimensions of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2015) 271 and essays about European countries in Michael 
R. Anderson and Paolo Galizzi (eds), International Environmental Law in National Courts (BIICL 2002) 
178 Lorenzo Cotula and Paul Mathieu (eds), Legal Empowerment in Practice: Using Legal Tools to Secure Land 
Rights in Africa (IIED and FAO 2008) 1. 
179 See the previous section 2.1. 
180 For instance, the case of India TK database as discussed in the previous section 2.1. 
Compliance and Human Rights Implications 
234 
This process gives similar effect to the Nagoya Protocol as in human rights laws 
because the treaty norms are given true substance and enforceability via national laws 
and courts. However, because the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol subject the exact 
ways to regulate ABS to domestic laws and States’ discretion, as discussed in previous 
chapters, it is not clear to what extent, if at all, State Parties would make rights-based 
ABS claims admissible for domestic remedies. This uncertainty is closely related to 
the national recognition of ILCs’ rights over their GR and TK, which determines the 
extent to which the legal empowerment of ILCs could be realised via access to justice 
at domestic level.181 
3.1.6 Human rights implications on the Nagoya Protocol  
The above analysis has demonstrated the human rights norm of access to justice and 
various ways in which the IPLCs’ right of access to justice could be realised. How 
could it contribute to interpreting and implementing compliance-related provisions in 
the Nagoya Protocol? On the one hand, the human rights standards of access to justice 
could clarify in particular the interpretation of Article 18 of the Nagoya Protocol.182 
Specifically, it could invalidate the narrow interpretation of Article 18 that access to 
justice in the Nagoya Protocol only refers to access to domestic judicial remedies with 
respect to the contractual terms established under MAT. This is because access to 
justice is a fundamental and widely established human right of IPLCs. Furthermore, 
IPLCs’ rights over GR and TK, as they are part and parcel of IPLCs’ human rights to 
their natural resources and culture, cannot be merely subject to contractual agreements. 
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As discussed in section 2.2.1, Article 18 implies that Parties need to effectively 
facilitate access to justice for ILCs to courts, tribunals and other non-judicial remedies. 
This means that Parties of the Nagoya Protocol shall endeavour to develop legislative 
and administrative means to facilitate ILCs in ensuring the realisation of their right of 
access to justice, both in light of Parties’ responsibilities to ensure the inter-operability 
of the ABS framework and more fundamentally, State’s international human rights 
obligations. 
On the other hand, as discussed, the practical experience of seeking human 
rights remedies at both international and domestic levels opens the way for considering 
the possibility of using human rights mechanism to defend violations of ABS rights 
and enforcing ABS norms as enshrined in the Nagoya Protocol. In jurisdictions where 
requirements such as FPIC and benefit-sharing have been explicitly recognised as a 
procedural safeguard of IPLCs’ human rights, it is more conspicuous that the 
enforcement of human rights and ABS norms may complement each other. As 
demonstrated, this is the case within the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, the 
African Commission and the HRC. However, prominent legal avenues such as the ICJ 
and some human rights treaty bodies also have proved to be difficult for IPLCs to 
approach because of issues relating to standing and admissibility. In general, access to 
justice guarantees the effectiveness of a legal framework and the protection it accords 
for certain rights. This effect is strengthened by the process of treaty implementation 
at the national level, which renders internationally established norms with domestic 
enforceability via national courts and tribunals. As argued, this process is imperative 
for both international human rights law and the Nagoya Protocol for it substantiates 
the international standards in accordance to varying political, social and cultural 
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contexts. 183  To approach ABS issues from a human rights-based perspective, the 
opportunities to enhance IPLCs’ ability to use legal tools and enunciate States’ 
obligation to facilitate legal empowerment of IPLCs do exist. In turn, recalling the 
innovative features of the international compliance mechanism under the Nagoya 
Protocol that envisage an indirect Committee trigger that can be initiated by IPLCs, 
the ABS mechanism may also salvage the complete incapability of IPLCs to bring 
legal proceedings in front of international judicial organs. This enables the injured 
groups to defend their rights and allows IPLCs to participate in the enforcement 
process of international law. Furthermore, it is worth asking how court systems and 
quasi-judicial mechanisms at both international and domestic level could be directed 
and designed to promote equal and affordable accessibility to justice. 184  These 
questions could be included in the agenda for future scholarly debates but they indeed 
exceed the scope of this thesis.  
3.2 Compliance with States’ responsibilities from an inter-State perspective 
The issue with compliance of the Nagoya Protocol can also be investigated from an 
inter-State perspective through the lens of State Parties’ obligations. This section 
investigates the possibilities and limitations of inter-State litigation and cooperation in 
both international human rights law and the Nagoya Protocol. It also unpacks the 
normative and practical complementarity between the two frameworks in light of a 
mutually supportive interpretation. It starts with a discussion of the nature of Parties’ 
obligations, focusing on the distinction of bilateral obligations and collective 
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obligations that are binding erga omnes partes. 185  This clarification is important 
because different types of obligations imply different legal consequences. 186  For 
instance, any contracting State is entitled to bring legal proceedings against breach of 
collective obligations owed to a group of States but only an injured State has standing 
against breach of bilateral obligations. The key question is, if some obligation under 
the Nagoya Protocol could be perceived as human rights obligations, is there a 
possibility that States could invoke the responsibility of any other State for a breach of 
fair and equitable benefits-sharing – as an erga omnes partes obligation – before 
international judicial organs and international human rights mechanisms? I also 
examine a shared trend in international human rights law and environmental regimes—
the development of “softened” mechanisms to promote compliance of international 
law and States’ cooperation.  
3.2.1 Nature of the obligations under the Nagoya Protocol and the human rights 
law 
Different types of obligations exist under general international law. As Mégret and 
Brunnée have suggested, they could be either unilateral or multilateral, reciprocal or 
non-reciprocal, temporal or eternal, conditional or unconditional, relative or absolute, 
or indeed a mixture of some of these characteristics. 187  The distinction between 
bilateral obligations (or multilateral obligations that can be reduced to “a bundle of 
bilateral obligations”) and collective obligations that are binding erga omnes partes 
therefore cannot be deconstructed into bilateral components, has been central for 
scholarly debates. 188  For instance, Pauwelyn has elaborated the typology of 
                                               
185 Jutta Brunnée, ‘Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée 
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multilateral treaty obligations in the context of World Trade Organization;189 Cardesa-
Salzmann has investigated its implications vis-à-vis global environmental regimes;190 
and Mégret has demonstrated that human rights obligations are in some ways radically 
distinct from other types of multilateral obligations.191 For this research, I focus on the 
nature of the obligations owed by Parties of the Nagoya Protocol as well as 
international human rights obligations and examine its implication from an inter-State 
perspective in light of the principle of mutual supportiveness. As a matter of scope, 
the broader debate about the creation of peremptory rules 192  and erga omnes 
obligations193 in the context of international environmental law is not considered.  
One of the initial recognitions of collective obligation is made by the ICJ in its 
advisory opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide. 194  By contrasting bilateral approach that speaks of 
“individual advantages or disadvantages to States” and “the maintenance of a perfect 
contractual balance between rights and duties”, with the underlying objects of the 
Genocide Convention, the ICJ concluded that, “in such a convention the contracting 
States do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common 
interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'être 
of the convention.”195 Based on this recognition, the late Special Rapporteur Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice has suggested two sets of obligations under multilateral treaties: A) 
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reciprocal obligations that provide for “a mutual interchange of benefits between 
Parties, and B) integral obligations whose force is “self-existent, absolute and 
inherent”, which must be applied integrally. 196  The former can be compared to 
obligations constructed under a contract and the latter, because that they are concluded 
for collective interests, are binding erga omnes partes.197 
The above quotation from the ICJ illustrates the collective nature of human 
rights obligations. Twenty years later, the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case further 
articulates that some human rights obligations are indeed erga omnes. That is, they are 
owned “towards the international community as a whole” and “by their nature, are the 
concern of all States”.198 One example, according to the ICJ in the East Timor case in 
1995, is the right to self-determination.199  Additionally, human rights obligations 
distinctively focus on intra-State relations between States and its individuals. From the 
perspective of the European Commission of Human Rights, the obligations undertaken 
by Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights “are essentially of an 
objective characteristic”, which are established to “protect fundamental rights of 
individual human beings” rather than to create “subjective and reciprocal rights” for 
Parties themselves.200 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights also has elaborated 
this intra-State dimension in one of its advisory opinions, “in concluding these human 
rights treaties, the States can be deemed to submit themselves to a legal order within 
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which they, for the common good, assume various obligations, not in relations to other 
States, but towards all individuals within their jurisdiction”.201  
In the Nagoya Protocol, the realisation of the treaty objectives relies greatly on 
the reciprocal relationship between the provider and user Parties, incentivised by MAT 
on transferring GR for agreed monetary or non-monetary benefits.202 However, in 
parallel to such economic instruments and bilateral approaches, there are collective 
interests of Parties—the raison d'être of biodiversity conservation that provides 
normative grounds for the ABS framework.203 Specifically, biodiversity conservation 
is established by the CBD as a “common concern of humankind”; therefore, the CBD 
is endowed with obligations that are binding erga omnes partes vis-à-vis biodiversity 
conservation. Because the Nagoya Protocol is to implement the third objective of the 
CBD—fair and equitable sharing of the benefit arising from the utilisation of genetic 
resources—and thereby contributing to the conservation of biodiversity and 
sustainable use of its components, it is also inherently linked to the goal of biodiversity 
conservation that is the “common concern of humankind”. This collective 
characteristic of obligations under the Nagoya Protocol could be supported by its 
triggering construction of the compliance mechanism, in which any Party may initiate 
the procedures with respect to another Party and the Secretariat may submit 
information for a Committee trigger in defence of the common interest. Thus, I argue 
that a broader interest in the treaty compliance exists under the international ABS 
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framework rather than just bilateral obligations owed individually as either provider 
or user Parties. In addition, as demonstrated in the previous chapters, Parties of the 
Nagoya Protocol also bear intra-State obligations to ensure fair and equitable benefit-
sharing of ILCs and that access to their GR and TK are subject to ILCs’ PIC.  
Thus, arguably, the Nagoya Protocol entails obligations that are similar in 
nature with some human rights obligations in the sense that they are established for 
the collective interests of the international community and that an intra-State 
dimension is included. These obligations could be binding erga omnes partes because 
they have transcend the sphere of bilateral relations of State Parties and are established 
for wider common interests. In particular, they include obligations that relate directly 
to conserving biodiversity, for instance, obligations to “create conditions to promote 
and encourage research which the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity”, 204  to “encourage users and providers to direct benefits…towards the 
conservations of biological diversity…”, 205  and to consider a global multilateral 
benefit-sharing mechanism.206 They may also include obligations to regulate access to 
and benefit-sharing of GR and associated TK,207 whose potential role to contribute to 
biodiversity conservation is explicitly recognised in the Preamble of the Nagoya 
Protocol. Furthermore, it may also include Parties’ obligation to ensure fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing of ILCs who live within their territories, on the basis that 
FPIC and benefit-sharing are part and parcel of ILCs’ fundamental human rights 
pertaining to their land, resources and culture.208 
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3.2.2 Inter-State litigation 
The traditional legal consequence follow such a distinction of bilateral and erga omnes 
partes obligations relates to the right to invoke State responsibility—how a State could 
be held responsible for a breach of its international obligation. It is an important aspect 
of nature of States’ responsibility, even though, as demonstrated by Birnie and others, 
judicial remedies are rarely sought in MEAs in practice. 209  The theory of State 
responsibility was attributed in the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles) by the International Law Commission 
(ILC) in August 2001.210 For erga omnes partes obligations, the ILC Draft Articles 
provide that any State (injured or not) is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another 
State if the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State and 
established for the protection of a collective interest of the group.211 This approach 
also manifests in the ICJ Statute establishing the procedures, which asserts, “whenever 
the construction of a convention to which states other than those concerned in the case 
are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such states” and “every state 
party so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings”. 212  According to 
Crawford’s commentary to the Draft Articles, the standard example of such collective 
obligations are those concerning the environment or security of a region.213  
In light of the collective nature of human rights obligations, any State may have 
legal standing to bring proceedings before an international court in cases of violation 
of erga omnes human rights on the ground that the obligations are owed to the 
international community as a whole. They may also bring proceedings concerning erga 
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omnes partes obligations on the ground that the obligations are owed to the particular 
group of States. Thus, if certain obligations under the international ABS framework 
could be established as erga omnes partes obligations, any State may invoke the 
responsibility of another State according to the Draft Articles. This possibility would 
have a significant impact, considering that the CBD has 196 Parties and the Nagoya 
Protocol has 117 Parties.214 Having said that, this approach is also limited by the fact 
that only States, not the individuals or communities whose rights are violated, have 
standing to invoke State responsibilities in front of international judicial organs, for 
instance, the ICJ. 215 In addition to the various ways for seeking quasi-judicial remedies 
at the international level as discussed in the previous section 3.1, there is also extensive 
scholarly literature on actio popularis litigations—to have States defending injured 
groups by acting on behalf of them and invoke state responsibility of other States 
within their capabilities.216 Admittedly, there is a question mark on the practicality and 
effectiveness of actio popularis litigation for both human rights and ABS issues.217 
Fundamentally, inter-State procedure and litigation is not a popular choice for States 
on international plane. At the time of writing, there have been only 10 inter-State cases 
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submitted before the European Court of Human Rights,218 while no inter-State dispute 
regarding a violation of human rights treaty obligation has ever been referred to a UN 
treaty body.219  
Finally, it is necessary to note that the traditional approach to deal with breach 
of multilateral obligations faces many challenges especially under international 
environmental law.220 Nègre has demonstrated that, under the CBD framework, it is 
difficult to identify States’ wrongful acts because damage to biodiversity in many cases 
is “a product of normal development of lawful activities”.221  Furthermore, in the 
context of biodiversity loss, the responsible State and the victim State may be both at 
the same time.222 As Fitzmaurice has argued, special features of the environment have 
resulted in particular solutions, applications or rules, but this does not mean in any way 
that environmental law is separate from the general principles of international law.223 
Thus I argue that even though scholars seem to have agreed to the point that 
sanctioning a State for its wrongdoings is not as preferable or effective as facilitating 
States to comply with their obligations in achieving the common objectives, 224 this 
does not follow that a State would not be held accountable in light of state 
responsibility if its conduct breaches collective obligations.  
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3.2.3 Multilateral accountability in the “softened” compliance mechanism 
Legal scholars including Risse-Kappen, Ropp and others have observed a significant 
change over the past decade in the process by which States and non-State actors 
comply with their human rights commitments and the ways in which they are held 
accountable—from the speaking of “wrongful act” to “situations of non-
compliance”. 225  They argue that a wealth of innovative legal or quasi-legal 
mechanisms have been developed and utilised to promote compliance of international 
human rights laws in additional to traditional judicial enforcement. For example, 
Mégret has demonstrated that both State Parties and human rights judicial bodies are 
increasingly assigned with the role to monitor each other’s behaviour for the ordre 
public and to raise issues of invalidity before the actual dispute takes place.226 Under 
the UN system, various mechanisms also oblige State Party to submit treaty-specific 
reports periodically about their compliance vis-à-vis the nine international human 
rights treaties and two optional protocols.227 Furthermore, Jinks and Goodman have 
pointed out that there is an emerging social approach that aims at creating an 
accommodating and enabling environment for the realisation of human rights, for 
instance, human rights capacity-building projects promoted through UN and other 
public organisations.228 Overall, the underlying idea echoes the one supporting the 
facilitative compliance procedures in MEAs: it is perhaps more efficient to prevent 
                                               
225 Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C. Ropp, ‘Introduction and Overview’ in Thomas Risse-Kappen and others 
(eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: from Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge University Press 
2013) 12. 
226 Mégret (n 95) 92. 
227 UN HRI, 'Compliance by States Parties with Their Reporting Obligations to International Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies' (2 May 2017) UN Doc HRI/MC/2017/2 para 1. 
228 This dimension is more social than legal, based on the recognition of the limits of statehood. See Derek Jinks and 
Ryan Goodman, ‘Social Mechanisms to Promote International Human Rights: Complementary or Contradictory? ’ 
in Thomas Risse-Kappen and others (eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: from Commitment to 
Compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013) 104. 
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violation of rights and address tensions and risks of non-compliance before disputes 
take place.229  
Under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, compliance is ensured through 
institutional arrangements, for instance, the COP/the COP-MOP, where in situ regime 
agreements could be negotiated. Cardesa-Salzmann has observed that measures 
adopted in this context to exercise erga omnes partes obligations often aim at 
facilitating “endogenous enforcement” via non-adversarial and non-confrontational 
means.230 Thus, the Nagoya Protocol and human rights law share a course by which 
multilateral treaty obligations are respected—a “softened” mechanism that is of a 
facilitative and non-adversarial nature. Inevitably, there are worries that this trend 
might harm the vigour of international law, dilute its normative force231 and to the 
worst, it might not work after all.232 However, as empirical evidence has demonstrated, 
the extent to which international human rights laws are complied with, does not only 
depend on States’ commitment and willingness, but also their institutional capacity.233 
In a pragmatic mind-set, it is therefore more probable that compliance mechanisms 
could yield satisfying results through negotiation and facilitation instead of dispute 
settlements or judicial remedies, because the former is more capable of 
accommodating and addressing diverse interests and varying institutional capacities 
among States. In this line, it is worth noting that under the Nagoya Protocol, the Party-
self trigger of a non-compliance issue allows States to submit themselves to 
international assistance and scrutiny; therefore, provides an alternative way for 
                                               
229 See the discussion in the previous section 1.1. 
230 Cardesa-Salzmann (n 11) 105. 
231  Prosper Weill, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’ (1983) 77 (3) American journal of 
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233 Risse-Kappen and Ropp (n 225) 4. 
 Complementarity between the Nagoya Protocol and human rights 
247 
ensuring multilateral accountability in which States Parties are able to hold themselves 
accountable.  
3.2.4 States’ obligation of international cooperation 
The relevance of international human rights is also evident in its implications on States’ 
obligations for international cooperation. According to Article 2 of the ICESCR, each 
State Party needs to “take steps, individually and through international assistance and 
co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means”.234  Elaborating the 
nature of such obligations, the General Comment No.3 points out that, international 
cooperation for development and thus for the realisation of relevant human rights is an 
obligation of all States, which is in particular incumbent upon those States who are in 
a position to assist others.235 Indeed, scholars including Skogly and Vandenhole have 
argued that States shall take responsibility not only towards individuals and groups 
who live in its jurisdiction, but also towards those from other parts of the world.236 In 
April 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment John 
Knox has proposed a series of framework principles on Human Rights and the 
Environment which highlights States’ obligations to cooperate in situations where 
                                               
234 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
3 January 1976], art 2(1). 
235 CESCR, 'General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations' (14 December 1990) UN Doc 
E/1991/23 para 14. 
236 For an overview see Sigrun Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States' Human Rights Obligations in International 
Cooperation (Intersentia 2006) 83. For an analysis of this obligation in the context of Children’s right, see Wouter 
Vandenhole, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the CRC: Is There a Legal Obligation to Cooperate 
Internationally for Development?’ (2009) 17 (1) The International Journal of Children's Rights, 26.  
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environmental issues interferes with the full enjoyment of human rights.237  Knox 
emphasises that such obligation “requires States to work together to address 
transboundary and global threats to human rights”, which are explicitly identified in 
the context of biodiversity conservation.238 Specifically, States are required to take 
action according to their capacities but the obligations must be complied by all States 
in good faith.239 Notably, “specific protections for Indigenous peoples and those in 
vulnerable situations” is called upon when States are to comply with their human rights 
obligations in the context of other international legal frameworks.240  
Under the Nagoya Protocol, international cooperation is emphasised 
throughout the text with respect to, inter alia, capacities for sustainable 
development,241 transboundary ABS issues,242 compliance,243 capacity-building for 
implementing the Protocol especially in developing countries 244  and benefit-
sharing. 245  One example of inter-State cooperation that is being increasingly 
implemented is the domestic compliance measures, as has been demonstrated in light 
of ensuring the inter-operability of the ABS rules of the Nagoya Protocol.246 Thus, it 
is clear that States bear responsibilities to cooperate with one another through 
appropriate means, not only as a human rights principle, but also as treaty obligation 
under the Nagoya Protocol. Knox’s articulation on States’ responsibility for 
                                               
237 Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to 
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international cooperation also paves the way to consider the interconnection between 
human rights and the Nagoya Protocol, using Article 2 of the ICESCR as a legal basis. 
However, more work is needed to clarify how human rights norms apply to specific 
ABS cases and to what extent the obligation to cooperate can be realised in both areas 
of laws while taking into account the requirements of another.  
3.2.5 Human rights implications 
To approach the issue of compliance from an inter-State perspective, the above 
analysis demonstrated that there are possibilities of ensuring States’ compliance via 
inter-State litigation based on the claim of breaching erga omnes partes obligations 
and multilateral accountability under the compliance mechanisms. I argued that a 
broader interest in treaty compliance is evident under the international ABS framework 
and that obligations relating directly to biodiversity conservation and protection of 
IPLCs’ rights could be constructed as obligations that are binding erga omnes partes. 
Thus, both frameworks entail obligations that are established for the collective 
interests and include an important aspect of intra-State obligations towards individual 
and groups who live within States. This argument contributes to the mutually 
supportive interpretation of the Nagoya Protocol and international human rights.  
In the context of inter-State litigation, I demonstrated that there is a possibility 
that States could invoke the responsibility of any other State for a breach of fair and 
equitable benefits-sharing – as an erga omnes partes obligation – before international 
judicial organs. States could also argue that these ABS obligations are established as 
human rights obligations or inherently link to human rights issues. With a sharpened 
focus on IPLCs, since they do not have legal standing to bring proceedings before the 
ICJ, I have also discussed the possibility of actio popularis litigations—to have States 
defending injured groups by acting on behalf of them and invoke state responsibility 
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of other States. In a positive light, the fact that the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol have 
a large number of Parties could enhance the practicality of inter-State litigation. 
However, I also cautioned that there are significant challenges embedded in this 
traditional adversarial approach to deal with breach of multilateral obligations 
especially in international environmental contexts. The fact that inter-State procedure 
and litigation have rarely been sought shall also not be overlooked.  
Under human rights law and the Nagoya Protocol, a “softened” mechanism 
that is of a facilitative and non-adversarial nature is gaining popularity over 
confrontational enforcement measures. The rationale for this phenomenon is based on 
the premise that it is perhaps more efficient to prevent violation of rights and address 
tensions and risks of non-compliance via facilitating States to comply with their 
international obligations rather than speaking of wrongful act and relying on judicial 
enforcement. I also discussed the relevance of the human rights obligation of State to 
cooperate, which is evinced in a number of international human rights instruments as 
well as the Nagoya Protocol. I argue that the fulfilment of this obligation may 
encourage some optimistic changes in respecting IPLCs’ ABS rights and human rights, 
as already manifest in the process of implementing the domestic compliance measures 
for ensuring the “inter-operability” of the ABS framework. Nevertheless, this is an 
area that has been largely neglected by international legal scholars and further research 
is necessary on how and to what extent human rights norms on the obligation to 
cooperate can be realised in both areas of laws while taking into account the 
requirements of another. 
4. Conclusion  
This chapter offers an original examination of the international compliance mechanism 
and domestic compliance measures of the Nagoya Protocol. It highlights the 
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opportunities and challenges embedded in the process of their interpretation and 
implementation vis-à-vis IPLCs. As discussed, the international compliance 
mechanism of the Nagoya Protocol provides an important avenue where non-
adversarial, non-confrontational and facilitative measures are adopted to promote and 
encourage Parties’ compliance and to address cases of non-compliance. With a 
sharpened focus on ILCs, an indirect trigger of the compliance procedures of the 
Nagoya Protocol is present as “directly affected ILCs” could submit information about 
non-compliance to the Compliance Committee. This is significant because it increases 
the level of participation of ILCs in the compliance mechanism of the Nagoya Protocol, 
and meanwhile expands the Committee’s function from, traditionally, only addressing 
non-compliance between Parties, to monitor and address Parties’ compliance with 
their obligations vis-à-vis ILCs. These two characteristics are unprecedented in any 
other environmental treaties at the time of writing. With respect to domestic 
compliance measures, Articles 15-18 of the Nagoya Protocol explicitly impose 
obligations on Parties to regulate user compliance with domestic procedural ABS 
requirements, including ILCs’ PIC and MAT, and to ensure ILCs’ rights of access to 
justice. Although a certain level of protection is established for ILCs and their TK, I 
argued that relying solely on domestic ABS legislative authority to address GR and 
TK renders too much discretion to State governments and risks the potential of 
aggravating the persisting power asymmetries between ILCs and State authorities. In 
both contexts, I highlighted the relevance of international human rights standards and 
suggested that to interpret and implement ABS obligation in light of relevant human 
rights law might be helpful to address the cross-cutting issues with respect to Parties’ 
intra-State obligation owed towards ILCs as well as interpretative ambiguities of the 
ABS rules of the Nagoya Protocol.  
This chapter unpacked the human rights implications on compliance-related 
provisions of the Nagoya Protocol from two perspectives: the IPLCs’ human right of 
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access to justice and an inter-State perspective through the lens of State Parties’ 
obligations. The human right of access to justice is essential for substantiating and 
enforcing IPLCs’ fundamental human rights and also helpful to elaborate the 
opportunities and risks embedded in understanding Parties’ obligation of ensuring 
access to justice of IPLCs under the Nagoya Protocol. I demonstrated that the human 
rights norm of access to justice could contribute to clarifying Parties’ ABS obligations 
that they are obliged to effectively facilitate access to justice for IPLCs to courts, 
tribunals and other non-judicial remedies. Meanwhile, I explored the possible ways for 
realising the right of access to justice at both international and domestic levels, 
including regional human rights courts, international treaty bodies, ICJ and its advisory 
opinions and domestic tribunals. Their relevance and the practicality for IPLCs to seek 
a remedy for violations of their ABS rights depend on the legal recognition of IPLCs’ 
human rights and is limited by a range of administrative factors, such as standing and 
admissibility.  
From an inter-State perspective, I demonstrated the possibilities of ensuring 
States’ compliance via inter-State litigation based on the claim of breaching erga 
omnes partes obligations and multilateral accountability under the compliance 
mechanisms. This is based on the observation that obligations relating directly to 
biodiversity conservation and protection of IPLCs’ rights have indeed transcended the 
sphere of bilateral relations of the State Parties. These obligations are established for 
the wider common interests of States; therefore, are binding erga omnes partes. 
Specifically, I examined the possibilities where States could invoke the responsibility 
of any other State for a breach of fair and equitable benefits-sharing—as an erga omnes 
partes obligation—before international judicial organs, or defend injured groups by 
acting on their behalf—actio popularis litigations. These options remain possible but 
have rarely been carried out. Furthermore, I observed a shared trend of favouring a 
“softened” mechanism that is of a facilitative and non-adversarial nature in both human 
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rights law and the Nagoya Protocol. Indeed, this approach might be more efficient to 
prevent non-compliance via facilitation rather than confrontational measures and 
judicial enforcement.  
A mutually supportive interpretation could attribute greater legal significance 
to the ABS principles and standards of the Nagoya Protocol by enhancing its relevance 
and enforceability at both international and domestic levels. In turn, the accelerated 
progress of implementing ABS compliance measures and new opportunities for 
strengthening IPLCs’ participation in the context of compliance could also contribute 
to better realising IPLCs’ human rights of access to justice and safeguarding many 
other fundamental rights with respect to their lands, natural resources and culture. 
Finally, I suggested that further research is needed in order to fully unravel the 
potential of interpreting and implementing the Nagoya Protocol in light of human 
rights standards. For example, it is worth asking how court systems and quasi-judicial 
mechanisms could be directed and designed to promote equal and affordable 
accessibility to justice, and what the role and function of IPLCs’ customary laws and 











This research project has sought to provide a pragmatic account of how the Nagoya 
Protocol could be interpreted and implemented in light of international human rights 
law based on the principle of systemic integration and mutual supportiveness of 
international law. It has contributed a timely and thorough scrutiny of the Nagoya 
Protocol and its current implementation with a primary focus on Indigenous peoples 
and local communities (IPLCs). It has articulated the extent to which the human rights 
of IPLCs may be applicable in the access and benefit-sharing (ABS) context of the 
Nagoya Protocol and how these two branches of international law may complement 
each other in realising their respective objectives, developing what is currently very 
minimal literature on the exact application of the principle of mutual supportiveness 
at the interface between international environmental law and human rights law. This 
final chapter discusses the key findings of this thesis and their relevance, in response 
to the research questions set out in chapter one. It also suggests some potential avenues 
for further research.  
1. Key findings and their relevance 
1.1 What are, and what are the purpose of, the principles of systemic integration 
and mutual supportiveness? 
The principles of systemic integration and mutual supportiveness are emerging 
principles that guide the interpretation and implementation of international law. Their 
legal implications and scope remain an unsettled debate for international legal scholars, 
judges and lawyers. However, as discussed in chapter one, it has become a regular 
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occurrence on international fora that different branches of international law should be 
interpreted and implemented in a systemic and mutually supportive manner, especially 
in between the fields concerning trade and environment protection, biodiversity 
conservation, sustainable development and human rights. It is clear from the literature 
that the questions of systemic integration and mutual supportiveness have a doctrinal 
dimension on solving potentially conflicting legal norms or harmonising the 
“fragmented” international law.1 Nevertheless, they speak beyond merely doctrinal 
matters—as demonstrated in the thesis, the principle could also shed light on 
addressing practical challenges in interpreting and implementing treaty norms and 
standard setting at both international and domestic levels. Much has been written about 
how international trade law should be mutually supportive with environmental law, or 
how international law-making on intellectual property rights (IPRs) should consider 
and address the issue of traditional knowledge (TK).2 In contrast, the interface between 
international environmental law and international human rights law remains an under-
studied field. This is in particular the case with IPLCs, whose cultural integrity and 
ways of life rely on the natural environment yet whose fundamental human rights 
relating to lands and resources are consistently under threat. Thus, the point of 
departure is, as Fitzmaurice has argued, “special features of the environment have 
resulted in particular solutions, applications or rules, but this does not mean in any way 
that environmental law is separate from the general principles of international law”.3 
                                               
1 Riccardo Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: A Watershed for the 
‘WTO-and-Competing-Regimes’ Debate?’ (2010) 21 (3) European Journal Of International Law, 661 and ILC, 
'Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law' (13 April 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 8. 
2  Pavoni (n 1) 661, Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge 
(Earthscan 2004) 3, Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property, Indigenous People and their Knowledge (Cambridge 
University Press 2014) 108 and Johanna Gibson, Community Resources: Intellectual Property, International Trade, 
and Protection of Traditional Knowledge (Routledge 2016) 185. 
3 Malgosia A. Fitzmaurice, ‘International Environmental Law as a Special Field’ (1994) 25 Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, 183. 
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For this thesis, the multifaceted challenges facing global biodiversity conservation and 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing with IPLCs determine that the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) and its Nagoya Protocol cannot be interpreted and 
implemented in isolation from international human rights standards. 
1.2 What are the strengths and limitations of the Nagoya Protocol in protecting 
IPLCs’ rights? 
This question is dealt with in chapters two to four under the theme of access, benefit-
sharing and compliance respectively. In general, I observed that the Nagoya Protocol 
envisages a comprehensive set of obligations for State Parties to ensure fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing with IPLCs. Specifically, chapter two articulated State 
Parties’ responsibilities to ensure GR and TK held by IPLCs are obtained with their 
prior informed consent (PIC) and in accordance with their customary laws and 
community protocols. Chapter three looked into the requirements of benefit-sharing 
that fair and equitable terms (often as contractual terms) of benefit-sharing must be 
negotiated with IPLCs and State Parties are obliged to facilitate IPLCs in this process 
through means such as capacity-building so that the negotiation is also on a fair and 
equitable basis. 4  As demonstrated in chapter four, the Nagoya Protocol 
unprecedentedly includes IPLCs in its international compliance mechanism and 
provides them with an “indirect trigger” of the compliance procedures through the 
Compliance Committee, which is traditionally only available for State Parties. In 
reality, the Nagoya Protocol is facilitating a normative shift as States commit 
themselves to ABS principles and undertake legislative and policy duties to transpose 
ABS rules into their domestic systems. Consequentially, practices of access to and 
utilisation of IPLCs’ GR and TK are subject to specific procedures and substantive 
                                               
4 These requirements have been articulated through various voluntary guidelines adopted by the COP decisions. See 
the discussion in section 1.4.1 of chapter three. 
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requirements. Against this background, the Nagoya Protocol contributes to 
safeguarding IPLC’s rights pertaining to their natural resources and knowledge, as well 
as to their customary laws and thus cultural integrity.  
However, as have been discussed throughout the chapters, there persist 
interpretative ambiguity and practical challenges in applying the Nagoya Protocol at 
both the international and domestic levels. Legal uncertainty is often a result of 
different possibilities of interpreting the operative provisions, especially with the 
frequently used qualifiers such as “as appropriate”, “with the aim of ensuring” and “in 
accordance with domestic law”. As discussed in chapter two, this deliberate flexibility 
for States’ interpretation and implementation reflects the principle recognised in the 
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol that States have sovereign rights over their natural 
resources thus the authority to determine how their GR may be accessed, what benefit 
should be shared and under what condition. However, I argued that this approach poses 
risk of undermining IPLCs’ rights over their GR and TK, as it suggests that IPLCs’ 
rights are subsidiary to domestic recognition. Therefore, the fundamental limitation of 
the Nagoya Protocol is embedded in the risk that IPLCs’ ABS rights might be 
neglected or rejected if they live in countries where there is no applicable ABS rules 
or no legal recognition of their status as holder of GR and TK. Allowing too much 
discretion on State governments, as argued in chapter four, might aggravate the 
persisting power asymmetry among IPLCs, State authorities and multinational 
corporations. It would put IPLCs in a vulnerable and passive position to fully 
participate in the ABS process or claim fair and equitable benefit-sharing. 
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1.3 What are the relevant human rights of IPLCs in the ABS context and what 
are their implications on States’ obligations vis-à-vis IPLCs?  
The Nagoya Protocol concerns GR and TK; therefore, its ABS principles and rules 
interlink and interact with human rights norms regulating lands and natural resources, 
intellectual property, as well as issues of Indigenous and traditional ownership over 
such resources and knowledge, and more broadly their cultural identities and ways of 
life. In chapters two to four, I surveyed substantive human rights of IPLCs of self-
determination, equality and non-discrimination, property, development, culture and 
access to justice, as well as procedural human rights of free, prior, informed consent 
(FPIC), consultation, impact assessment and those pertaining to their customary laws. 
The discussion of the relevance of these human rights to ABS has been situated in the 
contexts of access, benefit-sharing and compliance, but it is clear that these rights of 
IPLCs are intrinsically intertwined and inseparable. In fact, the contemporary 
international human rights law has become the dominant rubric for pursuing the rights 
of IPLCs and shaping States’ obligations,5 even though the normative grounds, nature 
and contents of these rights still face controversies. International human rights law 
imposes obligations on States to respect, protect and fulfil IPLCs’ human rights. The 
principle of systemic integration and mutual supportiveness requires these obligations 
to be fulfilled in all circumstances, including when interpreting and implementing the 
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. Specifically, in chapter two, I argued that the principle 
of States’ sovereign rights over natural resources is neither absolute nor unconditional 
but takes shape as a human rights obligation, as required by the right of internal self-
determination, to exercise States’ sovereign rights for promoting national development 
and well-being of all its peoples. Evident in an expansive body of judicial and quasi-
                                               
5 See the discussion of the history and contemporary development of international law with respect to IPLCs in section 
2.1.2 of chapter one. Also see S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Second edn, Oxford 
University Press 2004) 66 and Karen Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, 
Strategy (Duke University Press 2010) 46. 
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judicial practices, States are also required to fulfil IPLCs’ participatory rights by 
ensuring FPIC and consultations before granting concession to projects that might 
affect IPLCs’ rights.6 In chapter three, I argued that the normative standards of fairness 
and equity under the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol are akin to equality and non-
discrimination as established in human rights law, which implies that States should 
eliminate any discriminatory measures and to ensure de jure equality in order to 
achieve fair outcome. The property rights of IPLCs to their lands, territories, natural 
resources and TK also speak to States obligations of ensuring benefit-sharing—a 
linkage that has been increasingly substantiated by regional human rights courts.7 In 
the context of compliance, States’ obligation to respect IPLCs’ right of access to justice 
could strengthen the ABS obligation as envisaged in Article 18 of the Nagoya Protocol 
that States should endeavour to develop legislative and administrative means to 
facilitate access to justice for IPLCs to courts, tribunals and other non-judicial 
remedies. 
1.4 Can Nagoya Protocol and human rights be mutually supportive in protecting 
the rights of IPLCs? 
Higgins has suggested that international law should be perceived as “a normative 
system and a process rather than as rules”.8 This perception of international law lays 
the cornerstone for the premise that the Nagoya Protocol should not be interpreted or 
implemented in isolation from international human rights law. As discussed in chapter 
one, Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
provides key criteria of applying the principle of systemic integration in the process of 
treaty interpretation. Specifically, to establish what the “relevant rules” are and to 
which “Parties” the relevant rules may apply, have proved to be the key issues that 
                                               
6 See the discussion in section 2.2 of chapter two.  
7 See the discussion about case law in section 2.3.2 of chapter three. 
8 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press 1994) 8. 
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need to be addressed in adopting the principle of systemic interpretation. The value of 
a broad and inclusive approach to determine these key terms is discussed in chapter 
one, although the extent to which this principle has been adopted by international 
tribunals is indeed rather inconsistent. In terms of the principle of mutual 
supportiveness, its implications in both interpretative and law-making dimensions are 
attracting more and more scholarly attention with a positive potential in guiding the 
law-making process in international law.9 As discussed, the impacts of this principle 
manifest in the current negotiating processing of revising the TRIPS Agreement so 
that its rules on the patentability of GR and TK is in accordance with the ABS 
requirements under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. In light of a broad 
understanding of the principles of systemic integration and mutual supportiveness, 
human rights principles and standards that concern IPLCs are relevant rules not only 
Parties of the Nagoya Protocol, but also Parties of the CBD; because it is an integral 
and imperative part of the contemporary international legal system.10 Parties of the 
Nagoya Protocol need to take into account their human rights obligations also 
because a treaty needs to be interpreted "in good faith".11 The analysis of specific 
human rights in the chapters two to four showed that the exact application of the 
relevant human rights rules may vary from case to case. 12  
In practice, the extent to which the ABS rules may be complementary with 
IPLCs' human rights is influenced by the political willingness of Parties to endorse the 
implications of international human rights law in an ABS context. As discussed in 
chapter three, IPLCs' representatives have long fought for explicit and comprehensive 
                                               
9 Pavoni (n 1) 655. 
10 Manfred Nowak, Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime (Nijhoff 2003) 9. 
11 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980] 1155 UNTS 
331, art 31(1). 
12 For instance, the different approach to determining the applicable rules in the 1998 US-Shrimp case and the 2006 
EC-Biotech case, see discussion in section 2.2.2 of chapter one. 
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recognition of IPLCs' human rights under the CBD framework. In response, 
State governments only begin to do so rather recently, while making considerable legal 
and technical reservations. 13  Meanwhile, the judicial interpretation of a mutually 
supportive interpretation of States’ obligations imposed by international human rights 
law and environmental law may support the integration of the human rights of IPLCs 
into interpreting and implementing the Nagoya Protocol. Specifically, in the 
remarkable Kaliña and Lokono case, the Inter-American Court of Human Right cross-
referenced States’ obligations under the CBD to support its interpretation of human 
rights and highlighted the relevance of the Nagoya Protocol, even though the State 
concerned was not a Party to the Protocol. This kind of judicial practice upholds 
the value and feasibility of a mutually supportive interpretation, underpinned by the 
rationale that ABS rights are part and parcel of human rights of IPLCs. 
1.5 What are the normative and practical implications of the principles of 
systemic integration and mutual supportiveness? 
This question is central to the thesis’s contribution. Chapters two to four have 
approached it from two perspectives, asking how human rights may complement the 
interpretation and implementation of the Nagoya Protocol and vice versa. Looking at 
the Nagoya Protocol through the prism of human rights, I argued that the integration 
of international human rights could strengthen the normative ground and procedural 
significance of the ABS rules and mechanisms of the Nagoya Protocol. In particular, 
chapters two and three identified that substantive human rights, such as the property 
rights of IPLCs towards their lands and resources, could provide a much stronger 
normative ground for imposing procedural obligations on States such as consultation, 
FPIC and benefit-sharing. For instance, in the context of intra-State benefit-sharing 
                                               
13  CBD COP Decision XII/12, 'Article 8(j) and related Provisions' (13 October 2014) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XII/12 sec F. See the discussion in section 1.2.2 of chapter three. 
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with IPLCs, such obligations mean that States need to take positive measures to 
recognise the customary laws of IPLCs in controlling and using their natural resources 
and TK, as well as their perception of fairness and equity in benefit-sharing terms. 
Furthermore, I demonstrated on various occasions that the human rights standards 
could invalidate the narrow reading of the Nagoya Protocol and limit States Parties’ 
discretion to interpret and implement the ABS provisions according to their own 
political preferences or legislative conveniences. For instance, the human rights 
standards on FPIC could invalidate the narrow reading of Article 6 on PIC in the sense 
that IPLCs’ rights to grant FPIC is not just an extrinsic normative creation by States, 
but an intrinsic right derived from the identity of such peoples and communities.14 In 
addition, I argued that international human rights principles and standards could help 
to set the benchmark for interpreting and implementing the ABS rules of the Nagoya 
Protocol, especially when they overlap and/or conflict with human rights requirements 
or remain implicit.15 For example, the human rights principle of non-discrimination 
and equality requires gender equality, as well as equal and fair treatment of those 
vulnerable to discriminatory and unfair customary rules within IPLCs--issues touched 
upon by the Protocol but remain ambiguous.16 Finally, with respect to access to justice, 
chapter four surveyed the possibilities where IPLCs could rely on human rights 
mechanisms to seek remedies for violations of their ABS rights. Under jurisdictions 
where procedural requirements such as FPIC and benefit-sharing have been explicitly 
recognised as integral safeguards for realising IPLCs’ human rights, there is indeed an 
                                               
14 See the discussion in section 3.2.4 of chapter two.  
15 Elisa Morgera, ‘The Need for an International Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing’ (2016) 27 (2) 
European Journal Of International Law, 355. 
16 See the discussion on gender inequality that might be embodied in IPLCs’ traditional practices and customs in 
section 2.1 of chapter three. See also, Susan Moller Okin, ‘Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions’ (1998) 
108 (4) Ethics, 664 and Sandra Lovelace v Canada [30 July 1981] (HRC) UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977 166. 
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opportunity for IPLCs to bring ABS claims to human rights judicial bodies and seek 
for domestic enforcement.17  
In terms of how the ongoing process of interpreting and implementing the 
Nagoya Protocol may contribute to human rights law, I argued that the ongoing 
international and domestic implementation of the Nagoya Protocol could help to 
contextualise the realisation of IPLCs’ human rights and give teeth to international 
human rights law. Specifically, it could provide particular contexts, timely normative 
guidance and practical evidence on how to transpose human rights standards into 
feasible agendas of States governments and private entities with respect to utilising 
GR and TK and fair and equitable benefit-sharing. For instance, the detailed procedural 
guidance for negotiating and implementing benefit-sharing terms in accordance with 
IPLCs’ customary laws could complement the realisation of IPLCs’ right to lands and 
resources, development and culture. Furthermore, the Nagoya Protocol bears great 
potential to inform the jurisprudential interpretations of international human rights 
norms, as well as the development of new human rights instruments and standards, 
especially with respect to IPLCs.18 The ABS rules of the Nagoya Protocol also could 
help to expand the focus of traditional human rights mechanisms from coercion and 
infringement of States vis-à-vis IPLCs, to the emerging tension between IPLCs and 
powerful multinational companies.19 In addition, State Parties could demonstrate their 
compliance with human rights obligations by acting in accordance with ABS laws, for 
instance, to recognise ILCs’ customary laws and to ensure consultation, FPIC and 
                                               
17 For instance, under the jurisdiction of the Human Right Committee, the Inter-America Court of Human Right and 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, see the discussion in section 3.1 of chapter four. 
18 See various case law discussed in chapters two to four and the normative developments under the international 
human rights law. See also, Elisa Morgera, ‘Under the Radar: Fair and Equitable Benefit-sharing and the Human 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities related to Natural Resources’ (2019) (Online) International 
Journal of Human Rights, 4. 




benefit-sharing. Finally, I argued that the domestic implementation of the Nagoya 
Protocol, especially by making them applicable in national courts, could render 
substantive power to not only ABS principles and standards, but also relevant human 
rights of IPLCs. For instance, among emerging national ABS legislation and policies, 
many EU countries such as the Netherlands, France and Germany, have incorporated 
ABS compliance rules into their national civil and criminal laws; therefore, made the 
norms of the Nagoya Protocol domestically judiciable and enforceable. Such domestic 
implementation could give teeth to the internationally recognised human rights values 
and principles, especially of those “soft” human rights instrument like UNDRIP.  
Thus, a mutually supportive interpretation could contribute to alleviating the 
potential clash of cultures, national policies, enforcement strategies and normative 
conflicts, generated from the multilateral law-making processes and the varying 
degrees of national implementation. The principle of mutual supportiveness is 
therefore essential for achieving the respective goals of international legal frameworks 
and harmonising the common principles and procedural requirements in protecting 
IPLCs’ rights over their lands, territories, natural resources and TK. 
1.6 What are the limitations of applying the principles of systemic integration and 
mutual supportiveness in bridging the gaps between the Nagoya Protocol and 
the international human rights law?  
This question is necessary because the principles of systemic integration and mutual 
supportiveness need to be appraised critically. As discussed in chapter four, in general, 
factors including the ambiguity of treaty language, States’ lack of capacity and/or 
willingness to comply with their obligations and the time lags between a State’s 
commitment and performance, might limit or undermine mutually supportive 
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interpretation and implementation.20 There is also limitation on forming a perspective 
of the potential synergies between international environmental law and human rights 
law relying on the “soft” law instruments—declarations, voluntary guidelines and 
decisions adopted by the CBD Parties, and views issued by quasi-judicial bodies such 
as the UN human rights treaty bodies, because they are not of a binding force for 
States.21 Furthermore, the value of systematic integration and mutual supportiveness 
might be questioned by scholars who request empirical data to demonstrate the actual 
effectiveness of a treaty regime.22 It is true that these are all valid criticisms and each 
of them merits a further inquiry into topics concerning, for instance, the status and 
significance of “soft” international law23 and the exact approach taken at the domestic 
level by courts and tribunals towards international binding and non-binding norms, 
and the methods to evaluate the performance of International norms in national and 
local contexts.24 These questions could be pursued in future research. 
2. Further research 
During the course of this research, I have touched upon several issues but due to the 
scope and the focus of this thesis, I did not discuss them in detail. This section thus 
                                               
20  Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements (Harvard University Press 1998) 15 and Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes, ‘On Compliance’ 
(1993) 47 (2) International Organization, 175. 
21 See conclusions in Christof H. Heyns and Frans Viljoen (eds), The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights 
Treaties on the Domestic Level (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2002) 31 and James Crawford, ‘The UN Human 
Rights Treaty System: A System in Crisis?’ in Philip Alston and James Crawford (eds), The Future of UN Human 
Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge University Press 2000) 2. 
22 See in general, Oona A. Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?’ (2002) 111 (8) Yale Law 
Journal, 2020, Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties’ (2003) 14 (1) 
European Journal Of International Law, 172 and Oona A. Hathaway, ‘Why Do Countries Commit to Human 
Rights Treaties?’ (2007) 51 (4) Journal of Conflict Resolution, 588. 
23 Alan E. Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 210. 
24 See essays in Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic 
Courts: Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence (Oxford University Press 2016) 1. 
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aims to highlight the relevance of these issues for further research. There are three key 
avenues of interests.  
The first avenue is the question about human rights obligations of non-State 
actors, especially those of multinational corporations. On a few occasions, I mentioned 
the important role of multinational corporations in the ABS processes, not only in 
obtaining FPIC from IPLCs or State authorities and establishing fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing terms, but also in ensuring compliance with the ABS rules of the 
Nagoya Protocol. 25  In international human rights discourse, the literature on an 
extension of human rights responsibilities from States to non-State actors is growing, 
especially based on the recognition of the increasing power and influence of 
multinational corporations in international economic and social affairs.26 A number of 
initiatives at the UN level has emerged, including the UN's Global Compact,27 and the 
international process of standard setting vis-à-vis business and human rights is 
accelerating.28 For instance, under the auspices of the Human Rights Council, the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights for implementing the UN’s 
                                               
25 See the discussion in section 1.3 of chapter three and section 2 of chapter four. Also see Edith B. Weiss and Harold 
K. Jacobson (eds), Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords 
(MIT Press 1998) 545. 
26 Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights and Multinationals: Is there a Problem?’ (2001) 77 (1) International Affairs, 
31, Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press 2006) 195, John 
Gerard Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda’ (2007) 101 (4) American 
journal of international law, 819 and essays in Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations of 
Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge University Press 2013) 1. 
27 See Jennifer Clapp, ‘Global Environmental Governance for Corporate Responsibility and Accountability’ (2005) 5 
(3) Global Environmental Politics, 23 and Stefan Fritsch, ‘The UN Global Compact and the Global Governance of 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Complex Multilateralism for a More Human Globalisation?’ (2008) 22 (1) Global 
Society, 1. 
28 Jordan J. Paust, ‘Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations’ (2002) 35 (3) Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, 802 and Denis G. Arnold, ‘Corporations and Human Rights Obligations’ (2016) 1 (2) Business 
and Human Rights Journal, 267. 
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“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework was adopted in 201129 and the zero draft 
of a legally binding instrument addressing business and human rights was released in 
July 2018. 30  However, the content and nature of corporations’ human rights 
obligations are still subject to intense debate.31 Continuing in the light of systemic 
integration and mutual supportiveness, this raises the question of how the 
responsibility of multinational corporations might be addressed at the interface of 
international human rights law and international environmental law when the core 
business practices of the corporation concern exploitation of natural resources, 
especially those conducted on IPLCs’ lands and territories.32 Considering the fact that 
multinational corporations possess the resources to be capable of both being “evil” (e.g. 
causing environmental harm) and “good” (e.g. contributing to sustainable 
development), it is worthwhile to pursue, how the intricacies of establishing and 
elaborating corporations’ responsibility to respect the human rights of IPLCs may 
inform the debate about the accountability of multinational corporations in 
international environmental law. 33  Again, the Nagoya Protocol could be a good 
                                               
29 Human Rights Council, 'Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework' (21 March 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 anx. 
30  The Human Rights Council created an Intergovernmental Working Group to elaborate a “legally binding 
instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises” in 2014. See Human Rights Council, 'Res 26/9 Elaboration of An International Legally 
Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights' 
(14 July 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/9 para 1 and Human Rights Council, Zero Draft 
16.7.2018)https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf> 
accessed 16/07/2019. 
31 See essays in Philip Alston (ed), Non-state Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2005) 203, Robert 
McCorquodale and Penelope Simons, ‘Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial 
Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law’ (2007) 70 (4) Modern Law Review, 598 and 
Arnold (n 28) 267. 
32 For an overview of the cross-fertilisation between international human rights and biodiversity law with regard to 
business responsibility to respect the human rights in the context of ABS, see Morgera (n 18) 22. 
33 André Nollkaemper, ‘Responsibility of Transnational Corporations in International Environmental Law: Three 
Perspectives’ in Gerd Winter (ed), Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Change: Perspectives from 
Science, Sociology and the Law (Cambridge University Press 2006) 179 and Jennifer A. Zerk, Multinationals and 
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example for this work because of the various ways in which its ABS rules envisage 
the responsibility of private entities and the integration of private law in ensuring 
compliance with treaty norms, for instance, the use of mutually agreed terms (MAT) 
for negotiating and ensuring benefit-sharing.34 In any event, we have seen how the 
requirements of international environmental law and human rights law intertwine with 
each other. The responsibilities of multinational corporations to exercise due diligence 
vis-à-vis human rights in the ABS context may be a useful avenue to bridge these two 
branches of international law from another perspective. 
Furthermore, I set out at the beginning of the thesis that this research aims to 
provide a pragmatic account of treaty interpretation rather than a theoretical reflection. 
The question of theory, however, is an important means of furthering the 
understanding of systemic integration and mutual supportiveness. Different theoretical 
accounts of international law provide diverse answers to what international law is, and 
consequentially, how its interpretation may be guided by the principle of systemic 
integration and mutual supportiveness.35 A further research in this direction may help 
to reconcile the increasingly fragmented discipline of international law—with “general 
principles” encompassing issues such as the sources of law, jurisdiction and States’ 
responsibility, and “fields of application” including international trade, environment 
and human rights. 36 A theoretical account of systemic integration and mutual 
supportiveness may also have important implications for protecting IPLCs, as their 
                                               
Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2006) 198. 
34 See the discussion in section 1.3.2 of chapter three. 
35 Boyle and Chinkin (n 23) 10. 
36 See the discussion in section 2.2 of chapter one about the fragmentation of international law. Also see Martti 
Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’ (2002) 15 (3) Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 554 and essays in Margaret A. Young (ed), Regime Interaction in International Law: 
Facing Fragmentation (Cambridge University Press 2012) 21. 
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rights are formulated differently under different theoretical frameworks.37 This point 
has already been touched upon in chapter two as it discusses the question of the legal 
status of IPLCs’ customary laws and community protocols. In light of legal pluralism, 
the essential question is to what extent IPLCs may be recognised as norm generating 
subjects and how their customary laws intersect with national laws established by State 
authorities.38 As demonstrated, an interpretation of the Nagoya Protocol could not 
provide an answer to this question, although its requirement to recognise IPLCs’ 
customary laws in the ABS transactions may provide evidence of the Nagoya Protocol 
supporting the premises of the theory of legal pluralism.39 In general, the findings of 
this thesis could feed back into the theoretical debate about systemic integration and 
mutual supportiveness of international law, and more broadly, to the contemporary 
development of international law-making.  
Last but not the least, building on the analysis of the issue of gender equality 
in the context of the Nagoya Protocol,40 a salient point that could be developed further 
is how to integrate the human rights protection of women into the broader context of 
international environmental law. The literature has shown that the exclusion of women 
in decision-making on environmental matters and property ownership is strikingly 
common in many domestic and local contexts.41 Yet the plight of women in a world 
                                               
37 For instance, the Third World and the feminist approaches to international law, see Obiora Chinedu Okafor, 
‘Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in Our Time: A Twail Perspective’ (2005) 43 (1 2) 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 171, Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’ (1999) 93 (2) 
American journal of international law, 380 and Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of 
International Law: A Feminist Analysis (Manchester University Press 2000) 1. 
38 Roderick Macdonald and Martha-Marie Kleinhans, ‘What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?’ (1997) 12 (2) Canadian 
Journal of Law and Society, 34. 
39 See discussion in section 2.3 of chapter two. 
40 See the discussion about how the Nagoya Protocol addresses women of ILCs in the ABS context in the previous 
section 2.1.2 of chapter three. 
41 Patricia Kameri-Mbote, ‘Law, Gender and Environmental resources: Women's Access to Environmental Justice in 
East Africa’ in Jonas Ebbesson and Phoebe Okowa (eds), Environmental Law and Justice in Context (Cambridge 
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facing fast environmental degradation has not attracted much attention from 
international lawyers.42 How may international law be constructed to protect both 
women and environment sufficiently? How can we reconcile the norms of gender 
equality at the intersection of IPLCs’ customary laws, national laws and international 
standards? What should be the responsibility of States and multinational corporations 
in promoting gender equality especially in an environmental context? 43  These 
questions link to the previous two avenues of interests and merit further research.  
3. Final remarks 
In answering the research questions this thesis has provided an original analysis of the 
human rights implications of the interpretation and implementation of the Nagoya 
Protocol. It contributes to furthering scholarly research on the interplay between the 
environmental law and the human rights law, articulating the exact application of the 
principle of systemic integration and mutual supportiveness. The focus of this research 
project has been Indigenous peoples, minorities, local communities and women within 
these often-marginalised groups. The aim has been to identify the ways in which their 
fundamental human rights could be fully respected in the ABS context of the Nagoya 
Protocol and the ways in which State Parties could fulfil their ABS obligations in 
                                               
University Press 2009) 399 and Lorenzo Cotula, Gender and Law: Women's Rights in Agriculture (UNFAO 2006) 
21. 
42 See Christopher C. Joyner and George E. Little, ‘It's Not Nice to Fool Mother Nature: The Mystique of Feminist 
Approaches to International Environmental Law’ (1996) 14 (2) Boston University International Law Journal, 228 
and essays in Irene Dankelman (ed), Gender and Climate Change: An Introduction (Earthscan 2010) 1. 
43  The issue of gender equality and women’s rights has been addressed in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, especially through the gender-specific Goal 5 among other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
This might be a potential entry point to consider the human rights obligations of States and other non-State actors in 
protecting women in an environmental context. See Shahra Razavi, ‘The 2030 Agenda: Challenges of 
Implementation to Attain Gender Equality and Women's Rights’ (2016) 24 (1) Gender & Development, 25 and 
Valeria Esquivel and Caroline Sweetman, ‘Gender and the Sustainable Development Goals’ (2016) 24 (1) Gender 
& Development, 1. 
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accordance with international human rights principles and standards. This thesis is 
relevant for structuring an interpretation of the Nagoya Protocol in accordance with 
international human rights law in order to address the multifaceted challenges facing 
IPLCs nowadays. It could also provide jurists, domestic legislators, human rights 
practitioners and NGOs with a more coherent and holistic view for interpreting and 
implementing the Nagoya Protocol and human rights law vis-à-vis IPLCs. Essentially, 
it contributes a pragmatic legal account of the principle of systemic integration and 
mutual supportiveness for realising the original and primary objectives of the 
international environmental law and human rights law—a clean, safe, healthy and 
sustainable environment in which human dignity, justice, fairness and equity are 
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